Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "이스라엘-팔레스타인 분쟁" in Korean language version.
Makdisi rightly argues that almost every law of South African Apartheid has its equivalent in Israel today.18 A significant example is the Law of Return (1950), which even Kretzmer claims is explicitly discriminatory against Palestinian citizens.... The Law of Return, which determines the second-class citizenship of Palestinians, is recognized as a fundamental principle in Israel and "is possibly even its very raison d'etre as a Jewish state."19
In its advisory opinion the ICJ voiced concern that "the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent."115 Taking note of this ICJ concern, Israel's High Court rejoined that the ICJ lacked a "factual basis" for reaching definite conclusions.116 Not just the ICJ, however, but also many respected human rights organizations expressed such worries. B'Tselem concluded that the "underlying reason" of the wall's route was "to establish facts on the ground that would perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel." Likewise, Human Rights Watch concluded that the "existing and planned route of the barrier appears to be designed chiefly to incorporate and make contiguous with Israel illegal civilian settlements." Likewise, Amnesty International concluded that Israel was building the wall to "consolidate its control over land which is being used for illegal Israeli settlements," and that "the very expensive and sophisticated structure of the fence/wall indicates that it is likely intended as a permanent structure."117
UNRWA put the figure at 413000
아마도 위원회 권고안에서 가장 매력적인 조항은 미래 유대인 국가에서 아랍인들을 '강제 이전'시키는 것에 관한 것이었다. 벤구리온에게 이것은 '전례 없는 성과'였다. Berl Katznelson에 따르면 이것은 '모든 해결책 중 최고'였다. 그는 '멀리 있는 이웃이 가까운 적보다 낫다'고 말했다. 이전은 너무나 이상적인 해결책이어서 '언젠가는 일어나야 한다'고 그는 결론지었다. 단계별 전략은 인정하건대 항상 모호하고 명확한 행동 계획과는 거리가 멀었지만, 인구통계학적 문제에 대한 해결책이 발견되어야만 성공할 수 있었다. '이전'이 마법의 공식이었다. 아랍인에 대한 이전이라는 생각은 시온주의 사상에 오랜 역사를 가지고 있었다.
따라서 헤르츨의 말처럼 팔레스타인인들이 '국경을 넘어 순식간에 사라질' 수 있거나, 쟁윌의 표현처럼 단순히 '텐트를 접고 사라질' 것이라는 시온주의 초기의 희망적이고 다소 순진한 믿음은 곧 더 현실적인 평가로 바뀌었다. 1937년에서 1948년 사이에 시온주의 운동의 최고 기관들, 즉 시온주의 기관 집행부, 제20차 시온주의 회의, 이훗 포알레이 시온 세계 대회(지배적인 시온주의 세계 노동 운동의 최고 포럼), 그리고 여러 공식 및 반공식 이주 위원회에서 광범위한 비밀 이주 논의가 이루어졌다.
아랍 소작농과 유대인 정착을 위한 토지 비축이라는 두 가지 문제에 대한 쉬운 해결책으로서 인구 이전의 개념은 한동안 시온주의 지도자들의 마음속에 자리 잡고 있었다. 사실, 영국과의 비공개 논의에서 시온주의 지도자들은 인구 이전을 잠정적인 제안으로 제시했지만, 이를 행동 계획으로 공식화하는 데까지는 이르지 못했다.
'이전이라는 생각은 시온주의 운동의 아주 초기부터 함께 해왔다'고 톰 세게프는 보고한다.
The 1973 War demonstrated that Arabs could work together when needed and that Israel was not as invincible as it had believed. The war left its scars on Israel, which suffered over 2,500 dead, US$4 billion in direct monetary losses, and deflated confidence. Although the Arabs technically lost the war, they won psychologically and diplomatically as the world once again focused on the ongoing conflict.156 In 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, affirming the land-for-peace framework enshrined in Resolution 242 and setting into motion what was to become known as the Middle East peace process. Palestinian control of the PLO and the rise of guerilla warfare, together with the shift ushered in by the 1973 War, would lay the groundwork for the PLO's political agenda and aggressive legal strategy throughout the decade that followed.
The collaboration was solidified and made public during Begin's first term. Begin was impressed by the pleas and the aristocratic manner of the Maronite leaders and several times declared "Israel will not allow genocide [of the Maronites] in Lebanon." In March 1978, Israeli forces temporarily occupied southern Lebanon, in an attempt to neutralize Palestinian guerilla groups and enlarge the territory controlled by Major Haddad, in an undertaking called Operation Litani (the river that more or less marked the boundary of the Israeli influence).
