Modello principale-agente (Italian Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Modello principale-agente" in Italian language version.

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12doi.org

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1archive.org

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1emerald.com

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archive.org

Principals and agents: the structure of business, collana Research colloquium / Harvard Business School, Harvard Business School Press, 1985, ISBN 978-0-87584-164-9.

doi.org

dx.doi.org

Michael C. Jensen e William H. Meckling, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, n. 4, 1976-10, pp. 305-360, DOI:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Gerald A. Feltham, Joel S. Demski: A Leader in Accounting Scholarship, Springer New York, pp. 1-32, ISBN 978-0-387-30397-0. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
MICHAEL SPENCE e RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, Elsevier, 1978, pp. 333-343, ISBN 978-0-12-214850-7. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, n. 2, 1980-04, pp. 288-307, DOI:10.1086/260866. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Amiya K. Basu, Rajiv Lal e V. Srinivasan, Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective, in Marketing Science, vol. 4, n. 4, 1985-11, pp. 267-291, DOI:10.1287/mksc.4.4.267. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Barry M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 75-96. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Edward J. Conlon e Judi McLean Parks, The Effects of Monitoring and Tradition on Compensation Agreements: An Experiment on Principal/Agent Dyads., in Academy of Management Proceedings, vol. 1988, n. 1, 1988-08, pp. 191-195, DOI:10.5465/ambpp.1988.4980510. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Eugene F. Fama e Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, in The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 26, n. 2, 1983-06, pp. 301-325, DOI:10.1086/467037. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, in SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998, DOI:10.2139/ssrn.94036. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 14, n. 1, 1989-01, pp. 57-74, DOI:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches, in Management Science, vol. 31, n. 2, 1985-02, pp. 134-149, DOI:10.1287/mnsc.31.2.134. URL consultato il 2 novembre 2024.
Filippo Ferrari, Balancing efficiency and fairness in an output-based agency relationship: an empirical investigation of the cognitive factors favouring a win–win situation, in Evidence-based HRM: a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship, ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print, 1º gennaio 2024, DOI:10.1108/EBHRM-03-2024-0060. URL consultato il 26 dicembre 2024.

emerald.com

Filippo Ferrari, Balancing efficiency and fairness in an output-based agency relationship: an empirical investigation of the cognitive factors favouring a win–win situation, in Evidence-based HRM: a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship, ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print, 1º gennaio 2024, DOI:10.1108/EBHRM-03-2024-0060. URL consultato il 26 dicembre 2024.