The Russian World in Moscow’s Grand Strategy www.csis.org Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). av Igor Zevelev. August 2016. sitat:The concepts of “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” have evolved within two different yet overlapping discourses. Each of these concepts has its own intellectual history. However, these ideas have something in common. Basically they both reflect the tension between actual Russian Federation state borders and the mental maps of “Russianness” that exist in the minds of many Russians. (...) Of the Russian communities abroad, none faces a greater challenge than that in Ukraine. Today, Ukraine is effectively a lost cause within the context of the Russian World. For much of the Ukrainian population and for the entire political class, the idea of the Russian World has become synonymous with war.
doi.org
dx.doi.org
«Menneskerettigheter og Den russisk-ortodokse kirke: opportunisme, autoritarianisme eller ortodoks nasjonalisme?» Hans Morten Haugen (2017) Nordisk Østforum 31, 45–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/noros.v31.726 sitat:Uavhengig av hvilke endringer som faktisk har funnet sted, er det sterke felles interesser mellom den russiske stat og ROK i å bevare tradisjonelle verdier og fremme patriotisme og en anti-vestlig agenda. Gjennom å gjensidig legitimere hverandre bidrar ROK og dagens russiske regime til hverandres opprettholdelse. Mens Stoeckl og March peker på en endring der dialogorienterte tradisjonalister nå preger ROK fremfor sterkt intolerante fundamentalister, er andre skeptiske til at vi faktisk ser slike endringer, og hevder at vi snarere ser en tilbakevending til ortodokse verdier (Agadjanian 2010: 100). Forklaringer på en slik tilbakevending finner vi i et felles ønske mellom regimet og ROK om en forent anti-vestlig front. I tillegg, som vi kommer tilbake til under, har vi sett en revitalisering av teologiske begreper om sakralisering av nasjoner og guddommeliggjøring av mennesker, og en utvidelse av fellesskapsbegreper til å omfatte fellesskapet skapt gjennom ROK.
foreignpolicy.com
Young, Benjamin R. (6. mars 2022). «Putin Has a Grimly Absolute Vision of the ‘Russian World’». Foreign Policy(engelsk). Besøkt 8. april 2022. «Putin believes an invasion of Ukraine is a righteous cause and necessary for the dignity of the Russian civilization, which he sees as being genetically and historically superior to other Eastern European identities. The idea of protecting Russian-speakers in Eurasia has been a key part of Putin's "Russkiy Mir" worldview and 21st-century Russian identity. Under the rubric of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), Putin's government promotes the idea that Russia is not a mere nation-state but a civilization-state that has an important role to play in world history. While the Kremlin refers to the Ukrainian government as "Nazis," the actual neo-fascist ideologues in this conflict are those in the Russian leadership. Beginning as far back as 1994, Russian political elites started talking about a uniquely Eurasianist Russian civilization. In 1997, Russian post-liberal, neo-fascist philosopher Alexander Dugin, later an advisor to Putin, published his foundational book, Foundations of Geopolitics. Referred to as Putin's Rasputin, Dugin argues that the world order is shaped by competition between Sea Powers (Atlanticists), such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU countries, and Land Powers (Eurasianists), such as Russia. (...) Beginning in 2012, Putin began to refer to a distinct Russian civilizational identity and explained that "the self-definition of the Russian people is that of a multiethnic civilization." Included within this civilizational framework are ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in former Soviet republics that extend beyond Russia's national borders. In 2020, Putin appeared on state television and said that Russia's unique civilizational identity needed to be protected via genetics and technological sophistication. This ideology positions contemporary Russia as a global bastion of traditional values and national conservatism. Most of all, it argues that the Kremlin has a duty and right to defend the interests and culture of Russian-speakers all over the world. Putin rejects the Westphalian state system for an irredentist vision of an expansionist Russian civilization. (...) While security concerns regarding NATO expansion are certainly important to the Kremlin, the politico-cultural role that Ukraine plays in contemporary Russian ideology is of greater value to Putin's long-term vision of a rejuvenated Russian World. In February 2021, Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine as a part of Russkiy Mir. Simply put, Putin and his circle genuinely do not believe Ukraine is a real country. To them, Ukraine has become too linguistically, culturally, and spiritually separated from Russian civilization. In the paranoid and Manichaean worldview of the Kremlin, the renegade region known in the West as "Ukraine" needs to be reconnected with its motherland, Russia. Russian history and civilization demand it.»
Bremer, Thomas (22. mars 2022). «Ukrainian Nationhood, “Russkii Mir,” and the Abuse of History». Public Orthodoxy(engelsk). The Orthodox Christian Studies Center of Fordham University. Besøkt 8. april 2022. «Many observers of the current war in Ukraine who try to analyze its deeper reasons refer to the idea of a “Russian World,” “Russkii Mir.” This idea, they claim, is the key concept behind the Russian aggression, and shows the tight connection between religion and politics in Russia. A glance at the website of the Moscow Patriarchate, however, shows that in recent years the term has been used very rarely—and then mostly to refer to a foundation called “Russkii Mir,” established by President Putin and meant to promote Russian culture and the knowledge of the Russian language abroad. True, high-ranking representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church have played an important role in that foundation from the time of its 2007 creation. But what does that have to do with Ukraine now?»
