Greene & Cohen 2011 Greene, Joshua; Cohen, Jonathan (2011). „For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything”. Ур.: Illes, Judy; Sahakian, Barbara J. Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-162091-1. „Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)” referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by Dennett, DC (2003). „The self as a responding and responsible artifact”(PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1001: 39—50. doi:10.1196/annals.1279.003.
Nagel 1989, стр. 112 Nagel, Thomas (1989). „Freedom”. The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. стр. 112. ISBN9780195056440. „Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.”
Shariff, Azim F.; Schooler, Jonathan; Vohs, Kathleen D. (2008). „The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will”. Ур.: Baer, John; Kaufman, James C.; Baumeister, Roy F. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. стр. 183,190—93. ISBN978-0-19-518963-6.
Bargh, John A. (2007-11-16). „Free will is un-natural”(PDF). Архивирано из оригинала(PDF) 3. 9. 2012. г. Приступљено 21. 8. 2012. „Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?” Also found in Bargh, John A. (2008). „Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural”. Ур.: Baer, John; Kaufman, James C.; Baumeister, Roy F. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. стр. 128. ISBN978-0-19-518963-6.
Russell, Paul (2002). „Chapter 1: Logic, "liberty", and the metaphysics of responsibility”. Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press. стр. 14. ISBN978-0-19-515290-6. „...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.”
Shariff, Schooler & Vohs 2008 harvnb грешка: више циљева (3×): CITEREFShariffSchoolerVohs2008 (help) Shariff, Azim F.; Schooler, Jonathan; Vohs, Kathleen D. (2008). „The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will”. Ур.: Baer, John; Kaufman, James C.; Baumeister, Roy F. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. стр. 183,190—93. ISBN978-0-19-518963-6.
Freeman 2000, стр. 5 Freeman, Walter J. (2000). How Brains Make Up Their Minds. Columbia University Press. стр. 5. ISBN978-0-231-12008-1. „Instead of postulating a universal law of causality and then having to deny the possibility of choice, we start with the premise that freedom of choice exists, and then we seek to explain causality as a property of brains.”
Greene & Cohen 2011 Greene, Joshua; Cohen, Jonathan (2011). „For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything”. Ур.: Illes, Judy; Sahakian, Barbara J. Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-162091-1. „Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)” referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by Dennett, DC (2003). „The self as a responding and responsible artifact”(PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1001: 39—50. doi:10.1196/annals.1279.003.
Clark, TW (1999). „Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain.”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6 (8–9): 279—93. „Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything.” Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this
routledge.com
rep.routledge.com
Strawson, Galen (2011) [1998]. „Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.)”. Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge. Архивирано из оригинала 26. 8. 2012. г. Приступљено 12. 12. 2012.
scientificamerican.com
Nahmias, Eddy (1. 1. 2015). „Why We Have Free Will”. Scientific American. Приступљено 11. 3. 2016.
O'Connor, Timothy (29. 10. 2010). Zalta, Edward N., ур. „Free Will”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition). Приступљено 15. 1. 2013.
McKenna, Michael (2009). „Compatibilism”. Ур.: Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter изд.).
Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). „Arguments for Incompatibilism”. Ур.: Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 изд.).
Zagzebski, Linda (2011). „Foreknowledge and Free Will”. Ур.: Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 изд.). See also McKenna, Michael (2009). „Compatibilism”. Ур.: Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 изд.).
tufts.edu
ase.tufts.edu
Greene & Cohen 2011 Greene, Joshua; Cohen, Jonathan (2011). „For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything”. Ур.: Illes, Judy; Sahakian, Barbara J. Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-162091-1. „Free will, compatibilists argue, is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable (Dennett 2003)” referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by Dennett, DC (2003). „The self as a responding and responsible artifact”(PDF). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1001: 39—50. doi:10.1196/annals.1279.003.
web.archive.org
Clark, TW (1999). „Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain.”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6 (8–9): 279—93. „Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything.” Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this
Bargh, John A. (2007-11-16). „Free will is un-natural”(PDF). Архивирано из оригинала(PDF) 3. 9. 2012. г. Приступљено 21. 8. 2012. „Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?” Also found in Bargh, John A. (2008). „Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural”. Ур.: Baer, John; Kaufman, James C.; Baumeister, Roy F. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. стр. 128. ISBN978-0-19-518963-6.
Strawson, Galen (2011) [1998]. „Free will. In E. Craig (Ed.)”. Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy. London: Routledge. Архивирано из оригинала 26. 8. 2012. г. Приступљено 12. 12. 2012.
yale.edu
Bargh, John A. (2007-11-16). „Free will is un-natural”(PDF). Архивирано из оригинала(PDF) 3. 9. 2012. г. Приступљено 21. 8. 2012. „Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states?” Also found in Bargh, John A. (2008). „Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural”. Ур.: Baer, John; Kaufman, James C.; Baumeister, Roy F. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. стр. 128. ISBN978-0-19-518963-6.
