von Lingen, Kerstin (1. mars 2008). «Conspiracy of Silence: How the «Old Boys» of American Intelligence Shielded SS General Karl Wolff from Prosecution». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 1 (engelsk). 22: 74–109. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/dcn004. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «Key to his evasion of justice was his role in “Operation Sunrise”—negotiations conducted by high-ranking American, Swiss, and British officials in violation of the Western Allies' agreements with the Soviet Union—for the surrender of German forces in Italy. After 1945, these officials, including most notably Allen W. Dulles, shielded Wolff from prosecution in order to prevent information about the negotiations from coming out. The details had to be kept secret, they believed, in order to avoid a confrontation with Stalin as the Cold War took shape. New evidence suggests that the Western Allies not only failed to ensure cooperation between their respective national war crimes prosecution organizations, but in certain cases even obstructed justice by withholding evidence.»
Breitman, Richard (1. januar 2002). «New Sources on the Holocaust in Italy». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 3 (engelsk). 16: 402–414. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/16.3.402. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «In 2000 the United States National Archives opened a collection of intelligence documents containing new evidence about the October 1943 roundup and deportation of more than 1,000 Jews in Rome. This article draws upon British decodes of radio messages exchanged between SS and SD officials in Rome and Berlin to identify key participants in the decisions to deport and murder Italian Jews, and to revise the chronology of these decisions. It also shows that this evidence could have been useful in post‐World War II trials of a number of Nazi officials, such as Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Karl Wolff, and Wilhelm Harster. Finally, it suggests that the attitudes of the Italian public represented a significant obstacle for Nazi officials seeking to carry out the Final Solution in Italy.»
von Lingen, Kerstin; Salter, Michael (1. januar 2005). «Contrasting Strategies within the War Crimes Trials of Kesselring and Wolff». Liverpool Law Review. 3 (engelsk). 26: 225–266. ISSN1572-8625. doi:10.1007/s10991-005-1599-y. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «It explores the question of why Wolff, whose complicity was arguably much greater than that of Kesselring, received more favourable treatment, and the role of various political and geo-political factors, including those influencing the interventions of US intelligence officials, as explanations for this apparent legal discrepancy.»
Munzinger Personen, Munzinger IBA 00000009776, besøkt 9. oktober 2017[Hentet fra Wikidata]
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von Lingen, Kerstin (1. mars 2008). «Conspiracy of Silence: How the «Old Boys» of American Intelligence Shielded SS General Karl Wolff from Prosecution». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 1 (engelsk). 22: 74–109. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/dcn004. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «Key to his evasion of justice was his role in “Operation Sunrise”—negotiations conducted by high-ranking American, Swiss, and British officials in violation of the Western Allies' agreements with the Soviet Union—for the surrender of German forces in Italy. After 1945, these officials, including most notably Allen W. Dulles, shielded Wolff from prosecution in order to prevent information about the negotiations from coming out. The details had to be kept secret, they believed, in order to avoid a confrontation with Stalin as the Cold War took shape. New evidence suggests that the Western Allies not only failed to ensure cooperation between their respective national war crimes prosecution organizations, but in certain cases even obstructed justice by withholding evidence.»
Breitman, Richard (1. januar 2002). «New Sources on the Holocaust in Italy». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 3 (engelsk). 16: 402–414. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/16.3.402. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «In 2000 the United States National Archives opened a collection of intelligence documents containing new evidence about the October 1943 roundup and deportation of more than 1,000 Jews in Rome. This article draws upon British decodes of radio messages exchanged between SS and SD officials in Rome and Berlin to identify key participants in the decisions to deport and murder Italian Jews, and to revise the chronology of these decisions. It also shows that this evidence could have been useful in post‐World War II trials of a number of Nazi officials, such as Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Karl Wolff, and Wilhelm Harster. Finally, it suggests that the attitudes of the Italian public represented a significant obstacle for Nazi officials seeking to carry out the Final Solution in Italy.»
von Lingen, Kerstin (1. mars 2008). «Conspiracy of Silence: How the «Old Boys» of American Intelligence Shielded SS General Karl Wolff from Prosecution». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 1 (engelsk). 22: 74–109. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/dcn004. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «Key to his evasion of justice was his role in “Operation Sunrise”—negotiations conducted by high-ranking American, Swiss, and British officials in violation of the Western Allies' agreements with the Soviet Union—for the surrender of German forces in Italy. After 1945, these officials, including most notably Allen W. Dulles, shielded Wolff from prosecution in order to prevent information about the negotiations from coming out. The details had to be kept secret, they believed, in order to avoid a confrontation with Stalin as the Cold War took shape. New evidence suggests that the Western Allies not only failed to ensure cooperation between their respective national war crimes prosecution organizations, but in certain cases even obstructed justice by withholding evidence.»
Breitman, Richard (1. januar 2002). «New Sources on the Holocaust in Italy». Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 3 (engelsk). 16: 402–414. ISSN8756-6583. doi:10.1093/hgs/16.3.402. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «In 2000 the United States National Archives opened a collection of intelligence documents containing new evidence about the October 1943 roundup and deportation of more than 1,000 Jews in Rome. This article draws upon British decodes of radio messages exchanged between SS and SD officials in Rome and Berlin to identify key participants in the decisions to deport and murder Italian Jews, and to revise the chronology of these decisions. It also shows that this evidence could have been useful in post‐World War II trials of a number of Nazi officials, such as Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Karl Wolff, and Wilhelm Harster. Finally, it suggests that the attitudes of the Italian public represented a significant obstacle for Nazi officials seeking to carry out the Final Solution in Italy.»
von Lingen, Kerstin; Salter, Michael (1. januar 2005). «Contrasting Strategies within the War Crimes Trials of Kesselring and Wolff». Liverpool Law Review. 3 (engelsk). 26: 225–266. ISSN1572-8625. doi:10.1007/s10991-005-1599-y. Besøkt 26. februar 2020. «It explores the question of why Wolff, whose complicity was arguably much greater than that of Kesselring, received more favourable treatment, and the role of various political and geo-political factors, including those influencing the interventions of US intelligence officials, as explanations for this apparent legal discrepancy.»
