(en) Democracy and Its Discontents - Esquire (2018). Gearchiveerd op 30 december 2022. “"As a citizen, I am horrified," Fukuyama said of Trump. "As a political scientist, I am delighted." The rise of such a figure is "a kind of natural experiment where we get to see how theories like checks and balances work in practice and where we can gauge how strong American institutions are. It’s all just theoretical until these concepts are challenged."”
(en) Francis Fukuyama, The Neoconservative Moment. The National Interest (1 juni 2004). Gearchiveerd op 18 augustus 2022. Geraadpleegd op 22 september 2022.
(en) James Atlas, What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama grew up in Manhattan's Stuyvesant Town, a middle-class housing development on the Lower East Side. His father was a Congregational minister who later became a professor of religion, and Fukuyama's own direction in the beginning was toward an academic career. As a freshman at Cornell in 1970, he was a resident of Telluride House, a sort of commune for philosophy students; Allan Bloom was the resident Socrates. They shared meals and talked philosophy until all hours, living the good life Bloom would later evoke in "The Closing of the American Mind," the professor and his disciples sitting around the cafeteria discussing the Great Books.”
(en) James Atlas, What is Fukuyama saying? And to whom is he saying it?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama majored in classics, then did graduate work in comparative literature at Yale, where he studied with the deconstructionist Paul de Man (who would achieve posthumous notoriety when it was discovered that he'd published pro-Nazi articles in the Belgian press at the height of World War II). "It was kind of an intellectual side journey," Fukuyama says.
After Yale, he spent six months in Paris, sitting in on classes with Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, whose abstruse and fashionable discours would become required reading for a generation of American graduate students. Fukuyama was less than impressed. "I was turned off by their nihilistic idea of what literature was all about," he recalls. "It had nothing to do with the world. I developed such an aversion to that whole over-intellectual approach that I turned to nuclear weapons instead." He enrolled in Harvard's government department, where he studied Middle Eastern and Soviet politics. Three years later he got a Ph.D. in political science, writing his thesis on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.”
What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama's first job out of the academic world was at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Then, in 1981, Paul D. Wolfowitz, director of policy planning in the Reagan Administration (and also a former student of Bloom's), invited him to join his staff. Fukuyama worked in Washington for two years, then returned to Rand. For the next six years, he wrote papers for Rand on Soviet foreign policy, speculating on such weighty matters as "Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan" and "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission." In "Gorbachev and the Third World" (published in the spring 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs), Fukuyama claimed that Soviet foreign policy was still expansionist, and that despite efforts to economize at home and act conciliatory abroad, Gorbachev was quietly "trying to stake out a more combative position" in client nations like Angola and Afghanistan, Libya and Nicaragua. The message of these heavily footnoted articles was clear: The cold war is still on. Last February, shortly before he returned to Washington to become deputy to Dennis Ross, the new director of policy planning, Fukuyama gave a lecture at the University of Chicago in which he surveyed the international political scene. It was sponsored by his former professor, Allan Bloom. "My whole life has been spent in organizations that prize technical expertise," says Fukuyama. "I was anxious to deal with larger and more important issues" - what Bloom calls "the big questions." As it happened, Owen Harries, co-editor of The National Interest, was looking around for a think piece on the current situation - a piece, as Harries explains it, that would "link history with the great traditions of political thought." Harries got hold of Fukuyama's lecture and instantly recognized that it was "a provocative, stimulating essay, just what the times needed."”
(en) Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “The members of the initiative group thanked Francis Fukuyama for his consistent and unequivocal support for Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war, for his publications, which tremendously helped the world gain a better understanding of Ukraine’s position.”
