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İsrail'in Gazze'den çekilmesi (Turkish Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "İsrail'in Gazze'den çekilmesi" in Turkish language version.

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georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov

  • "Archives.gov". Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 23 Ekim 2011 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 
  • "Archives.org". Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 20 Mayıs 2011 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 

arutzsheva.com

bbc.co.uk

news.bbc.co.uk

books.google.com

  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (Ed.). The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2010. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. s. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border, and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will. Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry. It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied. 
    * Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. s. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. 27 Haziran 2020 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza. 
    * Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. s. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. 26 Nisan 2020 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human right organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied. 
  • Ali Abunimah (21 Ağustos 2007). One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. Henry Holt and Company. ss. 61-. ISBN 978-1-4299-3684-2. In August 2005, for the first time since Israel was established, Jews no longer formed an absolute majority in the territory they controlled. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics counted 5.26 million Jews living in Israel-Palestine and, combined with figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 5.62 million non-Jews. Israel's pullout from the Gaza Strip allowed it to "subtract" the 1.4 million Palestinians who live there and claim therefore that the overall Jewish majority is back up to about 57 percent. 
  • Ilan Peleg; Dov Waxman (6 Haziran 2011). Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within. Cambridge University Press. ss. 122-. ISBN 978-0-521-76683-8. The so-called demographic threat to Israel's ability to remain a Jewish and democratic state has become a major political issue in Israel over the past decade (this threat pertains not only to the Arab minority within Israel but also to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories over whom Israel effectively rules). It was one of the primary justifications used in support of Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, as Prime Minister Sharon presented the Gaza disengagement as a means of preserving a Jewish majority in the state. It was also the major rationale behind the short-lived "convergence plan" proposed in early 2006 by Sharon's successor Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which would have involved a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from much of the West Bank. Both of these plans were intended, at least in part, to substantially reduce the number of Palestinians living under Israeli control. As such, they reflected the importance that demographic concerns had come to play in Israel. In the words of Shlomo Brom, a former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Affairs and head of Strategic Planning in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF): “The most salient development in Israeli national security thinking in recent years has been the growing role of demography at the expense of geography.” 
  • Paul Morland (23 Mayıs 2016). Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict. Routledge. ss. 132-. ISBN 978-1-317-15292-7. 8 Mart 2021 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. Unlike the cases of Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, the conflict in Israel/Palestine is unambiguously unresolved. Nor are the borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state agreed, if such a state ever comes into being. Yet those borders have been subject to considerable negotiation, discussion and, in the case of the barrier and Gaza withdrawal, of action. Only when the boundaries are finally drawn will we be able to determine whether a form of soft demography of the political/ethnic variety has been at work. Significant and concrete developments to date – namely the barrier and the Gaza withdrawal – have indeed been heavily influenced by demographic considerations and can therefore be considered as soft demographic engineering of an ethnic and political nature. For the time being however, this demographic engineering is work in progress. 
  • Abdel Monem Said Aly; Shai Feldman; Khalil Shikaki (28 Kasım 2013). Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East. Macmillan International Higher Education. s. 373. ISBN 978-1-137-29084-7. Far from seeing themselves as having withdrawn from Gaza in the summer of 2005 “under fire,” mainstream Israelis viewed their disengagement from the area as consequence of their success in abating the Intifada and, at the same time, their growing recognition of the limits of force. For them, by 2005 Israel was threatened not by violence but rather by demographic trends in the population residing between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River: changes in the relative size of population groups that now appeared to pose an enormous challenge to Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state. Since Jews were about to lose their majority status in the area, it became clear that Israel's continued control of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem posed the following dilemma: either grant the Arab population in these areas full participatory rights, in which case Israel would lose its character as a Jewish state, or continue to deny them such rights, in which case Israel could no longer be considered a democracy. [ölü/kırık bağlantı]
  • Joel Beinin; Rebecca L. Stein (2006). The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993–2005. Stanford University Press. ss. 310-. ISBN 978-0-8047-5365-4. 
  • Jamil Hilal (4 Temmuz 2013). Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two-State Solution. Zed Books Ltd. ss. 21-. ISBN 978-1-84813-801-8. 
  • Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism: Fourth Report of Session, 2005–2006 17 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi., Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, The Stationery Office, 2006 pp. 71–84
  • Thomas G. Mitchell, Israel/Palestine and the Politics of a Two-State Solution, 17 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. McFarland 2013 p. 78.
  • P R. Kumaraswamy, The A to Z of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 19 Ağustos 2020 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Scarecrow Press, 2009 p.xl.

cnn.com

edition.cnn.com

  • "CNN.com". Edition.cnn.com. 28 Temmuz 2012 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 

articles.cnn.com

democracynow.org

doi.org

  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (Ed.). The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2010. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. s. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border, and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will. Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry. It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied. 
    * Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. s. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. 27 Haziran 2020 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza. 
    * Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. s. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. 26 Nisan 2020 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human right organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied. 
  • Cuyckens, Hanne (2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3). ss. 275-295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1 Özgürce erişilebilir. ISSN 0165-070X. 
  • Dromi, Shai M. (2014). "Uneasy Settlements: Reparation Politics and the Meanings of Money in the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza". Sociological Inquiry. 84 (1). ss. 294-315. doi:10.1111/soin.12028. 29 Şubat 2020 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 30 Mayıs 2020. 

