American Army Interrogation Reports, feldmaršal von Weichs, ANNEX A - PARTISAN WARFARE "Mihailovićeve trupe nekada su se borile protiv naših okupacionih snaga zbog odanosti svom kralju. U isto vreme borili su se protiv Tita, zbog antikomunističkih ubeđenja. Ovaj rat na dva fronta nije mogao dugo da traje, posebno kad je britanska podrška favorisala Tita. Posledično, Mihailović je pokazao pro-nemačke sklonosti. (Maximilian von Weichs)"
NARA, T501, Roll 248, frame no. 000289. (njem."Sperrgruppen: Loyale Cetniks unter deutscher Führung von Bronzani Majdan im Vorgehen nach NW. Feind bei Piskavica wird eingeschlossen. Nord und West keine besonderen Ereignisse.")
NARA, T501, Roll 248, frames no. 000298—000299. (njem."Sperrgruppen: Kroat. Verbände haben in Anschluss an Gruppe "Fritz" die Sicherung W Banja Luka nach W übernommen. Höhen N und NW Bronzani Majdan feindbesetzt. Angriff nationaler Cetniks auf diese Höhen in Durchführung. Verbindung zwischen kroat. Freiwilligen bei Sanski Most und nationalen Cetniks in Bronzani Majdan bei Debeljak hergestellt.")
BRITANSKA POLITIKA PREMA POKRETU OTPORA U JUGOSLAVIJI I GRČKOJ, - referati i diskusije sa konferencije iz maja 1973. održane u engl.School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University of London)' - engl.Phyllis Auty i Richard Clogg, urednici, Delo, Ljubljana-Zagreb 1978 - glava 12. Diskusija o izlaganjima engl.E. Baker, engl.Bailey-a, engl.Maclean-a i engl.Taylor-a str. 458-459
citirano u: F.W.D. Deakin: Embattled mountain, New York : Oxford University Press, 1971, u prevodu na srpski: F. V. D. Dikin: Bojovna planina, Nolit 1973
BRITANSKA POLITIKA PREMA POKRETU OTPORA U JUGOSLAVIJI I GRČKOJ, - referati i diskusije sa konferencije iz maja 1973. održane u engl.School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University of London)' - engl.Phyllis Auty i engl.Richard Clogg, urednici, Delo, Ljubljana-Zagreb 1978 - glava 4. Britanska politika prema Draži Mihailoviću, referat engl.S. W. Bailey, str. 341
GENERAL EISENHOWER stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theater... He believed that all possible equipment should be sent to Tito since Mikhailovitch’s forces were of relatively little value. SEXTANT/EUREKA CONFERENCES (Cairo and Tehran. 22 November-7 December 1943), strana 445
Turning to Yugoslavia, GENERAL BROOKE said that since the withdrawal of Italian forces there, the Germans have found it difficult to maintain their communications in that country. Therefore, full advantage must be taken of all opportunities to increase the German difficulties in Yugoslavia by assisting the Partisans. It is desired to organize a system by which arms can be supplied to them and air assistance rendered as well. GENERAL BROOKE said that there were now some 21 German divisions deployed in Yugoslavia as far down as the Grecian border. SEXTANT/EUREKA CONFERENCES (Cairo and Tehran. 22 November-7 December 1943), strane 528-529
Splendid things had been accomplished in Yugoslavia by Tito, who is doing much more than Mihailovich had accomplished. There were no plans to put a large army into Yugoslavia, but a blow could be struck at the Germans by means of assisting the Tito forces through increased supplies. SEXTANT/EUREKA CONFERENCES (Cairo and Tehran. 22 November-7 December 1943), strana 519
OVAVEŠTENjE O SPORAZUMU IZMEĐU PUKOVNIKA JEVREMA SIMIĆA I KAPETANA NIKOLE KALABIĆA SA NEMAČKIM PREDSTAVNIKOM OD 27. NOVEMBRA 1943. - https://www.znaci.org/00001/4_14_3_262.htm
Zabeleška sa sastanka načelnika štaba komande jugoistoka fon Gajtnera i Neška Nedića održanog 20. avgusta 1944, Nacionalna arhiva Vašington, T311, rolna 195, frejmovi 978-81[mrtav link]
Službena beleška sa referisanja Hitleru o planu saradnje sa četnicima od 22.8.1944. Nacionalna arhiva Vašington, T311, rolna 192, frejmovi 802-812, Zbornik NOR-a XII/4, dokument 112
Thomas T. Matteson, Commander, USCG: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE RESCUE AND EVACUATION OF ALLIED AIRCREWMEN FROM YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1945 "To some, it may be difficult to understand how the Chetniks could rescue American Airmen from the Germans, as they did in at least one instance, and, at the same time, collaborate with these very same forces. The answer rests in the Chetniks' perception of who vas really the enemy. The Chetniks considered the Partisan communist movement a far greater threat to Yugoslavia than the German occupation forces. Renewed American support was Mihailovic's only means of reversing the Partisan takeover. There was absolutely nothing to be gained by turning American airmen over to the Germans. In fact, evacuated Americans were a significant source of first rate public relations on behalf of the Chetniks. In late 1944. only Americans displayed any outward concern for what might happen to the Chetniks when the Partisans gained control. To do anything except rescue and protect American airmen would mean the loss of their last source of support and salvation."
Basil Davidson: PARTISAN PICTURE "General Mihaylovitch saw his contribution to the common cause in turning anti-German feeling into anti-partisan feeling. Only on the most Jesuitical grounds can his action be represented as anything but damaging to the cause of the Allies."
