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worldcat.org
Sertel (1999. szeptember 1.). „The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable” (angol nyelven). Social Choice and Welfare16 (4), 615–627. o. DOI:10.1007/s003550050164. ISSN0176-1714.