Elsa Peyrony, « Les pays enclavés et la mer », Cargo Marine, Centre d'études stratégiques de la Marine (France), no 7, , p. 14 p. (lire en ligne [PDF], consulté le ), p. 4, n. 2 [consulté le 7 mai 2017].
doi.org
Xavier Guignard, « « LATTE-ABDALLAH Stéphanie & PARIZOT Cédric, Israelis and Palestinians in the Shadows of the Wall. Spaces of Separation and Occupation, Farnham, Ashgate, 2015, 276 p » », Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, no 143, (DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.9532)
«Immediately after the Likud election victory in 1977, the term Judea and Samaria was formally adopted as official usage instead of the West Bank. The message of the words Judea and Samaria is a message of continuity, while the message of "West Bank," "Occupied Territories" or even "Administered Territories" implies a temporary stage, perhaps presaging a changed territorial status», Saul B. Cohen et Nurit Kliot, « Place-Names in Israel's Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories », Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 82, no 4, , p. 653–680 (ISSN0004-5608, lire en ligne, consulté le )
«Immediately after the Likud election victory in 1977, the term Judea and Samaria was formally adopted as official usage instead of the West Bank. The message of the words Judea and Samaria is a message of continuity, while the message of "West Bank," "Occupied Territories" or even "Administered Territories" implies a temporary stage, perhaps presaging a changed territorial status», Saul B. Cohen et Nurit Kliot, « Place-Names in Israel's Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories », Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 82, no 4, , p. 653–680 (ISSN0004-5608, lire en ligne, consulté le )
Neville Brown, « L'idée d'abandonner la rive occidentale du Jourdain gagne du terrain dans le royaume hachémite », Le Monde diplomatique, , p. 1 et 6 (lire en ligne [html], consulté le ) [consulté le 7 mai 2017].
Bachir Barghouti, « Un Palestinien de Cisjordanie : scepticisme nuancé d'espoir sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain », Le Monde diplomatique, , p. 7 (lire en ligne [html], consulté le ) [consulté le 7 mai 2017].
« L’Assemblée générale de l’ONU a massivement adopté une résolution condamnant l’édification par Israël d’un mur défensif empiétant sur les terres palestiniennes. », RFI, 22 octobre 2003 : [1]
Selon un rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans les territoires palestiniens présenté le par le Rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations unies, « la proportion de terres palestiniennes confisquées par Israël serait d'environ 60 % en Cisjordanie et 33 % dans la bande de Gaza, ainsi que 33 % des superficies palestiniennes à Jérusalem – soit au moins 32,5 km2 –, et ce à des fins publiques, semi-publiques ou privées, dans le but de créer des zones militaires israéliennes, des installations de peuplement, des zones industrielles, des routes de contournement ou des carrières et de mettre des terres sous le contrôle de l’État à l’usage exclusif d’Israël »[2] Rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans les territoires palestiniens occupés depuis 1967, présenté par M. Giorgio Giacomelli, Rapporteur spécial, conformément à la résolution 1993/2 A de la Commission des droits de l'homme], 22 p.— Voir en page 3 du document.
World Bank, « West Bank and Gaza – Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy », World Bank, Washington DC, (consulté le ) : « UNOCHA analysis suggests that less than one percent of the land in Area C is currently available to Palestinians for construction; permit data also shows that it is almost impossible to obtain permission to build in Area C. Less than 6 percent of all requests made between 2000 and 2007 secured approval. This situation applies not only to housing but to public economic infrastructure (roads, water reservoirs, waste treatment plants) and industrial plant, and to the access roads and utility lines needed to connect Areas A and B across Area C. […] The outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 interrupted this trend, bringing increased violence and uncertainty – and most significantly, the intensification by Israel of a complex set of security-related restrictions that impeded the movement of people and goods and fragmented the Palestinian territories into small enclaves lacking economic cohesion. […] Transportation infrastructure is particularly problematic as Palestinian use of roads in Area C is highly restricted, and travel times can be inordinate; the Palestinian Authority has also been unable to develop roads, airports or railways in or through Area C. ».
(en) « West Bank and Gaza – Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy », World Bank, : « While internal Palestinian political divisions have contributed to investor aversion to the Palestinian territories, Israeli restrictions on trade, movement and access are clearly the binding constraint to investment: these restrictions substantially increase the cost of trade and make it impossible to import many production inputs into the Palestinian territories, as illustrated, for instance, on the example of the telecommunications sector. For Gaza, the restrictions on import and export are in particular severe. In addition to the restrictions on labor movement between the Palestinian territories, the restrictions on movement of labor within the West Bank have been shown to have a strong impact on employability, wages, and economic growth. Israeli restrictions render much economic activity very difficult or impossible to conduct on about 61 percent of the West Bank territory, called Area C. Restrictions on movement and access, and the stunted potential of Area C. », p. 2.
« West Bank and Gaza – Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy », World Bank, : « […] assumed that the various physical, legal, regulatory and bureaucratic constraints that currently prevent investors from obtaining construction permits, and accessing land and water resources are lifted, as envisaged under the Interim Agreement. […] It is understood that realizing the full potential of such investments requires other changes as well – first, the rolling back of the movement and access restrictions in force outside Area C, which prevent the easy export of Palestinian products and inhibit tourists and investors from accessing Area C; and second, further reforms by the Palestinian Authority to better enable potential investors to register businesses, enforce contracts, and acquire finance. […] Neglecting indirect positive effects, we estimate that the potential additional output from the sectors evaluated in this report alone would amount to at least USD 2.2 billion per annum in valued added terms – a sum equivalent to 23 percent of 2011 Palestinian GDP. The bulk of this would come from agriculture and Dead Sea minerals exploitation. […] Tapping this potential output could dramatically improve the PA's fiscal position. Even without any improvements in the efficiency of tax collection, at the current rate of tax/GDP of 20 percent the additional tax revenues associated with such an increase in GDP would amount to some USD 800 million. Assuming that expenditures remain at the same level, this extra resource would notionally cut the fiscal deficit by half – significantly reducing the need for donor recurrent budget support. This major improvement in fiscal sustainability would in turn generate significant positive reputational benefits for the PA and would considerably enhance investor confidence. xi. The impact on Palestinian livelihoods would be impressive. An increase in GDP equivalent to 35 percent would be expected to create substantial employment, sufficient to put a significant dent in the currently high rate of unemployment. If an earlier estimated one-to-one relationship between growth and employment was to hold, this increase in GDP would lead to a 35 percent increase in employment. This level of growth in employment would also put a large dent in poverty, as recent estimates show that unemployed Palestinians are twice as likely to be poor as their employed counterparts. », viii.
openknowledge.worldbank.org
(en) « West Bank and Gaza - Investment Climate Assessment : Unlocking the Potential of the Private Sector », Groupe de la Banque mondiale (rapport), (lire en ligne, consulté le )
