Libre albedrío (Galician Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Libre albedrío" in Galician language version.

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Carus, Paul (1910). "Person and personality". En Hegeler, Edward C. The Monist 20. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. p. 369. Para dicilo brevemente, definimos o "libre albedrío" como unha vontade sen obstáculos por ningunha compulsión.
Schopenhauer, A. (1985). "What is freedom?". On the Freedom of the Will.

books.google.com

Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-823794-5. Consultado o 24 de novembro do 2023. "... ...Aristóteles e Epicteto: Nestes últimos autores era o feito de que nada nos impedía facer ou elixir algo o que nos facía ter control sobre eles. Segundo o relato de Alexander, os termos enténdense de forma diferente: o que nos fai ter control sobre as cousas é o feito de que estamos causalmente indeterminados na nosa decisión e, polo tanto, podemos decidir libremente entre facelos/elixilos ou non facelos/non escolleios.
Un argumento de Rudolf Carnap descrito por: C. James Goodwin (2009). Research In Psychology: Methods and Design (6th ed.). Wiley. p. 11. ISBN 978-0-470-52278-3.
Robert C Bishop (2010). "§28.2: Compatibilism and incompatibilism". En Raymond Y. Chiao; Marvin L. Cohen; Anthony J. Leggett; William D. Phillips; Charles L. Harper, Jr. Visions of Discovery: New Light on Physics, Cosmology, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. p. 603. ISBN 978-0-521-88239-2.
Véxase, por exemplo, Janet Richards (2001). "The root of the free will problem: kinds of non-existence". Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. pp. 142 ff. ISBN 978-0-415-21243-4.
Thomas Nagel (1989). "Freedom". The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 112. ISBN 978-0-19-505644-0. Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.
John R Searle (2013). "The problem of free will". Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-231-51055-4. The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-7391-7136-3. Un dos apoios máis sólidos da tese da libre elección é a intuición inequívoca de practicamente todos os seres humanos de que son libres de tomar as decisións que toman e de que as deliberacións que conducen a esas decisións tamén son libres...
Corliss Lamont (1969). Freedom of choice affirmed. Beacon Press. p. 38. ISBN 9780826404763.
Azim F Shariff; Jonathan Schooler; Kathleen D Vohs (2008). "The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will". En John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 183, 190–93. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.
William James (1896). "The dilemma of determinism". The Will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy. Longmans, Green. pp. 145 ff.
John A Bargh (2007-11-16). "Free will is un-natural" (PDF). Arquivado dende o orixinal (PDF) o 2012-09-03. Consultado o 2012-08-21. Son os comportamentos, xuízos e outros procesos mentais superiores produto de eleccións conscientes libres, influídas por estados psicolóxicos internos (motivos, preferencias etc.)/ etc.), ou están eses procesos mentais superiores determinados por eses estados? Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". En John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 128 ff. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.
Paul Russell (2002). "Chapter 1: Logic, "liberty", and the metaphysics of responsibility". Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-19-515290-6. ...o coñecido dilema do determinismo. Un aspecto deste dilema é o argumento de que se unha acción foi causada ou necesaria, entón non puido realizarse libremente e, por tanto, o axente non é responsable dela. O outro corno é o argumento de que se a acción non foi causada, entón é inexplicable e aleatoria, e por tanto non pode atribuírse ao axente, e por tanto, de novo, o axente non pode ser responsable dela.... Tanto se afirmamos coma se negamos a necesidade e o determinismo, é imposible dar un sentido coherente á liberdade moral e á responsabilidade.

cogprints.org

Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11). pp. 2–29.

doi.org

dx.doi.org

Baumeister, Roy F.; Monroe, Andrew E. (2014). Recent Research on Free Will. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 50. pp. 1–52. ISBN 9780128002841. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-800284-1.00001-1.
Bobzien, Susanne (2000). "Did Epicurus discover the free-will problem?". Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. pp. 287–338. ISBN 978-0-19-924226-9. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199242269.003.0008. Consultado o 25 de novembro do 2023.

ingentaconnect.com

TW Clark (1999). "Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain.". Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9). pp. 279–93. Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything. Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this Arquivado 2013-05-05 en Wayback Machine..

naturalism.org

TW Clark (1999). "Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain.". Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9). pp. 279–93. Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything. Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this Arquivado 2013-05-05 en Wayback Machine..

philpapers.org

Bobzien, Susanne (2000). "Did Epicurus discover the free-will problem?". Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. pp. 287–338. ISBN 978-0-19-924226-9. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199242269.003.0008. Consultado o 25 de novembro do 2023.

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

McKenna, Michael; Coates, D. Justin (2015). "Compatibilism". En Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University – vía Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Vihvelin, Kadri, "Arguments for Incompatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (en línea)

web.archive.org

TW Clark (1999). "Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain.". Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9). pp. 279–93. Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything. Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this Arquivado 2013-05-05 en Wayback Machine..
John A Bargh (2007-11-16). "Free will is un-natural" (PDF). Arquivado dende o orixinal (PDF) o 2012-09-03. Consultado o 2012-08-21. Son os comportamentos, xuízos e outros procesos mentais superiores produto de eleccións conscientes libres, influídas por estados psicolóxicos internos (motivos, preferencias etc.)/ etc.), ou están eses procesos mentais superiores determinados por eses estados? Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". En John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 128 ff. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.

yale.edu

John A Bargh (2007-11-16). "Free will is un-natural" (PDF). Arquivado dende o orixinal (PDF) o 2012-09-03. Consultado o 2012-08-21. Son os comportamentos, xuízos e outros procesos mentais superiores produto de eleccións conscientes libres, influídas por estados psicolóxicos internos (motivos, preferencias etc.)/ etc.), ou están eses procesos mentais superiores determinados por eses estados? Also found in John A Bargh (2008). "Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural". En John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 128 ff. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.