Bergmann 2005, p. 352: "use of the term... is inconsistent in the literature" Bergmann, Werner (2005), «Pogrom», in: Heitmeyer, Wilhelm; Hagan, John, International handbook of violence research, ISBN9781402039805, 1, Springer, p. 351
Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East Central Europe, Chapter by Neal Pease, "This Troublesome Question", p 60, "Blatant and brutal attacks against Jews emphatically did occur, but opinions differed then, and continue to differ now, about the applicability of the term "pogrom" to these incidents... [footnote] For example, Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars, describes these actions as pogroms, while Norman Davies says flatly that they were no such thing, God's Playground: A History of Poland, and Europe: A History. Jerzy Tomaszewski, ed. Najnowsze dziejow Zydow w Polsce, labels the Lwow riots of November 1918 a pogrom, but not the Pinsk affair. The disagreement does not so much concern the facts of what happened, but how to characterize them. For its part, the Morgenthau report consciously strove to limit usage of the word "pogrom" as an elastic and imprecise term applied indiscriminately to a broad range of actions, from individual muggings to concerted mob attacks, instead employing the more general, less emotive "excesses"."
Anti-Jewish Violence. Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History. Edited by Jonathan Dekel-Chen, David Gaunt, Natan M. Meir, and Israel Bartal, Chapter 1 "What's in a pogrom?", pp 23-24 "As it turns out, the large majority of the events or sets of events listed in the previous paragraphs, though manifestly dissimilar in detail, appear to display a surprising number of shared characteristics. To begin with, all took place in divided societies in which ethnicity or religion (or both) served as significant definers of both social boundaries and social rank. Moreover, all involved collective violent applications of force by members of what perpetrators believed to be a higher-ranking ethnic or religious group against members of what they considered a lower-ranking or subaltern group. Indeed, those against whom such force was applied were identified primarily on the basis of their group membership, not because of anything they might have said or done as ethnically or religiously unlabeled individuals; at most it can be said that the appliers of the decisive force tended to interpret the behavior of victims according to stereotypes commonly applied to the groups to which they belonged. Either during or following violence, perpetrators expressed some complaint about the victims’ group, claiming collective injury or violation of one or more of their own group’s cardinal values or legitimate prerogatives as a result of some action allegedly taken on behalf of the lower-ranking group by one or more of its members, or by that group as a whole. And, according to the perpetrators, the injured, higher-ranking group could be made whole only through violent action unmediated by the mechanisms that the state normally provided for resolution of disputes or redress of grievances. In other words, the episodes in question all seem to have embodied a fundamental lack of confidence on the part of those who purveyed decisive violence in the adequacy of the impersonal rule of law to deliver true justice in the event of a heinous wrong. In the perpetrators’ hierarchy of values the transgressions of the lower-ranking group were of such magnitude that the legitimate order of things could be restored only when either they themselves took the law into their own hands or--as in Pinsk in 1919, Ukraine during the Russian Civil War, Kristallnacht, or Iasi in 1941--instruments of the state or claimants to state power bypassed normal political and legal channels in favor of direct action against the offenders. Such a moral balance made perpetrators believe that what they had done was right, even where, as in the majority of the cases at hand, state authorities representing the community whose integrity they sought to defend told them the opposite by trying them for their misdeeds. Please note: I do not claim that these features, taken together, constitute the essential defining characteristics of a 'pogrom.' My claim is merely that it is possible to identify a set of historical incidents that display all of those characteristics."
Magalhães, João Carlos MagalhãesBruno SousaJoão Carlos; de 2019, Bruno Sousa22 de Novembro; 20h10. «O estranho ódio de Olavo de Carvalho aos judeus». The Intercept Brasil. Consultado em 29 de maio de 2022
