St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary on De anima, Bk. I, 402a1–403b2, §1.Արխիվացված 2010-04-04 Wayback Machine "Now living beings taken all together form a certain class of being; hence in studying them the first thing to do is to consider what living things have in common, and afterwards what each has peculiar to itself. What they have in common is a life-principle or soul; in this they are all alike. In conveying knowledge, therefore, about living things one must first convey it about the soul as that which is common to them all. Thus when Aristotle sets out to treat of living things, he begins with the soul; after which, in subsequent books, he defines the properties of particular living beings."
Summa, I, Q.3, art.4. "Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles."
Summa, I, Q.75, art.5. The meaning of this sentence can be altered depending on how the Latin word used in this sentence, "materiæ", is translated into English. An alternate rendering of this sentence is "The form causes matter to be what it is.
Summa, II-I, Q.91, art.4. "By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law."
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De Ente et Essentia, 67–68.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "Although everyone admits the simplicity of the First Cause, some try to introduce a composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in souls... But this is not in agreement with what philosophers commonly say, because they call them substances separated from matter, and prove them to be without all matter."
De Ente et Essentia, 83.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "And this is why substances of this sort are said by some to be composed of "that by which it is" and "that which is," or as Boethius says, of "that which is" and "existence.""
Ibid., 110.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from matter and their difference from form, as in the case of composed substances."
Thomas offers more metaphysical explanations for the existence of God in De Ente et EssentiaԱրխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine and elsewhere, though the Quinquae viae are the most well-known and most commonly analyzed among these.
De Ente et Essentia, 24.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except as the non-designated from the designated. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the seventh book of the Metaphysics that "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.""
De Ente et Essentia, 33.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "The difference, on the contrary, is a name taken from a determinate form, and taken in a determinate way, i.e. as not including a determinate matter in its meaning. This is clear, for example, when we say animated, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is, whether a body or something other, is not expressed. Whence Ibn Sīnā says that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its essence, as the subject also is understood in its properties. And this is why the genus is not predicated essentially of the difference, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Metaphysics and in the fourth book of the Topics, but only in the way in which a subject is predicated of its property."
De Ente et Essentia, 67–68.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "Although everyone admits the simplicity of the First Cause, some try to introduce a composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in souls... But this is not in agreement with what philosophers commonly say, because they call them substances separated from matter, and prove them to be without all matter."
De Ente et Essentia, 83.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "And this is why substances of this sort are said by some to be composed of "that by which it is" and "that which is," or as Boethius says, of "that which is" and "existence.""
Ibid., 110.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from matter and their difference from form, as in the case of composed substances."
Thomas offers more metaphysical explanations for the existence of God in De Ente et EssentiaԱրխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine and elsewhere, though the Quinquae viae are the most well-known and most commonly analyzed among these.
De Ente et Essentia, 24.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except as the non-designated from the designated. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the seventh book of the Metaphysics that "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.""
De Ente et Essentia, 33.Արխիվացված 2009-11-26 Wayback Machine "The difference, on the contrary, is a name taken from a determinate form, and taken in a determinate way, i.e. as not including a determinate matter in its meaning. This is clear, for example, when we say animated, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is, whether a body or something other, is not expressed. Whence Ibn Sīnā says that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its essence, as the subject also is understood in its properties. And this is why the genus is not predicated essentially of the difference, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Metaphysics and in the fourth book of the Topics, but only in the way in which a subject is predicated of its property."
St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary on De anima, Bk. I, 402a1–403b2, §1.Արխիվացված 2010-04-04 Wayback Machine "Now living beings taken all together form a certain class of being; hence in studying them the first thing to do is to consider what living things have in common, and afterwards what each has peculiar to itself. What they have in common is a life-principle or soul; in this they are all alike. In conveying knowledge, therefore, about living things one must first convey it about the soul as that which is common to them all. Thus when Aristotle sets out to treat of living things, he begins with the soul; after which, in subsequent books, he defines the properties of particular living beings."