(en) Francis Fukuyama, Huntington’s Legacy. The American Interest (27 augustus 2018). Gearchiveerd op 20 september 2022. Geraadpleegd op 20 september 2022.
theguardian.com
(en) Stephen Moss (23 mei 2011). Francis Fukuyama: 'Americans are not very good at nation-building'. The Guardian. Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2022 "Fukuyama, who is 58, was born in Chicago but grew up in New York. His father is a second-generation Japanese-American whose own father fled the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and started a shop on the west coast before being interned in the second world war (that distant family experience has made Fukuyama a critic of Islamophobia). His mother, who comes from an academic family in Japan, met her husband when she came to study in the US. Some Japanese was spoken at home, but Fukuyama, an only child, never learned to speak it – "it just wasn't fashionable to be ethnic when I was growing up" – though he says his three children have embraced their dual identity and his eldest son is learning Japanese."
(en) Francis Fukuyama, U.S. vs. Them. The Washington Post (11 september 2002). “Between these two views of the sources of legitimacy, the Europeans are theoretically right but wrong in practice. It is impossible to assert as a matter of principle that legitimately constituted liberal democracies can't make grave mistakes or indeed commit crimes against humanity. But the European idea that legitimacy is handed downward from a disembodied international community rather than handed upward from existing democratic institutions reflecting the public will on a nation-state level invites abuse on the part of elites, who are then free to interpret the will of the international community to suit their own preferences. This is the problem with the International Criminal Court. Instead of strengthening democracy on an international level, it tends to undermine democracy where it concretely lives, in nation-states.
(...)
This conflict does not lend itself to "moral clarity"; both sides believe what they believe by dint of their histories and experiences. Americans are right to insist that there is no such thing as an "international community" in the abstract, and that nation-states must ultimately look out for themselves when it comes to critical matters of security. But they should also understand that they are dependent on international institutions and cooperation to manage this thing called the global economy, from which they benefit enormously.”
(en) Why red and blue America can’t hear each other anymore. The Washington Post (24 januari 2020). Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2021. “Democrats will not win back swing voters by writing off their opponents as simple racists and xenophobes; they need to show empathy for the legitimate concerns of a working class that is in serious trouble. Identity is an inherently flexible concept that can be deliberately shaped in broader or narrower ways. Liberals around the world have lost ground to populists by ignoring the broad moral appeal of national identity, which in a diverse contemporary society needs to be built around liberal and democratic values. Klein dismisses complaints about political correctness and identity politics on the left, but a politics built on the grievances of ever narrower identity groups breeds similar thinking on the right, and it cannot be the basis for a broader democratic, civic identity that is the ultimate answer to polarization.”
web.archive.org
(en) Stanford University, Francis Fukuyama. cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu. Gearchiveerd op 2 maart 2021. Geraadpleegd op 23 februari 2021.
(en) Stephen Moss (23 mei 2011). Francis Fukuyama: 'Americans are not very good at nation-building'. The Guardian. Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2022 "Fukuyama, who is 58, was born in Chicago but grew up in New York. His father is a second-generation Japanese-American whose own father fled the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and started a shop on the west coast before being interned in the second world war (that distant family experience has made Fukuyama a critic of Islamophobia). His mother, who comes from an academic family in Japan, met her husband when she came to study in the US. Some Japanese was spoken at home, but Fukuyama, an only child, never learned to speak it – "it just wasn't fashionable to be ethnic when I was growing up" – though he says his three children have embraced their dual identity and his eldest son is learning Japanese."
(en) James Atlas, What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama grew up in Manhattan's Stuyvesant Town, a middle-class housing development on the Lower East Side. His father was a Congregational minister who later became a professor of religion, and Fukuyama's own direction in the beginning was toward an academic career. As a freshman at Cornell in 1970, he was a resident of Telluride House, a sort of commune for philosophy students; Allan Bloom was the resident Socrates. They shared meals and talked philosophy until all hours, living the good life Bloom would later evoke in "The Closing of the American Mind," the professor and his disciples sitting around the cafeteria discussing the Great Books.”
(en) James Atlas, What is Fukuyama saying? And to whom is he saying it?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama majored in classics, then did graduate work in comparative literature at Yale, where he studied with the deconstructionist Paul de Man (who would achieve posthumous notoriety when it was discovered that he'd published pro-Nazi articles in the Belgian press at the height of World War II). "It was kind of an intellectual side journey," Fukuyama says.
