การให้เหตุผลแบบอุปนัย (Thai Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "การให้เหตุผลแบบอุปนัย" in Thai language version.

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  • Rainbolt, George W.; Dwyer, Sandra L. (2014). Critical Thinking: The Art of Argument. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-285-19719-7.
  • Johnson, Dale D.; Johnson, Bonnie; Ness, Daniel; Farenga, Stephen J. (2005). Trivializing Teacher Education: The Accreditation Squeeze. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 182–183. ISBN 9780742535367.
  • J.M., Bochenski (December 6, 2012). Caws, PEter (บ.ก.). The Methods of Contemporary Thought. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 108–109. ISBN 9789401035781. สืบค้นเมื่อ June 5, 2020.
  • Chowdhry, K.R. (January 2, 2015). Fundamentals of Discrete Mathematical Structures (3rd ed.). PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd. p. 26. ISBN 9788120350748. สืบค้นเมื่อ 1 December 2016.
  • Stefano Gattei, Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science: Rationality without Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2009), ch. 2 "Science and philosophy", pp. 28–30.
  • Roberto Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 219–21[216].
  • Roberto Torretti, The Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 226, 228–29.
  • David Andrews, Keynes and the British Humanist Tradition: The Moral Purpose of the Market (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 63–65.
  • Bertrand Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (New York: Routledge, 2009), "The validity of inference"], pp. 157–64, quote on p. 159.
  • Gregory Landini, Russell (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 230.
  • Donald Gillies, "Problem-solving and the problem of induction", in Rethinking Popper (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S Cohen, eds, pp. 103–05.
  • Ch 5 "The controversy around inductive logic" in Richard Mattessich, ed, Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology: An Epistemology of the Applied and Social Sciences (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1978), pp. 141–43.
  • Donald Gillies, "Problem-solving and the problem of induction", in Rethinking Popper (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S Cohen, eds, p. 111: "I argued earlier that there are some exceptions to Popper's claim that rules of inductive inference do not exist. However, these exceptions are relatively rare. They occur, for example, in the machine learning programs of AI. For the vast bulk of human science both past and present, rules of inductive inference do not exist. For such science, Popper's model of conjectures which are freely invented and then tested out seems to be more accurate than any model based on inductive inferences. Admittedly, there is talk nowadays in the context of science carried out by humans of 'inference to the best explanation' or 'abductive inference', but such so-called inferences are not at all inferences based on precisely formulated rules like the deductive rules of inference. Those who talk of 'inference to the best explanation' or 'abductive inference', for example, never formulate any precise rules according to which these so-called inferences take place. In reality, the 'inferences' which they describe in their examples involve conjectures thought up by human ingenuity and creativity, and by no means inferred in any mechanical fashion, or according to precisely specified rules".

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  • สำหรับข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับการอนุมานโดยแนวเทียบ ดูที่ Juthe, 2005.

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  • "Deductive and Inductive Arguments", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, It is worth noting that some dictionaries and texts define "deduction" as reasoning from the general to specific and define "induction" as reasoning from the specific to the general. However, there are many inductive arguments that do not have that form, for example, 'I saw her kiss him, really kiss him, so I'm sure she's having an affair.'
  • Ted Poston "Foundationalism", § b "Theories of proper inference", §§ iii "Liberal inductivism", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 Jun 2010 (last updated): "Strict inductivism is motivated by the thought that we have some kind of inferential knowledge of the world that cannot be accommodated by deductive inference from epistemically basic beliefs. A fairly recent debate has arisen over the merits of strict inductivism. Some philosophers have argued that there are other forms of nondeductive inference that do not fit the model of enumerative induction. C.S. Peirce describes a form of inference called 'abduction' or 'inference to the best explanation'. This form of inference appeals to explanatory considerations to justify belief. One infers, for example, that two students copied answers from a third because this is the best explanation of the available data—they each make the same mistakes and the two sat in view of the third. Alternatively, in a more theoretical context, one infers that there are very small unobservable particles because this is the best explanation of Brownian motion. Let us call 'liberal inductivism' any view that accepts the legitimacy of a form of inference to the best explanation that is distinct from enumerative induction. For a defense of liberal inductivism, see Gilbert Harman's classic (1965) paper. Harman defends a strong version of liberal inductivism according to which enumerative induction is just a disguised form of inference to the best explanation".

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  • Churchill, Robert Paul (1990). Logic: An Introduction (2nd ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 355. ISBN 978-0-312-02353-9. OCLC 21216829. In a typical enumerative induction, the premises list the individuals observed to have a common property, and the conclusion claims that all individuals of the same population have that property.