In 1982 the situation acquired a more dangerous dimension. The nationalist government in Israel, having secured its southern frontier by the peace treaty with Egypt, now tried to impose its own solution of the problem of the Palestinians. This involved an attempt to destroy both the military and the political power of the PLO in Lebanon, to install a friendly regime there, and then, freed from effective Palestinian resistance, to pursue its policy of settlement and annexation of occupied Palestine. With some degree of acquiescence from the USA, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. The invasion culminated in a long siege of the western part of Beirut, mainly inhabited by Muslims and dominated by the PLO. The siege ended with an agreement, negotiated through the US government, by which the PLO would evacuate west Beirut, with guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians given by the Lebanese and US governments. At the same time, a presidential election resulted in the military head of the Kata'ib, Bashir Jumayyil, becoming president; he was assassinated soon afterwards and his brother Amin was then elected. The assassination was taken by Israel as an opportunity to occupy west Beirut, and this allowed the Kata'ib to carry out a massacre of Palestinians on a large scale in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.
레바논에 있는 PLO의 기반 시설을 파괴하고 이스라엘에 대한 군사적 투쟁을 위한 아랍 국가의 마지막 팔레스타인 발판을 해체하는 것이 전쟁의 즉각적인 작전 목표였다. 그러나 침공의 설계자들은 훨씬 더 광범위한 야망을 가지고 있었다. 그들은 레바논에서 팔레스타인인들의 패배가 요르단강 동안으로의 팔레스타인인들의 대규모 탈출을 촉발할 것이며, 이는 결국 하심 왕조의 붕괴와 왕국의 팔레스타인화를 가져올 것이라고 믿었다. 이는 이스라엘이 유대와 사마리아에서 자유롭게 통치권을 행사할 수 있도록 할 것이었다. 이스라엘은 또한 레바논에서의 승리가 그 나라에 논란의 여지가 없는 기독교 헤게모니를 가진 새로운 정치 질서를 창출할 것이라고 믿었다.
was that "Operation Peace for Galilee"—the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982—was undertaken to protect the civilian population from Palestinian gunners, and that "the rocket and shelling attacks on Israel's northern border" were ended by the operation, though "If rockets again rain down on Israel's northern border after all that has been expended on Lebanon, the Israeli public will be outraged.19 This cannot be correct, given the history which is not challenged (even if unreported, for the most part). When it came to be recognized that the rockets still "rain down," the story was modified: "Israel's two military forays into Lebanon [1978, 1982] were military disasters that failed to provide long-term security for Israel's northern border."20 Security had indeed been at risk, as a result of Israel's unprovoked attacks from 1981, and to a large extent before. The phrase "military disaster" does not refer to the killing of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians in 1982, overwhelmingly civilians, the destruction of much of southern Lebanon and the capital city of Beirut, or the terrible atrocities carried out by Israeli troops through the mid-1980s; rather, to Israel's failure to impose the "new order" it had proclaimed for Lebanon and its inability to maintain its occupation in full because of the casualties caused by unanticipated resistance ("terror"), forcing it back to its "security zone." The actual reasons for the 1982 invasion have never been concealed in Israel, though they are rated "X" here.21 A few weeks after the invasion began, Israel's leading academic specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, pointed out that the decision to invade "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed" by the PLO, a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government because it endangered the policy of evading a political settlement. The PLO was gaining respectability thanks to its preference for negotiations over terror. The Israeli government's hope, therefore, was to compel "the stricken PLO" to "return to its earlier terrorism," thus "undercutting the danger" of negotiations. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir later stated, Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger... Not so much a military one as a political one." The invasion was intended to "undermine the position of the moderates within [the PLO] ranks" and thus to block "the PLO 'peace offensive"' and "to halt [the PLO's] rise to political respectability" (strategic analyst Avner Yaniv); it should be called "the war to safeguard the occupation of the West Bank," having been motivated by Begin's "fear of the momentum of the peace process," according to Israeli Arabist and former head of military intelligence General Yehoshaphat Harkabi. U.S. backing for Israel's aggression, including the vetoing of Security Council efforts to stop the slaughter, was presumably based on the same reasoning. After its failure to impose the intended "New Order" in Lebanon in 1982, Israel attempted to hold on to as much of Lebanon as possible, though it was forced to withdraw to its "security zone" as resistance caused too many Israeli casualties. Meanwhile Israel conducted violent terror operations, notably the "iron fist" operations of 1985 under the direction of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. These went on through the 1980s.2
As a result, the PLO did not attack Israel from mid-I98r to mid-I982.16 But in June 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon, and it used aerial bombardment to destroy entire camps of Palestine Arab refugees.17 By these means Israel killed 20,000 persons, mostly civilians,18 and while it occupied southern Lebanon it incarcerated 15,000 persons, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The IDF continued north to Beirut, where it forced the PLO out of Lebanon. Israel claimed self-defense for its invasion, but the lack of PLO attacks into Israel during the previous year made that claim dubious. By invading Lebanon, Israel evidently sought to destroy the extensive Palestinian military and administrative infrastructure in Lebanon19 and, by removing the PLO, to convince the Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank that they would get no help from the PLO.20 In the United States Harold Saunders, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, said that Israel aimed,
캠프 데이비드는 평화 프로세스의 참조 조항에 대한 양측의 상충되는 해석 때문에 실패했다. 이스라엘인들은 오슬로 협정의 서한에 내재된 확신을 가지고 협상에 임했는데, 이는 사전 개념화된 해결책이 존재하지 않으며 각 핵심 쟁점이 협상에 개방되어 양측의 요구 사이의 합리적인 균형점을 찾을 수 있는 개방형 프로세스라는 것이었다. 팔레스타인인들은 협상을 '국제적 정당성'과 '모든 관련 유엔 결의안'을 기반으로 한 명확한 탈식민화 과정인 것처럼 자신들의 권리를 얻게 될 여정의 한 단계로 보았다.