After Yale, he spent six months in Paris, sitting in on classes with Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, whose abstruse and fashionable discours would become required reading for a generation of American graduate students. Fukuyama was less than impressed. "I was turned off by their nihilistic idea of what literature was all about," he recalls. "It had nothing to do with the world. I developed such an aversion to that whole over-intellectual approach that I turned to nuclear weapons instead." He enrolled in Harvard's government department, where he studied Middle Eastern and Soviet politics. Three years later he got a Ph.D. in political science, writing his thesis on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.”
(en) Francis Fukuyama, Huntington’s Legacy. The American Interest (27 augustus 2018). Gearchiveerd op 20 september 2022. Geraadpleegd op 20 september 2022.
(en) Our Posthuman Future: The Perils and Promise of Biotechnology 2002. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “He was a member of the political science department of the RAND Corporation from
'79 to '80, then again from '83 to '89 and from '95 to '96. He has also served as a member of the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State - first as a regular member specializing in Middle East affairs and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs.”
What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama's first job out of the academic world was at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Then, in 1981, Paul D. Wolfowitz, director of policy planning in the Reagan Administration (and also a former student of Bloom's), invited him to join his staff. Fukuyama worked in Washington for two years, then returned to Rand. For the next six years, he wrote papers for Rand on Soviet foreign policy, speculating on such weighty matters as "Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan" and "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission." In "Gorbachev and the Third World" (published in the spring 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs), Fukuyama claimed that Soviet foreign policy was still expansionist, and that despite efforts to economize at home and act conciliatory abroad, Gorbachev was quietly "trying to stake out a more combative position" in client nations like Angola and Afghanistan, Libya and Nicaragua. The message of these heavily footnoted articles was clear: The cold war is still on. Last February, shortly before he returned to Washington to become deputy to Dennis Ross, the new director of policy planning, Fukuyama gave a lecture at the University of Chicago in which he surveyed the international political scene. It was sponsored by his former professor, Allan Bloom. "My whole life has been spent in organizations that prize technical expertise," says Fukuyama. "I was anxious to deal with larger and more important issues" - what Bloom calls "the big questions." As it happened, Owen Harries, co-editor of The National Interest, was looking around for a think piece on the current situation - a piece, as Harries explains it, that would "link history with the great traditions of political thought." Harries got hold of Fukuyama's lecture and instantly recognized that it was "a provocative, stimulating essay, just what the times needed."”
(en) JANUARY 17, 1992 Mr. Fukuyama discussed his book, The End of History and the Last Man, in which he contends that the shaping forces of history tend toward liberal democracy.. C-SPAN. YouTube (17 januari 1992). Gearchiveerd op 6 januari 2023. “Fukuyama: "... and then I returned in 1989 and I was a deputy director in that same policy planning staff. But my second State Department career was cut a little bit short by the publication of the original article of the End of History, which led me to write the book." Interviewer: "Was it cut short by your decision or by the decision the State Department?" Fukyama: "No, the State Department had nothing to do with it - it was a completely voluntary decision. I simply thought that, you know, writing the book
would be an opportunity in a certain sense, that would be very hard to pass up; whereas, you know, you can be a bureaucrat anytime you want."”
