[4] "Sending in Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) rather than regular army troops, and dispatching the Ayatollah Sadiq Khalkhali—the “Hanging Judge”—resulted in the deaths of nearly 10,000 Kurds in the 1979‐82 period alone, many in mass executions ordered by Khalkhali."
Denise, N. The Kurds And the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran:p.145 2005. Siracuse University Press. "Instead of creating a cohesive Kurdish nationalist movement, some Kurdish leaders such as Husayni's brother Shaykh Jalal accepted Iraqi military assistance and formed a Sunni militia opposed to the Iranian government and Kurdish nationalist parties. Qasimlu differentiated his real Kurdish nationalist party from traitors within the KDPI. Others, such as the prominent Ghani Bolourian, tried to negotiate with the central government. After the revolution some Shi'a Kurds from Ilam, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan turned away from Kurdish nationalists and towards non-Kurdish Shi'a communities. Sunni Kurdish leftists continued to direct the nationalist project in their enclave in Kurdistan Province, having marginal influence over Shi'a Kurds in other regions."
[1]
Denise, N. The Kurds And the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran:p.144-5. 2005. Siracuse University Press. "Free to discuss its political views, the KDPI came out of thirty years of clandestine existence and made public claims for political autonomy"; "Despite its criticisms of the regime, in its early post-revolutionary public discourses the KDPI called itself an authentically national and Iranian party". [5]
books.google.co.il
Ward, R.S. Immortal: a military history of Iran and its armed forces. 2009. pp.231-233. [2]
