Argumento do conhecimento (Portuguese Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Argumento do conhecimento" in Portuguese language version.

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Ver Dennett 1991, p. 398 & Dennett 2006. Dennett, Daniel (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN 978-0-316-18065-8. OCLC 23648691 Dennett, Daniel (2006). «What RoboMary Knows». In: Alter, Torin. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517165-5. OCLC 63195957
Lycan, William G., ed. (1990). Mind and cognition: a reader. Basil Blackwell. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: [s.n.] ISBN 978-0631160762
Churchland, Paul M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts: [s.n.] ISBN 978-0262031516
Chalmers, David John (1996). The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press. Col: Philosophy of mind series. New York: [s.n.] ISBN 978-0195105537

doi.org

dx.doi.org

Jackson 1982, p. 130 Jackson, Frank (1982). «Epiphenomenal Qualia». Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (127): 127–136. JSTOR 2960077. doi:10.2307/2960077
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). «Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States». The Journal of Philosophy. 82 (1): 8–28. JSTOR 2026509. doi:10.2307/2026509
Jackson, Frank (1986). «What Mary Didn't Know». The Journal of Philosophy. 83 (5): 291–295. JSTOR 2026143. doi:10.2307/2026143
Jackson 1982, p. 130. Jackson, Frank (1982). «Epiphenomenal Qualia». Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (127): 127–136. JSTOR 2960077. doi:10.2307/2960077
Graham, George; Horgan, Terence (maio de 2000). «Mary Mary, Quite Contrary». Philosophical Studies (em inglês). 99 (1): 59–87. ISSN 0031-8116. doi:10.1023/A:1018779425306
Maloney, J. Christopher (março de 1985). «About being a bat». Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 63 (1): 26–49. ISSN 0004-8402. doi:10.1080/00048408512341671
Alter, Torin (1997). «A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument». Philosophical Studies. 90 (1): 35–56. JSTOR 4320837. doi:10.1023/a:1004290020847
Lewis, David (18 de agosto de 1983). Philosophical Papers Volume I - Oxford Scholarship. Oxford University Press. [S.l.: s.n.] ISBN 9780199833382. doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
Levin, Janet (1986). «Could Love Be like a Heatwave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience». Philosophical Studies. 49 (2): 245–261. JSTOR 4319824. doi:10.1007/bf00354338
Conee, Earl (junho de 1994). «Phenomenal knowledge». Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 72 (2): 136–150. ISSN 0004-8402. doi:10.1080/00048409412345971
Gertier, Brie (março de 1999). «A Defense of the Knowledge Argument». Philosophical Studies (em inglês). 93 (3): 317–336. ISSN 0031-8116. doi:10.1023/A:1004216101557
Nida‐Rümelin, Martine (2007). «Grasping Phenomenal Properties». Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. [S.l.: s.n.] pp. 307–338. ISBN 9780195171655. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0013

google.com.br

books.google.com.br

Ravenscroft, Ian (2005). Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide (em inglês). [S.l.]: Oxford University Press

ingentaconnect.com

Ramachandran, V. S.; Edward M. Hubbard. (1 de janeiro de 2001). «Synaesthesia – A window into perception, thought and language». Journal of Consciousness Studies

jstor.org

Jackson 1982, p. 130 Jackson, Frank (1982). «Epiphenomenal Qualia». Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (127): 127–136. JSTOR 2960077. doi:10.2307/2960077
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). «Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States». The Journal of Philosophy. 82 (1): 8–28. JSTOR 2026509. doi:10.2307/2026509
Jackson, Frank (1986). «What Mary Didn't Know». The Journal of Philosophy. 83 (5): 291–295. JSTOR 2026143. doi:10.2307/2026143
Jackson 1982, p. 130. Jackson, Frank (1982). «Epiphenomenal Qualia». Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (127): 127–136. JSTOR 2960077. doi:10.2307/2960077
Alter, Torin (1997). «A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument». Philosophical Studies. 90 (1): 35–56. JSTOR 4320837. doi:10.1023/a:1004290020847
Levin, Janet (1986). «Could Love Be like a Heatwave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience». Philosophical Studies. 49 (2): 245–261. JSTOR 4319824. doi:10.1007/bf00354338

princeton.edu

Pettit, Philip (2004). «Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument». In: Jackson, Frank. There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (em inglês). [S.l.]: MIT Press

sciam.com

Ramachandran, V. S.; Edward M. Hubbard. (14 de abril de 2003). «More Common Questions about Synesthesia». Scientific American

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

Nida-Ruemelin, Martine (2015). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University

tufts.edu

ase.tufts.edu

Ver Dennett 1991, p. 398 & Dennett 2006. Dennett, Daniel (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN 978-0-316-18065-8. OCLC 23648691 Dennett, Daniel (2006). «What RoboMary Knows». In: Alter, Torin. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517165-5. OCLC 63195957

ubc.ca

webcat1.library.ubc.ca

Flanagan, Owen J. (1 de janeiro de 1992). Consciousness reconsidered. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts: [s.n.] ISBN 978-0262061483
Tye, Michael (2000). Consciousness, color, and content. MIT Press. Col: Representation and mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: [s.n.] ISBN 978-0262201292
Tye, Michael (2009). Consciousness revisited: materialism without phenomenal concepts. MIT Press. Col: Representation and mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: [s.n.] ISBN 9780262012737

worldcat.org

Graham, George; Horgan, Terence (maio de 2000). «Mary Mary, Quite Contrary». Philosophical Studies (em inglês). 99 (1): 59–87. ISSN 0031-8116. doi:10.1023/A:1018779425306
Ver Dennett 1991, p. 398 & Dennett 2006. Dennett, Daniel (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN 978-0-316-18065-8. OCLC 23648691 Dennett, Daniel (2006). «What RoboMary Knows». In: Alter, Torin. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517165-5. OCLC 63195957
Maloney, J. Christopher (março de 1985). «About being a bat». Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 63 (1): 26–49. ISSN 0004-8402. doi:10.1080/00048408512341671
Conee, Earl (junho de 1994). «Phenomenal knowledge». Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 72 (2): 136–150. ISSN 0004-8402. doi:10.1080/00048409412345971
Gertier, Brie (março de 1999). «A Defense of the Knowledge Argument». Philosophical Studies (em inglês). 93 (3): 317–336. ISSN 0031-8116. doi:10.1023/A:1004216101557