(en) Our Posthuman Future. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “One of the reasons that we ended up with liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism, was that technology in the late 20th century was actually quite friendly to these kinds of institutions. The information technology revolution democratized life - instead of centralizing political control, it tended to spread it out. It gave ordinary people access to information and therefore sponsored the kinds of political values that led to what were, in my view, fairly decent political institutions. But technology is not necessarily friendly to good political values and it could be that we were on the cusp of a very major wave of technological innovation that might have different political consequences. (...) I started thinking about whether it might be the case that a different form of technology - that is to say biotechnology - would have a very different kind of political impact. In a certain sense, the reason why I think we've ended up with liberal democracy in the 20th century was that you had a couple hundred years of social and political experiments by utopian revolutionary movements that sought to remake human societies on a perfectly just basis by completely restructuring the nature of society. In my view, all of them failed: beginning with the French Revolution, but going through the Bolshevik and Chinese and Cambodian revolutions. All of these revolutions failed for one essential reason: because they ran into this brick wall called 'human nature'; that all of the revolutionaries began with a model of human nature or human behavior that was not realistic. (...) and they tried through various very crude technologies like agate prop and labor camps and re-education to get the square peg of human nature pounded into this particular round hole and at the end of the 20th century it had all failed and people had largely given up. Now, supposing that you have a technology that is much better than that that is based on a scientific understanding, for example, of the human brain; on a modern cognitive neuroscience that has its disposals much more powerful tools than labor camps and re-education. Wouldn't that lead to different possibilities for social engineering and social control? So this was the starting point where I began this, and this is why I began thinking about biotechnology and what potential political consequences it may have. (...) Let me say at the outset that I am not at all against biotechnology: it has tremendous therapeutic promise, with the discovery of stem cells, you have the possibility for the first time of regenerative medicine where you can actually recreate tissues including neurons in the brain that we had one point thought simply could not be recreated after early childhood. You have the possibility of curing many of the major diseases - cancers and heart disease and a number of other scourges of mankind - and I think I would be the last to deny the promise of this. However I think that one of the problems with this technology, is that there are some bad things or questionable things that are all wrapped up in the good things that biotechnology brings; (...) With biotechnology, I think the problems are much more subtle and they're all mixed up with the good things that it is going to bring and that's why it is much more problematic.”
(en) Francis Fukuyama, The Neoconservative Moment. The National Interest (1 juni 2004). Gearchiveerd op 18 augustus 2022. Geraadpleegd op 22 september 2022.
(en) Will immigration change the American way? — with Francis Fukuyama (1994) | THINK TANK. American Enterprise Institute. YouTube (22 april 1994). Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “And so, to my mind, the issue is really much less immigration per se as what happens to the immigrants once they get there and whether, you know, we still believe in assimilation as the ultimate goal. And the only thing that troubles me about the current immigration compared to that that occurred at the turn of the century is that our belief in assimilation is — really we don’t believe in it in the way that we once did. (...) I mean, I am not nearly as confident as you in this American assimilation machine. I mean, I think we really do have something to worry about because the multicultural ideology, I think, is very strong today. And it’s something we’re doing to ourselves. It does not necessarily have to be. And I think that that’s really [a problem].”
(en) Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “The members of the initiative group thanked Francis Fukuyama for his consistent and unequivocal support for Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war, for his publications, which tremendously helped the world gain a better understanding of Ukraine’s position.”
(en) Why red and blue America can’t hear each other anymore. The Washington Post (24 januari 2020). Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2021. “Democrats will not win back swing voters by writing off their opponents as simple racists and xenophobes; they need to show empathy for the legitimate concerns of a working class that is in serious trouble. Identity is an inherently flexible concept that can be deliberately shaped in broader or narrower ways. Liberals around the world have lost ground to populists by ignoring the broad moral appeal of national identity, which in a diverse contemporary society needs to be built around liberal and democratic values. Klein dismisses complaints about political correctness and identity politics on the left, but a politics built on the grievances of ever narrower identity groups breeds similar thinking on the right, and it cannot be the basis for a broader democratic, civic identity that is the ultimate answer to polarization.”
(en) Democracy and Its Discontents - Esquire (2018). Gearchiveerd op 30 december 2022. “"As a citizen, I am horrified," Fukuyama said of Trump. "As a political scientist, I am delighted." The rise of such a figure is "a kind of natural experiment where we get to see how theories like checks and balances work in practice and where we can gauge how strong American institutions are. It’s all just theoretical until these concepts are challenged."”
