Epistemologia bayesiana (Portuguese Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Epistemologia bayesiana" in Portuguese language version.

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18philpapers.org

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13doi.org

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9stanford.edu

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2utm.edu

1,379^th place

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1oxfordreference.com

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1handle.net

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doi.org

dx.doi.org

Dorst, Kevin (2019). «Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy». Mind. 128 (509): 175–211. doi:10.1093/mind/fzx028
Locke, Dustin Troy (2014). «The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis». Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 57 (1): 28–54. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.858421
Pettigrew, Richard (2018). «Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96 (3): 749–754. doi:10.1111/phpr.12501
Meacham, Christopher J. G. (2015). «Understanding Conditionalization». Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 45 (5): 767–797. doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1119611
Trpin, Borut (2020). «Jeffrey Conditionalization: Proceed with Caution». Philosophical Studies. 177 (10): 2985–3012. doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Fitelson, Branden; Hawthorne, James (2010). «How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens». Springer. The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 284: 247–275. ISBN 978-90-481-3614-8. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11
Shogenji, Tomoji (1999). «Is Coherence Truth Conducive?». Analysis. 59 (4): 338–345. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00191
Pettigrew, Richard (2016). «Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92 (1): 35–59. doi:10.1111/phpr.12097. hdl:1983/27124cd3-9c62-41d8-b4bf-88312b23deeb
Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2014). «Description and the Problem of Priors». Erkenntnis. 79 (6): 1343–1353. doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9604-2
Eva, Benjamin (2019). «Principles of Indifference». Journal of Philosophy. 116 (7): 390–411. doi:10.5840/jphil2019116724
Dogramaci, Sinan (2018). «Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience». Philosophical Issues. 28 (1): 107–128. doi:10.1111/phis.12118
Hawke, Peter; Özgün, Aybüke; Berto, Francesco (2020). «The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience». Journal of Philosophical Logic. 49 (4): 727–766. doi:10.1007/s10992-019-09536-6
Howson, Colin (1991). «The 'Old Evidence' Problem». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 42 (4): 547–555. doi:10.1093/bjps/42.4.547

handle.net

hdl.handle.net

Pettigrew, Richard (2016). «Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92 (1): 35–59. doi:10.1111/phpr.12097. hdl:1983/27124cd3-9c62-41d8-b4bf-88312b23deeb

oxfordreference.com

«prior probability». Oxford Reference (em inglês). Consultado em 6 de março de 2021

philpapers.org

Olsson, Erik J. (2018). «Bayesian Epistemology». Introduction to Formal Philosophy. [S.l.]: Springer. pp. 431–442
Hartmann, Stephan; Sprenger, Jan (2010). «Bayesian Epistemology». The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. [S.l.]: London: Routledge. pp. 609–620
Hájek, Alan; Lin, Hanti (2017). «A Tale of Two Epistemologies?». Res Philosophica. 94 (2): 207–232. doi:10.5840/resphilosophica201794264 (inativo 6 de maio de 2021)
Dorst, Kevin (2019). «Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy». Mind. 128 (509): 175–211. doi:10.1093/mind/fzx028
Locke, Dustin Troy (2014). «The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis». Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 57 (1): 28–54. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.858421
Pettigrew, Richard (2018). «Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96 (3): 749–754. doi:10.1111/phpr.12501
Weisberg, Jonathan (2011). «Varieties of Bayesianism: 2.2 The Degree of Belief Interpretation». Handbook of the History of Logic: Inductive logic. [S.l.: s.n.]
Meacham, Christopher J. G. (2015). «Understanding Conditionalization». Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 45 (5): 767–797. doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1119611
Trpin, Borut (2020). «Jeffrey Conditionalization: Proceed with Caution». Philosophical Studies. 177 (10): 2985–3012. doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Pettigrew, Richard (2020). The Dutch Book Arguments. [S.l.]: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Fitelson, Branden; Hawthorne, James (2010). «How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens». Springer. The Place of Probability in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 284: 247–275. ISBN 978-90-481-3614-8. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11
Shogenji, Tomoji (1999). «Is Coherence Truth Conducive?». Analysis. 59 (4): 338–345. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00191
Pettigrew, Richard (2016). «Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference». Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92 (1): 35–59. doi:10.1111/phpr.12097. hdl:1983/27124cd3-9c62-41d8-b4bf-88312b23deeb
Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2014). «Description and the Problem of Priors». Erkenntnis. 79 (6): 1343–1353. doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9604-2
Eva, Benjamin (2019). «Principles of Indifference». Journal of Philosophy. 116 (7): 390–411. doi:10.5840/jphil2019116724
Dogramaci, Sinan (2018). «Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience». Philosophical Issues. 28 (1): 107–128. doi:10.1111/phis.12118
Hawke, Peter; Özgün, Aybüke; Berto, Francesco (2020). «The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience». Journal of Philosophical Logic. 49 (4): 727–766. doi:10.1007/s10992-019-09536-6
Howson, Colin (1991). «The 'Old Evidence' Problem». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 42 (4): 547–555. doi:10.1093/bjps/42.4.547

stanford.edu

plato.stanford.edu

Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). «Epistemology». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 5 de março de 2021
Talbott, William (2016). «Bayesian Epistemology». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 6 de março de 2021
Hájek, Alan (2019). «Interpretations of Probability: 3.3 The Subjective Interpretation». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 6 de março de 2021
Vineberg, Susan (2016). «Dutch Book Arguments». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 6 de março de 2021
Talbott, William. «Bayesian Epistemology > Dutch Book Arguments (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)». plato.stanford.edu
Crupi, Vincenzo (2021). «Confirmation». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 6 de março de 2021
Young, James O. (2018). «The Coherence Theory of Truth». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 4 de março de 2021
Olsson, Erik (2017). «Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Consultado em 4 de março de 2021
Goldman, Alvin; O'Connor, Cailin (2021). «Social Epistemology». The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University

utm.edu

iep.utm.edu

Truncellito, David A. «Epistemology». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado em 5 de março de 2021
Huber, Franz. «Confirmation and Induction». Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consultado em 6 de março de 2021