The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania 31 Mart 2010 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi., Artikel 162; vor der Wahl 2009 waren es bei völlig anderem Wahlsystem 2,5 % bzw. 4 % der gültigen Stimmen auf nationaler Ebene (nur für die Vergabe von Ausgleichssitzen; Direktmandate wurden ohne weitere Bedingungen an den stimmenstärksten Kandidaten zugeteilt)
Toker, Cem (2008). "Why Is Turkey Bogged Down?"(PDF). Turkish Policy Quarterly. Turkish Policy. 4 Ekim 2013 tarihinde kaynağından(PDF) arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 27 Haziran 2013.
The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania 31 Mart 2010 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi., Artikel 162; vor der Wahl 2009 waren es bei völlig anderem Wahlsystem 2,5 % bzw. 4 % der gültigen Stimmen auf nationaler Ebene (nur für die Vergabe von Ausgleichssitzen; Direktmandate wurden ohne weitere Bedingungen an den stimmenstärksten Kandidaten zugeteilt)
Toker, Cem (2008). "Why Is Turkey Bogged Down?"(PDF). Turkish Policy Quarterly. Turkish Policy. 4 Ekim 2013 tarihinde kaynağından(PDF) arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 27 Haziran 2013.
In 2004 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared this threshold to be manifestly excessive and invited Turkey to lower it (Council of Europe Resolution 1380 (2004)). On 30 January 2007 the European Court of Human Rights ruled by five votes to two (and on 8 July 2008, its Grand Chamber by 13 votes to four) that the 10% threshold imposed in Turkey does not violate the right to free elections, guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. It held, however, that this same threshold could violate the Convention if imposed in a different country. It was justified in the case of Turkey in order to stabilize the volatile political situation which has obtained in that country over recent decades. The case is Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, no. 10226/03. See also B. Bowring Negating Pluralist Democracy: The European Court of Human Rights Forgets the Rights of the Electors // KHRP Legal Review 11 (2007)