ประเทศมองโกเลีย (Thai Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "ประเทศมองโกเลีย" in Thai language version.

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1212.mn

apecthai.org

cia.gov

  • "Mongolia". The World Factbook. CIA. สืบค้นเมื่อ สิงหาคม 9, 2015.

constitutionnet.org

  • Odonkhuu, Munkhsaikhan (กุมภาพันธ์ 12, 2016). "Mongolia: A Vain Constitutional Attempt to Consolidate Parliamentary Democracy". ConstitutionNet. International IDEA. เก็บจากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 25, 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 21, 2016. Mongolia is sometimes described as a semi-presidential system because, while the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the SGKh, the president is popularly elected, and his/her powers are much broader than the conventional powers of heads of state in parliamentary systems.

doi.org

  • Shugart, Matthew Søberg (ธันวาคม 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns" (PDF). French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. ISSN 1476-3419. S2CID 73642272. เก็บ (PDF)จากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ มีนาคม 4, 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 21, 2016. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as 'quite considerable' in Duverger's sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people's elected agent. Such powers are especially relevant if an extraordinary majority is required to override a veto, as in Mongolia, Poland, and Senegal.

imf.org

mongolnews.mn

ubpost.mongolnews.mn

  • "Official Documents to be in Mongolian Script". UB Post. June 21, 2011. คลังข้อมูลเก่าเก็บจากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ November 1, 2011. สืบค้นเมื่อ 2010-07-11.

nso.mn

tuv.nso.mn

palgrave-journals.com

  • Shugart, Matthew Søberg (ธันวาคม 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns" (PDF). French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. ISSN 1476-3419. S2CID 73642272. เก็บ (PDF)จากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ มีนาคม 4, 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 21, 2016. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as 'quite considerable' in Duverger's sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people's elected agent. Such powers are especially relevant if an extraordinary majority is required to override a veto, as in Mongolia, Poland, and Senegal.

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

  • Shugart, Matthew Søberg (ธันวาคม 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns" (PDF). French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. ISSN 1476-3419. S2CID 73642272. เก็บ (PDF)จากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ มีนาคม 4, 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 21, 2016. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as 'quite considerable' in Duverger's sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people's elected agent. Such powers are especially relevant if an extraordinary majority is required to override a veto, as in Mongolia, Poland, and Senegal.

timeanddate.com

timetemperature.com

toollogo2010.mn

ucsd.edu

dss.ucsd.edu

undp.org

hdr.undp.org

web.archive.org

worldbank.org

data.worldbank.org

worldcat.org

  • Shugart, Matthew Søberg (ธันวาคม 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns" (PDF). French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. ISSN 1476-3419. S2CID 73642272. เก็บ (PDF)จากแหล่งเดิมเมื่อ มีนาคม 4, 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ กุมภาพันธ์ 21, 2016. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as 'quite considerable' in Duverger's sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people's elected agent. Such powers are especially relevant if an extraordinary majority is required to override a veto, as in Mongolia, Poland, and Senegal.