Criterio di maggioranza (Italian Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Criterio di maggioranza" in Italian language version.

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  • (EN) Harry Beatty, Voting Rules and Coordination Problems, in The Methodological Unity of Science, collana Theory and Decision Library, Springer, Dordrecht, 1973, pp. 155-189, DOI:10.1007/978-94-010-2667-3_9, ISBN 9789027704047.
    «This is true even if the members of the majority are relatively indifferent among a, b and c while the members of the minority have an intense preference for b over a. So the objection can be made that plurality or majority voting allows a diffident majority to have its way against an intense minority.»

leastevil.blogspot.com

opentextbookstore.com

  • David Lippman, Voting Theory, in Math in Society.
    «Borda count is sometimes described as a consensus-based voting system, since it can sometimes choose a more broadly acceptable option over the one with majority support.»

rangevoting.org

sites.google.com

web.archive.org

  • Single-winner Voting Method Comparison Chart, su fairvote.org (archiviato dall'url originale il 28 febbraio 2011).
    «Majority Favorite Criterion: If a majority (more than 50%) of voters prefer candidate A to all other candidates, then A should win.»
  • Score Voting, Approval Voting, and Majority Rule, in The Center for Election Science, 21 maggio 2015. URL consultato il 3 dicembre 2016 (archiviato dall'url originale il 3 dicembre 2016).
    «Score voting [and] approval voting, are sometimes attacked for not abiding by the majority criterion in all cases. ... This page shows that such an event with these methods is not catastrophic and may even be desirable.»
  • Majority Criterion, in The Center for Election Science, 21 maggio 2015. URL consultato il 3 dicembre 2016 (archiviato dall'url originale l'8 dicembre 2016).
    «Sometimes a candidate who is the Condorcet winner, or even the majority winner, isn’t the favored or “most representative” candidate of the electorate.»

worldcat.org

  • Peter Emerson, From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics, 1stª ed., Cham, Springer, 2016, ISBN 9783319235004, OCLC 948558369.
    «Unfortunately, one of the worst democratic structures is the most ubiquitous: majority rule based on majority voting. It must be emphasised, furthermore, that these two practices are often the catalysts of division and bitterness, if not indeed violence and war.»