Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Aneksija" in Slovenian language version.
Conquest and annexation are not synonymous either. The latter term is used within and outside the context of armed conflicts, to designate a unilateral decision adopted by a State in order to extend its sovereignty over a given territory. In many cases, the effective occupation of a terra nullius was followed by a declaration of annexation, in order to incorporate the territory under the sovereignty of the acquiring State. In the context of armed conflicts, annexation is the case in which the victorious State unilaterally declares that it is henceforth sovereign over the territory having passed under its control as a result of hostilities. This attempt at producing a transfer of sovereignty through the exclusive decision of the victor is not generally recognized as valid, both in classical and in contemporary international law. An example of a case of annexation preceding the adoption of the UN Charter is the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908. The annexation was not recognized by the major Powers and required a modification of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin which had simply granted Austria-Hungary the right to administer the territory. Another example is the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936. Examples of purported contemporary annexations are the Golan Heights annexed by Israel in 1980 and Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, both declared null and void by the Security Council, or the incorporation of Crimea and the City of Sebastopol in the Russian Federation.
However, in an era which has repudiated the 'right of conquest', the term 'annexation' is discreetly avoided by all states effecting acquisitions of territory by force.
Unlike cession, whereby territory is given or sold through treaty, annexation is a unilateral act made effective by actual possession and legitimized by general recognition.
…today's legal prohibition of conquest creates an incentive for states to obfuscate the reality of annexation that did not exist when such actions were lawful. Excessive formalism, accordingly, seems misplaced when assessing whether a state has manifested an intention to hold a territory "under its dominion" with sufficient clarity to constitute an unlawful annexation. Indeed, state practice offers no shortage of examples in which the international community has looked past a state's formal characterization of its actions when evaluating their lawfulness for this purpose—most recently in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea. Accordingly, while a formal act of annexation is powerful evidence of intent, the lack of one is by no means dispositive. What other kinds of acts signal such an intention? As noted above, it may be signaled by a state's exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign. An occupant's refusal to accept the law of occupation's applicability would seem probative for drawing this conclusion—as would a refusal to comply with duties under that law that relate specifically to distinguishing the rights of an occupant from those of a sovereign.
…today's legal prohibition of conquest creates an incentive for states to obfuscate the reality of annexation that did not exist when such actions were lawful. Excessive formalism, accordingly, seems misplaced when assessing whether a state has manifested an intention to hold a territory "under its dominion" with sufficient clarity to constitute an unlawful annexation. Indeed, state practice offers no shortage of examples in which the international community has looked past a state's formal characterization of its actions when evaluating their lawfulness for this purpose—most recently in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea. Accordingly, while a formal act of annexation is powerful evidence of intent, the lack of one is by no means dispositive. What other kinds of acts signal such an intention? As noted above, it may be signaled by a state's exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign. An occupant's refusal to accept the law of occupation's applicability would seem probative for drawing this conclusion—as would a refusal to comply with duties under that law that relate specifically to distinguishing the rights of an occupant from those of a sovereign.
…today's legal prohibition of conquest creates an incentive for states to obfuscate the reality of annexation that did not exist when such actions were lawful. Excessive formalism, accordingly, seems misplaced when assessing whether a state has manifested an intention to hold a territory "under its dominion" with sufficient clarity to constitute an unlawful annexation. Indeed, state practice offers no shortage of examples in which the international community has looked past a state's formal characterization of its actions when evaluating their lawfulness for this purpose—most recently in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea. Accordingly, while a formal act of annexation is powerful evidence of intent, the lack of one is by no means dispositive. What other kinds of acts signal such an intention? As noted above, it may be signaled by a state's exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign. An occupant's refusal to accept the law of occupation's applicability would seem probative for drawing this conclusion—as would a refusal to comply with duties under that law that relate specifically to distinguishing the rights of an occupant from those of a sovereign.
…today's legal prohibition of conquest creates an incentive for states to obfuscate the reality of annexation that did not exist when such actions were lawful. Excessive formalism, accordingly, seems misplaced when assessing whether a state has manifested an intention to hold a territory "under its dominion" with sufficient clarity to constitute an unlawful annexation. Indeed, state practice offers no shortage of examples in which the international community has looked past a state's formal characterization of its actions when evaluating their lawfulness for this purpose—most recently in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea. Accordingly, while a formal act of annexation is powerful evidence of intent, the lack of one is by no means dispositive. What other kinds of acts signal such an intention? As noted above, it may be signaled by a state's exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign. An occupant's refusal to accept the law of occupation's applicability would seem probative for drawing this conclusion—as would a refusal to comply with duties under that law that relate specifically to distinguishing the rights of an occupant from those of a sovereign.