契約理論 (Japanese Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "契約理論" in Japanese language version.

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20doi.org

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6jstor.org

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2uni-muenchen.de

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1worldcat.org

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1npr.org

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1acm.org

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acm.org

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Alkoby, Shani; Sarne, David; Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sharbaf, Tomer (2018-07-09). “Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information”. Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. AAMAS '18 (Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems): 1850–1852.

doi.org

Coase, R. H. (November 1937). “The Nature of the Firm” (英語). Economica 4 (16): 386–405. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x. ISSN 0013-0427.
Garen J (1994), "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory", Journal of Political Economy, 102(6):1175–1199, doi:10.1086/261967.
Jensen MC and Meckling WH (1976), "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305–360, doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.
Fama E F (1980), "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88(2):288–307, doi:10.1086/260866.
Shavell, Steven (1979). “Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship”. Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 55–73. doi:10.2307/3003319. JSTOR 3003319.
Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (1983). “An analysis of the principal-agent problem”. Econometrica 51 (1): 7–46. doi:10.2307/1912246. JSTOR 1912246.
Rogerson, William P. (1985). “Repeated moral hazard”. Econometrica 53 (1): 69–76. doi:10.2307/1911724. JSTOR 1911724.
Homström, Bengt; Milgrom, Paul (1991). “Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design”. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7: 24–52. doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24.
Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). “Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case of Risk Neutrality”. International Economic Review 53 (2): 433–452. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x.
Prendergast, Canice (1999). “The Provision of Incentive in Firms”. Journal of Economic Literature 37: 7–63. doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7.
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018). “Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory”. Games and Economic Behavior 109: 544–564. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
Stevens, Douglas E.; Thevaranjan, Alex (January 2010). “A moral solution to the moral hazard problem”. Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (1): 125–139. doi:10.1016/j.aos.2009.01.008.
Baron, David P.; Myerson, Roger B. (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs”. Econometrica 50 (4): 911–930. doi:10.2307/1912769. JSTOR 1912769.
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). “Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory”. Games and Economic Behavior 89: 17–33. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001.
Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles (1998). “Contracts and productive information gathering”. Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2): 174–193. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0651.
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). “Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study”. Review of Economic Studies 80 (4): 1516–1544. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt010.
Köszegi, Botond (2014). “Behavioral Contract Theory”. Journal of Economic Literature 52 (4): 1075–1118. doi:10.1257/jel.52.4.1075.
Connelly, Brian L.; Certo, S. Trevis; Ireland, R. Duane (December 10, 2010). “Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment”. Journal of Management 37: 39–67. doi:10.1177/0149206310388419.
Spence, Michael (August 1973). “Job Market Signaling”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010. JSTOR 1882010.
Caplin, Andrew; Leahy, John (2001). “Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (1): 55–79. doi:10.1162/003355301556347.

jstor.org

Shavell, Steven (1979). “Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship”. Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 55–73. doi:10.2307/3003319. JSTOR 3003319.
Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D. (1983). “An analysis of the principal-agent problem”. Econometrica 51 (1): 7–46. doi:10.2307/1912246. JSTOR 1912246.
Rogerson, William P. (1985). “Repeated moral hazard”. Econometrica 53 (1): 69–76. doi:10.2307/1911724. JSTOR 1911724.
Baron, David P.; Myerson, Roger B. (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs”. Econometrica 50 (4): 911–930. doi:10.2307/1912769. JSTOR 1912769.
Maskin, Eric; Riley, John (1984). “Monopoly with incomplete information”. RAND Journal of Economics 15 (2): 171–196. JSTOR 2555674.
Spence, Michael (August 1973). “Job Market Signaling”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010. JSTOR 1882010.

npr.org

Domonoske, Camila (10 October 2016). “It's Agreed: Nobel Prize In Economics Awarded For Contract Theory” (英語). NPR 2020年11月10日閲覧。

uni-muenchen.de

mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). “Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case of Risk Neutrality”. International Economic Review 53 (2): 433–452. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x.
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). “Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study”. Review of Economic Studies 80 (4): 1516–1544. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt010.

worldcat.org

search.worldcat.org

Coase, R. H. (November 1937). “The Nature of the Firm” (英語). Economica 4 (16): 386–405. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x. ISSN 0013-0427.