Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Наукові докази" in Ukrainian language version.
Data sometimes do not constitute the problem (or the primary problem) but serve chiefly as evidence that a problem (or at least a deeper problem) exists.See also: Nickles, Thomas (1988). Questioning and problems in philosophy of science: problem-solving versus directly truth-seeking epistemologies. У Meyer, Michel (ред.). Questions and questioning. Grundlagen der Kommunikation = Foundations of communication. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter. с. 43–67. doi:10.1515/9783110864205.43. ISBN 3110106809. And from a scientist's perspective: Krauss, Lawrence M. (14 травня 2015). The big unanswered questions. The Huffington Post. Процитовано 15 травня 2015.
No other criterion of a good scientific theory is as widely recognized as the falsifiability or testability of a theory—not only within the philosophy of science, but also way beyond it.And: Understanding Science 101: Testing scientific ideas. undsci.berkeley.edu. University of California Museum of Paleontology.
Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science.
To say that something is knowledge, it is important that the proposition claimed as knowledge be based on evidence of a kind that reaches a level where the proposition passes beyond the level of being accepted as true because it is based on evidence. Only when it is proved by a certain kind of evidence, that is sufficient for the discipline, or more generally the context in which the proposition was claimed, can something be properly said to be knowledge. The standard has to be high enough in a scientific inquiry to minimize the possibility that the proposition accepted as true will later have to be retracted.
Scientific evidence is generally taken to be anything tending to refute or confirm a hypothesis.
A question regularly posed by scientists and philosophers of science is: When do empirical data provide a good test of, or reliable evidence for, a scientific hypothesis? Despite this shared interest, the considerations scientists appeal to in answering it are markedly different from those invoked in philosophical accounts of evidence and confirmation.Mayo's paper was part of the symposium «Evidence, data generation, and scientific practice: toward a reliabilist philosophy of experiment» at the 1998 biennial meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. See also Achinstein's contribution to the symposium: Achinstein, Peter (2000). Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientists. Philosophy of Science. 67 (Supplement): S180—S192. doi:10.1086/392818. JSTOR 188667. S2CID 120774584.
No other criterion of a good scientific theory is as widely recognized as the falsifiability or testability of a theory—not only within the philosophy of science, but also way beyond it.And: Understanding Science 101: Testing scientific ideas. undsci.berkeley.edu. University of California Museum of Paleontology.
Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science.
The features of abductive prototypes are hypothesized in order to explain observations, as when Rutherford inferred that the mass of an atom is concentrated in a very small region in order to explain why alpha particles pass through gold foil. Abductive prototypes can change dramatically when new data require revision of hypotheses concerning explanatory features. This is just what happened to the concept of an atom when the experiments of Thompson and Rutherford revealed the divisibility of atoms.Rutherford's interpretation of the Geiger–Marsden experiment is also mentioned as an example of abduction in: Faye, Jan (2014). On interpretation. The nature of scientific thinking: on interpretation, explanation, and understanding. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. с. 60—84. doi:10.1057/9781137389831_3. ISBN 978-1137389824. OCLC 870285649.
Data sometimes do not constitute the problem (or the primary problem) but serve chiefly as evidence that a problem (or at least a deeper problem) exists.See also: Nickles, Thomas (1988). Questioning and problems in philosophy of science: problem-solving versus directly truth-seeking epistemologies. У Meyer, Michel (ред.). Questions and questioning. Grundlagen der Kommunikation = Foundations of communication. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter. с. 43–67. doi:10.1515/9783110864205.43. ISBN 3110106809. And from a scientist's perspective: Krauss, Lawrence M. (14 травня 2015). The big unanswered questions. The Huffington Post. Процитовано 15 травня 2015.
Traditional epistemology established knowledge on the basis of a false concept—true belief. On our theory, scientific evidence should be based on a process of justifying the agent's reasonable acceptance of a hypothesis in an inquiry that ends in proof. We have shown in section V how this procedure can be modeled using the Carneades Argumentation System. Any proposition that cannot be proved in an inquiry to an appropriate standard of proof following this kind of epistemological procedure is not acceptable as knowledge.
To say that something is knowledge, it is important that the proposition claimed as knowledge be based on evidence of a kind that reaches a level where the proposition passes beyond the level of being accepted as true because it is based on evidence. Only when it is proved by a certain kind of evidence, that is sufficient for the discipline, or more generally the context in which the proposition was claimed, can something be properly said to be knowledge. The standard has to be high enough in a scientific inquiry to minimize the possibility that the proposition accepted as true will later have to be retracted.