저 자신도 '제가 팔레스타인인이었다면 캠프 데이비드 정상회담에서 제안된 것을 거부했을 것이다'라고 말한 기록이 있습니다. 이 책은 이 주장을 지지합니다.
The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on 'international legitimacy' and 'all UN relevant resolutions.'
I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told her Palestinian interlocutors during a critical round of the peace process in 2007, "but I am against law—international law in particular.
But the abject submission of the Palestinians and the ever deepening system of occupation and discrimination in the territories are Israel's sole and exclusive responsibility. As brilliantly explained by Michael Sfard, this is a system built on three pillars: the gun, the settlements, and the law that formalizes the network of colonization.1 Under the mantle of security claims, the Jewish state has created in the Palestinian territories one of the most efficient occupation regimes in history, which is, moreover, also cost-effective, for it is the international community's donor money to the Palestinian Authority that saves the occupier the burden of having to directly administer the territories. This leaves Israel free to cater to its insatiable security needs with draconic measures, such as limiting the Palestinians' freedom of movement, erecting walls that separate communities, dotting roads with checkpoints where innocent people are manhandled, activating sophisticated intelligence mechanisms that control the lives of an ever growing number of suspects, conducting surprise searches of private houses in the middle of the night, and carrying out arbitrary administrative detentions. If this were not enough, vigilantes among the settlers, some known as "the Youth of the Hills," constantly harass Palestinian communities, destroy orchard trees, and arbitrarily apply a "price tag" of punishments to innocent civilians for whatever terrorist attack might have been perpetrated by a Palestinian squad. Underlying this very serious problem of the unpardonable depravity of settlers' extremism is the even more serious problem that has to do with the involvement of the entire Israeli body politic in maintaining and continuously expanding a regime of dominance in the territories. For too long, the peace process has served as a curtain behind which the policy of practical annexation has flourished.
A massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees would have clashed irreconcilably with the most vital and fundamental ethos of the new State of Israel, indeed with its very raison d'être, namely the consolidation of a Jewish state through the mass immigration of the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in Europe and the uprooted and dispossessed Jews of North Africa and the Arab Middle East... No Israeli statesman, either in 1948 or in 2005, would conceive of peace based on the massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees as an offer the Jewish state could accept and yet survive. The ethos of Zionism was twofold; it was about demography—ingathering the exiles in a viable Jewish state with as small an Arab minority as possible—and land.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said that returning Palestinians might be a fifth column and a demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state.
Evidently, the indigenous population also has a 'security problem'; in fact, the Palestinians have already suffered the catastrophe that Israelis justly fear.
The Israeli debate over the occupied territories is, then, not just an ideological divide between right and left; it is also overwhelmingly influenced by the all-encompassing "security network" that injects a security rationale into every political move.
In places the barrier separated farmers from their lands, even children from their schools, while preventing Palestinians from travelling within the West Bank or seeking work in Israel.
Its 2004 decision held that the construction of the wall in the West Bank, as opposed to along the 1949 armistice line, violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense. It advised Israel to "terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated." The court also observed that all states had an obligation "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction."
