제2차 인티파다 (Korean Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "제2차 인티파다" in Korean language version.

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archive.org

archive.today

btselem.org

old.btselem.org

cambridge.org

  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). “The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena”. 《European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie》 (영어) 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy. 

doi.org

dx.doi.org

  • Cohen, Samy (2010). 〈Botched Engagement in the Intifada〉. 《Israel's Asymmetric Wars》. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. 73–91쪽. doi:10.1057/9780230112971_6. ISBN 978-1-349-28896-0. "The al-Aqsa Intifada ushered in an era with a new brand of violence.1 It began with a popular uprising following Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount on September 28, 2000. But unlike the first Intifada, which was basically a civil uprising against the symbols of an occupation that has lasted since June 1967, the second Intifada very quickly lapsed into an armed struggle between Palestinian activists and the Israeli armed forces. Almost from the very start, armed men took to hiding among crowds of Palestinians, using them as cover to shoot from. The IDF retaliated forcefully, each time causing several casualties."
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). “The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena”. 《European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie》 (영어) 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy. 
  • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (2006년 6월 1일). “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada”. 《Social Forces》 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing. 

erudit.org

  • Kober, Avi (2007). “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada:: The Quest for Effectiveness”. 《Journal of Conflict Studies》 (영어) 27 (1): 94–114. ISSN 1198-8614. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government. 

inss.org.il

strategicassessment.inss.org.il

  • Schachter, J. (2010). The End of the Second Intifada? 보관됨 30 9월 2021 - 웨이백 머신. Strategic Assessment, 13(3), 63–70. "This article attempts to identify the end of the second intifada by focusing on the incidence of suicide bombings, arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence."

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). “The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena”. 《European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie》 (영어) 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy. 
  • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (2006년 6월 1일). “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada”. 《Social Forces》 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing. 

web.archive.org

  • Kober, Avi (2007). “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada:: The Quest for Effectiveness”. 《Journal of Conflict Studies》 (영어) 27 (1): 94–114. ISSN 1198-8614. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government. 
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). “The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena”. 《European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie》 (영어) 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy. 
  • Schachter, J. (2010). The End of the Second Intifada? 보관됨 30 9월 2021 - 웨이백 머신. Strategic Assessment, 13(3), 63–70. "This article attempts to identify the end of the second intifada by focusing on the incidence of suicide bombings, arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence."

worldcat.org

  • Kober, Avi (2007). “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada:: The Quest for Effectiveness”. 《Journal of Conflict Studies》 (영어) 27 (1): 94–114. ISSN 1198-8614. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government. 
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). “The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena”. 《European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie》 (영어) 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. 2022년 4월 5일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2022년 4월 5일에 확인함. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy. 
  • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (2006년 6월 1일). “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada”. 《Social Forces》 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.