(en) Robert Barro et David Gordon, « Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy », NBER Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, no w1079, , w1079 (DOI10.3386/w1079, lire en ligne, consulté le )
Alberto Alesina et Lawrence H. Summers, « Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence », Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 25, no 2, , p. 151–162 (ISSN0022-2879, DOI10.2307/2077833, lire en ligne, consulté le )
issn.org
portal.issn.org
Alberto Alesina et Lawrence H. Summers, « Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence », Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 25, no 2, , p. 151–162 (ISSN0022-2879, DOI10.2307/2077833, lire en ligne, consulté le )
jstor.org
Alberto Alesina et Lawrence H. Summers, « Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence », Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 25, no 2, , p. 151–162 (ISSN0022-2879, DOI10.2307/2077833, lire en ligne, consulté le )
nber.org
(en) Robert Barro et David Gordon, « Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy », NBER Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, no w1079, , w1079 (DOI10.3386/w1079, lire en ligne, consulté le )