„Chrysler SM-78/PGM-19A Jupiter”. nationalmuseum.af.mil (на језику: енглески). USAF National Museum. Приступљено 20. март 2022. „In October 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the first satellite--an event that caused the U.S. to greatly speed up missile development to counter the Soviet threat. As Jupiter was quickly made ready, the U.S. explored basing options. The single-stage missile's range of 1,500 miles required bases on the periphery of the USSR. Negotiations with France proved unsuccessful, and finally Italy and Turkey accepted IRBM bases. Italian and Turkish crews trained to operate the missiles, but Americans controlled the nuclear warheads. Two squadrons with a total of 30 missiles were operational at Gioia del Colle, Italy, by 1961; a single squadron of 15 Jupiters became operational at Cigli Air Base, Turkey, in 1962. Due in part to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the U.S. removed its Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey by July 1963.”
Robert Dallek (10. март 2013). „JFK vs. the Military”. theatlantic.com (на језику: енглески). The Atlantic. Приступљено 3. март 2022. „...Kennedy waited for three days after learning that a U-2 spy plane had confirmed the Cuban missiles’ presence before sitting down with the military chiefs to discuss how to respond—and then for only 45 minutes.
That meeting convinced Kennedy that he had been well advised to shun the chiefs’ counsel. As the session started, Maxwell Taylor—by then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—said the chiefs had agreed on a course of action: a surprise air strike followed by surveillance to detect further threats and a blockade to stop shipments of additional weapons. Kennedy replied that he saw no “satisfactory alternatives” but considered a blockade the least likely to bring a nuclear war. Curtis LeMay was forceful in opposing anything short of direct military action. The Air Force chief dismissed the president’s apprehension that the Soviets would respond to an attack on their Cuban missiles by seizing West Berlin. To the contrary, LeMay argued: bombing the missiles would deter Moscow, while leaving them intact would only encourage the Soviets to move against Berlin...”