Israeli officials alleged that total Palestinian deaths came to 1,166, of whom at least 60 percent were "terrorists." The discrepancy in the ratio of Palestinian combatant to civilian deaths partly resulted from disagreement on the proper classification of Gazan police. See Shay Fogelman, "Shock and Awe," Haaretz (31 December 2010). The broad consensus among human rights organizations was that these police should overwhelmingly be classified as civilians because they did not take a direct part in hostilities and were not members of Palestinian armed groups. The veracity of Israeli figures could be tested by scrutinizing the "under 16" subclassification. Whereas Israel alleged that 89 Palestinians under age 16 were killed, B'Tselem reported that 252 Palestinians under 16 were killed and that it had "copies of birth certificates and death certificates along with other documents regarding the vast majority of the minors who were killed." For critical analysis of Israeli casualty figures, see Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI), No Second Thoughts: The changes in the Israeli Defense Forces' combat doctrine in light of "Operation Cast Lead" (2009), pp. 9–11. This study showed that Israel abruptly altered the figures it tabulated for Palestinian deaths, and concluded that "the casualty estimates provided by other sources (around 1,400 killed) are more credible than those provided by the IDF Spokesperson." Even the largely apologetic US Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report put the number of dead "at close to 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 1,000 civilians."
In this context we should not overlook the latest turning point in the history of Palestine – the attack by Hamas on 7th October 2023 on Israeli settlements adjacent to Gaza and the subsequent genocidal war that the state of Israel has carried out in the Gaza strip
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
안보 장벽에 대한 모든 소송에 걸린 진정한 논란은 점령된 영토 내 이스라엘 정착촌의 운명에 관한 것이다. 1967년 이후 이스라엘은 이스라엘 땅에 있는 유대 민족의 역사와 관련된 종교적 및 국가적 정서에 동기를 부여받아 영토 내에 새로 설립된 정착촌에 시민들이 거주하는 것을 허용하고 심지어 장려해 왔다. 이 정책은 1967년 이전 이스라엘의 위험한 지리적 상황(지중해 연안의 이스라엘 지역이 요르단의 서안 지구 통제에 의해 잠재적으로 위협받을 수 있었던)을 고려하여 안보 이익의 측면에서도 정당화되었다. 국제 사회는 이 정책이 점령 하의 영토로 인구를 이동시키는 것을 금지하는 제4차 제네바 협정의 조항에 기반하여 명백히 불법이라고 보아 왔다.
연구원들은 중복되는 부분이 너무 적어 실제 사망자 수는 공식부처 총계보다 46-107% 더 높을 가능성이 있다고 밝혔다. 이 비율이 지난 6월 이후 동일하게 유지되었다고 가정하고(휴전 기간 동안 시스템이 따라잡으면서 감소하지 않았다고 가정하면) 현재 집계에 적용하면 가자 주민 중 77,000명에서 109,000명이 사망했으며, 이는 전쟁 전 인구의 4-5%에 해당한다(차트 참조).
roughly 6,400 Palestinians and 300 Israelis
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
In this context we should not overlook the latest turning point in the history of Palestine – the attack by Hamas on 7th October 2023 on Israeli settlements adjacent to Gaza and the subsequent genocidal war that the state of Israel has carried out in the Gaza strip
1. Calls upon all States to implement fully and faithfully all the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by peoples under colonial and foreign domination; 2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle; 3. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Namibian people, the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference...
Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
roughly 6,400 Palestinians and 300 Israelis
Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
국제사회는 추방과 정착촌 모두 국제법에 위배된다는 비판적 시각을 가지고 있다. 총회 결의안은 1969년부터 추방을 비난해 왔으며, 최근 몇 년 동안 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 마찬가지로, 그들은 일관되게 정착촌 건설을 개탄해 왔으며, 그 수가 급격히 증가한 기간(1976년 말 이후) 내내 압도적인 다수로 그렇게 해왔다. 안전보장이사회 또한 추방과 정착촌에 대해 비판적이었으며, 다른 기관들은 그들을 평화에 대한 장애물이자 국제법상 불법으로 간주해 왔다... 동예루살렘과 골란고원은 합병에 해당하는 행위로 직접 이스라엘 법의 적용을 받게 되었지만, 이 두 지역은 모두 국제사회에 의해 점령된 것으로 간주되며, 국제 규칙의 적용 가능성에 대한 그들의 지위는 대부분의 측면에서 서안 지구와 가자 지구와 동일하다.
In general, Israeli policy towards holy places can be considered a success with regard to its primary goal: facilitating Israel's acceptance into the international community of nations. However, the repeated failure of the Muslim Affairs Department to fulfill its mandate of protecting the Muslim holy places in Israel has been a largely forgotten chapter in Israeli history that deserves reexamination