(en) Our Posthuman Future: The Perils and Promise of Biotechnology 2002. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “He was a member of the political science department of the RAND Corporation from
'79 to '80, then again from '83 to '89 and from '95 to '96. He has also served as a member of the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State - first as a regular member specializing in Middle East affairs and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs.”
(en) JANUARY 17, 1992 Mr. Fukuyama discussed his book, The End of History and the Last Man, in which he contends that the shaping forces of history tend toward liberal democracy.. C-SPAN. YouTube (17 januari 1992). Gearchiveerd op 6 januari 2023. “Fukuyama: "... and then I returned in 1989 and I was a deputy director in that same policy planning staff. But my second State Department career was cut a little bit short by the publication of the original article of the End of History, which led me to write the book." Interviewer: "Was it cut short by your decision or by the decision the State Department?" Fukyama: "No, the State Department had nothing to do with it - it was a completely voluntary decision. I simply thought that, you know, writing the book
would be an opportunity in a certain sense, that would be very hard to pass up; whereas, you know, you can be a bureaucrat anytime you want."”
(en) Our Posthuman Future. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “One of the reasons that we ended up with liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism, was that technology in the late 20th century was actually quite friendly to these kinds of institutions. The information technology revolution democratized life - instead of centralizing political control, it tended to spread it out. It gave ordinary people access to information and therefore sponsored the kinds of political values that led to what were, in my view, fairly decent political institutions. But technology is not necessarily friendly to good political values and it could be that we were on the cusp of a very major wave of technological innovation that might have different political consequences. (...) I started thinking about whether it might be the case that a different form of technology - that is to say biotechnology - would have a very different kind of political impact. In a certain sense, the reason why I think we've ended up with liberal democracy in the 20th century was that you had a couple hundred years of social and political experiments by utopian revolutionary movements that sought to remake human societies on a perfectly just basis by completely restructuring the nature of society. In my view, all of them failed: beginning with the French Revolution, but going through the Bolshevik and Chinese and Cambodian revolutions. All of these revolutions failed for one essential reason: because they ran into this brick wall called 'human nature'; that all of the revolutionaries began with a model of human nature or human behavior that was not realistic. (...) and they tried through various very crude technologies like agate prop and labor camps and re-education to get the square peg of human nature pounded into this particular round hole and at the end of the 20th century it had all failed and people had largely given up. Now, supposing that you have a technology that is much better than that that is based on a scientific understanding, for example, of the human brain; on a modern cognitive neuroscience that has its disposals much more powerful tools than labor camps and re-education. Wouldn't that lead to different possibilities for social engineering and social control? So this was the starting point where I began this, and this is why I began thinking about biotechnology and what potential political consequences it may have. (...) Let me say at the outset that I am not at all against biotechnology: it has tremendous therapeutic promise, with the discovery of stem cells, you have the possibility for the first time of regenerative medicine where you can actually recreate tissues including neurons in the brain that we had one point thought simply could not be recreated after early childhood. You have the possibility of curing many of the major diseases - cancers and heart disease and a number of other scourges of mankind - and I think I would be the last to deny the promise of this. However I think that one of the problems with this technology, is that there are some bad things or questionable things that are all wrapped up in the good things that biotechnology brings; (...) With biotechnology, I think the problems are much more subtle and they're all mixed up with the good things that it is going to bring and that's why it is much more problematic.”
(en) Will immigration change the American way? — with Francis Fukuyama (1994) | THINK TANK. American Enterprise Institute. YouTube (22 april 1994). Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “And so, to my mind, the issue is really much less immigration per se as what happens to the immigrants once they get there and whether, you know, we still believe in assimilation as the ultimate goal. And the only thing that troubles me about the current immigration compared to that that occurred at the turn of the century is that our belief in assimilation is — really we don’t believe in it in the way that we once did. (...) I mean, I am not nearly as confident as you in this American assimilation machine. I mean, I think we really do have something to worry about because the multicultural ideology, I think, is very strong today. And it’s something we’re doing to ourselves. It does not necessarily have to be. And I think that that’s really [a problem].”