foxnews.com

gazasy.blogspot.com

gushkatif.co.il

gushkatif.net

haaretz.com

haaretzdaily.com

hrw.org

huffingtonpost.com

  • Richard Chesnoff, 'Gaza and Palestinian Leadership: The More It Changes, the More it Gets Worse,' 12 Ekim 2017 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Huffington Post July 22, 2014. 'Ariel Sharon, finally withdrew Israel's troops from Gaza and evacuated Israeli settlers from the rich fruit and vegetable producing settlements they had established along the strip. The corrupt Palestinian Authority took over full control of Gaza. Even the network of miraculously flourishing greenhouses that Israeli settlers had built became Palestinian, something Israel hoped would help convince the Gaza leadership to keep peaceful borders with the Jewish state. That didn't happen. The chain of greenhouses was soon looted and all but completely destroyed.'

ihlresearch.org

imra.org.il

independent.co.uk

comment.independent.co.uk

news.independent.co.uk

inn.co.il

israelnationalnews.com

israelreporter.com

jewishfederations.org

jewishvirtuallibrary.org

jpost.com

fr.jpost.com

jpost.com

m.jpost.com

  • Jerusalem Post 23 Kasım 2016 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi., "In fact, the impetus for the pull-out has been attributed, at least in part, to Soffer's decades-long doomsaying about the danger the Palestinian womb posed to Israeli democracy."

keshev.org.il

makorrishon.co.il

mfa.gov.il

mondediplo.com

mondoweiss.net

monstersandcritics.com

nbcnews.com

newyorker.com

nrg.co.il

  • "NRG.co.il". NRG.co.il. 15 Eylül 2004. 16 Eylül 2004 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 

nytimes.com

osf.io

osu.edu

library.osu.edu

sfgate.com

tabletmag.com

  • Lee Smith, 'Land for Death,' 6 Kasım 2018 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Tablet November 19, 2014: 'If only Ariel Sharon’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza had led to the peace and co-existence between Israel and Gazans that the international community’s peace advocates promised! If only the greenhouses left by Israeli settlers had become the foundation for Gazan agriculture, producing world famous oranges and tomatoes, prized by Brooklyn’s top chefs! But that’s not what happened. Palestinians laid waste to the greenhouses.'
  • Yair Rosenberg, citing Hillary Clinton'Watch Hillary Clinton vs. Jon Stewart on Gaza,' 13 Ekim 2019 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Tablet July 17, 2014. '“You know, when Israel withdrew from Gaza … they left a lot of their businesses–there was a really very valuable horticultural business that was set up by the Israelis who had lived in Gaza. And the idea was that this would be literally turned over–money was provided, there would be a fund that would train Palestinians in Gaza to do this work. And basically the leadership said ‘we don’t want anything left from Israel’ [and] destroyed it all. That mentality to me is hard to deal with”.'

theatlantic.com

  • J. J. Goldberg, 'What, Exactly, Is Hamas Trying to Prove?' 28 Mayıs 2020 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. The Atlantic July 13, 2014:' In the days after withdrawal, the Israelis encouraged Gaza’s development. A group of American Jewish donors paid $14 million for 3,000 greenhouses left behind by expelled Jewish settlers and donated them to the Palestinian Authority. The greenhouses were soon looted and destroyed, serving, until today, as a perfect metaphor for Gaza’s wasted opportunity.'

theguardian.com

  • Conal Urquhart in Tel Aviv (19 Ağustos 2005). "Guardian.co.uk". Londra: Guardian. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 

timesonline.co.uk

torontosun.com

  • Ezra Levant, 'Israel must defend itself,' 2 Şubat 2021 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Toronto Sun July 28, 2014. 'In 2005, Israel gave Palestinians at least part of a state – the Gaza Strip. Israel forcibly removed every Jew who lived there, and handed the place over to the Palestinians. Israel even gifted 3,000 greenhouses that were owned by the Jews who used to live there, as a ready-made industry. It is unlikely that Gaza could have become an Arab Hong Kong. But stranger things have happened, as the city of Dubai shows. But instead of setting to work building Gaza as a prosperous, or at least peaceful, mini-state, the Palestinians chose sharia law and a terrorist government that has fired thousands of rockets at Israel from amongst Gaza's houses and schools. Those 3,000 greenhouses? Like the Jews themselves, gifts from the Jews had to be destroyed.'

un.org

unitedwithisrael.org

  • Sherman, Joseph. "Remembering 'Gush Katif' 7 Years after Gaza Withdrawal". United with Israel. 26 Temmuz 2014 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 16 Temmuz 2014. Ms. Beziz explains the purpose of the Katif Center. “Our goal is to tell the story of 35 years of pioneering the land of Israel in Gush Katif and to allow an insight as to what life was in Gush Katif.” 

usatoday.com

w3ar.com

walla.co.il

news.walla.co.il

  • "Walla.co.il". News.walla.co.il. 26 Temmuz 2004. 20 Haziran 2013 tarihinde kaynağından arşivlendi. Erişim tarihi: 20 Ocak 2013. 

washingtonpost.com

  • Charles Krauthammer 'Moral Clarity in Gaza,' 6 Haziran 2020 tarihinde Wayback Machine sitesinde arşivlendi. Washington Post, July 17, 2014:'To help the Gaza economy, Israel gave the Palestinians its 3,000 greenhouses that had produced fruit and flowers for export. It opened border crossings and encouraged commerce. And how did the Gaza Palestinians react to being granted by the Israelis what no previous ruler, neither Egyptian, nor British, nor Turkish, had ever given them – an independent territory? First, they demolished the greenhouses. Then they elected Hamas.'

washingtontimes.com

web.archive.org

worldcat.org

yahoo.com

news.yahoo.com

story.news.yahoo.com

ynet.co.il

ynetnews.com