Data sometimes do not constitute the problem (or the primary problem) but serve chiefly as evidence that a problem (or at least a deeper problem) exists.See also: Nickles, Thomas (1988). Questioning and problems in philosophy of science: problem-solving versus directly truth-seeking epistemologies. У Meyer, Michel (ред.). Questions and questioning. Grundlagen der Kommunikation = Foundations of communication. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter. с. 43–67. doi:10.1515/9783110864205.43. ISBN 3110106809. And from a scientist's perspective: Krauss, Lawrence M. (14 травня 2015). The big unanswered questions. The Huffington Post. Процитовано 15 травня 2015.
A question regularly posed by scientists and philosophers of science is: When do empirical data provide a good test of, or reliable evidence for, a scientific hypothesis? Despite this shared interest, the considerations scientists appeal to in answering it are markedly different from those invoked in philosophical accounts of evidence and confirmation.Mayo's paper was part of the symposium «Evidence, data generation, and scientific practice: toward a reliabilist philosophy of experiment» at the 1998 biennial meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. See also Achinstein's contribution to the symposium: Achinstein, Peter (2000). Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientists. Philosophy of Science. 67 (Supplement): S180—S192. doi:10.1086/392818. JSTOR 188667. S2CID 120774584.
Data sometimes do not constitute the problem (or the primary problem) but serve chiefly as evidence that a problem (or at least a deeper problem) exists.See also: Nickles, Thomas (1988). Questioning and problems in philosophy of science: problem-solving versus directly truth-seeking epistemologies. У Meyer, Michel (ред.). Questions and questioning. Grundlagen der Kommunikation = Foundations of communication. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter. с. 43–67. doi:10.1515/9783110864205.43. ISBN 3110106809. And from a scientist's perspective: Krauss, Lawrence M. (14 травня 2015). The big unanswered questions. The Huffington Post. Процитовано 15 травня 2015.
Traditional epistemology established knowledge on the basis of a false concept—true belief. On our theory, scientific evidence should be based on a process of justifying the agent's reasonable acceptance of a hypothesis in an inquiry that ends in proof. We have shown in section V how this procedure can be modeled using the Carneades Argumentation System. Any proposition that cannot be proved in an inquiry to an appropriate standard of proof following this kind of epistemological procedure is not acceptable as knowledge.
A question regularly posed by scientists and philosophers of science is: When do empirical data provide a good test of, or reliable evidence for, a scientific hypothesis? Despite this shared interest, the considerations scientists appeal to in answering it are markedly different from those invoked in philosophical accounts of evidence and confirmation.Mayo's paper was part of the symposium «Evidence, data generation, and scientific practice: toward a reliabilist philosophy of experiment» at the 1998 biennial meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. See also Achinstein's contribution to the symposium: Achinstein, Peter (2000). Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientists. Philosophy of Science. 67 (Supplement): S180—S192. doi:10.1086/392818. JSTOR 188667. S2CID 120774584.
Scientific evidence is generally taken to be anything tending to refute or confirm a hypothesis.
The features of abductive prototypes are hypothesized in order to explain observations, as when Rutherford inferred that the mass of an atom is concentrated in a very small region in order to explain why alpha particles pass through gold foil. Abductive prototypes can change dramatically when new data require revision of hypotheses concerning explanatory features. This is just what happened to the concept of an atom when the experiments of Thompson and Rutherford revealed the divisibility of atoms.Rutherford's interpretation of the Geiger–Marsden experiment is also mentioned as an example of abduction in: Faye, Jan (2014). On interpretation. The nature of scientific thinking: on interpretation, explanation, and understanding. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. с. 60—84. doi:10.1057/9781137389831_3. ISBN 978-1137389824. OCLC 870285649.
More and more I have come to the conclusion that the core of the scientific method is not experimentation per se but rather the strategy connoted by the phrase 'plausible rival hypotheses'. This strategy may start its puzzle solving with evidence, or it may start with hypothesis. Rather than presenting this hypothesis or evidence in the context-independent manner of positivistic confirmation (or even of postpositivistic corroboration), it is presented instead in extended networks of implications that (although never complete) are nonetheless crucial to its scientific evaluation. This strategy includes making explicit other implications of the hypothesis for other available data and reporting how these fit. It also includes seeking out rival explanations of the focal evidence and examining their plausibility. The plausibility of these rivals is usually reduced by ramification extinction, that is, by looking at their other implications on other data sets and seeing how well these fit.This idea is further discussed in several chapters in: Bickman, Leonard, ред. (2000). Donald Campbell's legacy. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. OCLC 42603382.
To say that something is knowledge, it is important that the proposition claimed as knowledge be based on evidence of a kind that reaches a level where the proposition passes beyond the level of being accepted as true because it is based on evidence. Only when it is proved by a certain kind of evidence, that is sufficient for the discipline, or more generally the context in which the proposition was claimed, can something be properly said to be knowledge. The standard has to be high enough in a scientific inquiry to minimize the possibility that the proposition accepted as true will later have to be retracted.
