(en) Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Church Committee, 20 novembre 1975, pp. 4-5 [lire en ligne] [PDF]
(en) Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Church Committee, 20 novembre 1975, p. 7 [lire en ligne] [PDF]
(en) Reports : II. Section B Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation, Church Committee, 20 novembre 1975, p. 11 [lire en ligne] [PDF]
An additional possibility is that the President may, in fact, not be fully and accurately informed about a sensitive operation because he failed to receive the “circumlocutious” message... [...] The Committee finds that the system of Executive command and control was so inherently ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect that assassination activity might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government without its having been incontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the President of the United States.
It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the [Bay of Pigs] invasion could be concealed.The Committee’s investigation of assassination and the public disclosures which preceded the inquiry demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed.
"Plausible denial" increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less
(en) Office of the Historian, Department of State, « National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/2) », sur history.state.gov, Washington, (consulté le ) : « ...all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. »
(en) Office of the Historian, Department of State, « Covert Operations (NSC 5412/2) », sur history.state.gov, Washington (consulté le )