Assessment of the Future of 'Russkiy Mir' in Russia’s Grand Strategy realcleardefense.com av Gabriela Rosa-Hernández. Artikkel. sitat:Summary: In October 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the 7th World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad and approved a migration policy. In 2014, Russia utilized its "Russian World" rhetoric to justify its illegal annexation of Crimea and its support of secessionist groups in the Donbass. Following Russia’s demographic decline, and its economic issues; it is likely that the "Russian World" narrative will continue and focus on compatriot resettlement.
russkiymir.ru
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
Alexei Dolinsky (2. mars 2011). «How to Strengthen Soft Power?». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 2. juni 2012. Besøkt 20. desember 2011.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 2. juni 2012. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
«: About». russkiymir.ru. Arkivert fra originalen 7. august 2020. Besøkt 10. august 2020. «Access was denied | Error code 1020 | You do not have access to russkiymir.ru. | The site owner may have set restrictions that prevent you from accessing the site. Contact the site owner for access or try loading the page again.»
themoscowtimes.com
Russia Is a ‘Distinct Civilization,’ Putin Saysthemoscowtimes.com sitat :"Russia is not just a country, it’s really a separate civilization. If we want to preserve this civilization, we should focus on high-level technology and its future development," Putin said.
uacrisis.org
"Russkiy Mir" as the Kremlin’s Quasi-ideology uacrisis.org sitat:The Kremlin defines anyone who, according to Vladimir Putin, "speaks and thinks in Russian", as a part of "Russkiy Mir". On such grounds Dmitriy Peskov, the spokesperson of the Russian President, has named Ukraine as a part of "Russkiy Mir" in February 2021. It yet again underlines the expansionist nature of the concept and refusal to agree with the national self-determination of other states.
uio.no
hf.uio.no
The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Diplomacy uio.no Universitetet i Oslo, Senter for slaviske og østeuropeiske studier, invitasjon til Arrangement 2020, Alicja Curanović (Universitetet i Warszawa) skal holde foredrag om den russisk-ortodokse kirkens stadig mer fremtredende rolle i russisk statsdiplomati. Sitat:The Church and the state in Russia The Russian Federation's use of religion in foreign policy is exercised with a growing efficiency. This is, to a certain degree, a consequence of processes taking place in Russia: For many Russians, including the political elite, religion is a crucial component of tradition and as such the foundation of values for spiritual recovery of Russian society and Russia regaining its power status. The religious diplomacy is therefore a part of a wider phenomenon of rapprochement between Church and state in Russia. The Church as a valuable diplomatic asset Religion appears frequently in Russia’s official concepts of state policy: The country is depicted as a “civilisational pole” with its own cultural space (russkiy mir) and mission (i.e. promoting interfaith dialogue). Both russkiy mir and interfaith dialogue are connected with state security and soft power. Loyal religious organisations, capable of conducting transnational activity, are a valuable asset of state diplomacy. This is the case of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Religiøs og nasjonal symbolikk som virkemidler i sosiale medier Nicolaysen, Vegard, masteroppgave religion 2019. Universitetet i Agder sitat: Den russisk-ortodokse kirkeog Russland forholder seg til landegrenser på ulike måter. Den russiske føderasjonen forholder seg i stor grad til en politisk landegrense, mens kirken har medlemmer over hele verden. (...) Ifølge Patriark Kirill gjelder begrepet alle som helt eller delvis baserer sin nasjonale identitet på «Russian spiritual and cultural foundations …».42 Med Russkiy Mir Foundation kan statsmakten bidra til å danne et grunnlag for nasjonal bevissthet utover statens grenser, som igjen kan bli til nasjonalisme når ens eget samfunn tilsynelatende blir truet.
web.archive.org
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
«About Russkiy Mir Foundation». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 21. september 2013. Besøkt 1. september 2013.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 21. september 2013. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
Alexei Dolinsky (2. mars 2011). «How to Strengthen Soft Power?». Russkiy Mir Foundation. Arkivert fra originalen 2. juni 2012. Besøkt 20. desember 2011.«Arkivert kopi». Archived from the original on 2. juni 2012. Besøkt 8. april 2022.CS1-vedlikehold: Uheldig URL (link)
«: About». russkiymir.ru. Arkivert fra originalen 7. august 2020. Besøkt 10. august 2020. «Access was denied | Error code 1020 | You do not have access to russkiymir.ru. | The site owner may have set restrictions that prevent you from accessing the site. Contact the site owner for access or try loading the page again.»