Тягар доказування (Ukrainian Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Тягар доказування" in Ukrainian language version.

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archive.org

  • Cargile, James (January 1997). On the burden of proof. Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 72 (279): 59—83. doi:10.1017/s0031819100056655. JSTOR 3751305.
  • van Eemeren, Frans H.; Grootendorst, Rob (2004). A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. с. 60. ISBN 0521830753. [t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point.
  • Adler, Jonathan E. (2002). Belief's own ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. с. 164–167. ISBN 0262011921.

bloomu.edu

departments.bloomu.edu

books.google.com

  • Rodych, Victor (1996). Wittgenstein's inversion of Gödel's theorem. У Shanker, Stuart; Kilfoyle, David (ред.). Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments. Т. 2. The later Wittgenstein: from Philosophical investigations to On certainty. London; New York: Routledge. с. 232–265 (261). ISBN 0415149150. OCLC 47938413. Thus, in 1991 Wang seems to understand why Wittgenstein rejects GIT, but, apparently favouring the "onus game" (or "burden tennis"), he unfortunately concludes (pp. 257–58) that "the burden of proof falls ... squarely on Wittgenstein's side" because of Wang's own 'principle of presumed innocence'.
  • Abelson, Robert P. (1995). Credibility of argument. Statistics as principled argument. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. с. 170. ISBN 0805805273. OCLC 31011850. When research presentations advance claims that many or most readers deem incredible, these claims are vulnerable to severe challenge. In response, there will typically be a rebuttal by the investigator, and then a fresh round of criticism. The burden of proof shifts back and forth between the investigator and the critic in what might be called the game of 'burden tennis'.
  • Damer, T. Edward (2009). Attacking faulty reasoning: a practical guide to fallacy-free arguments. Cengage Learning. с. 17. ISBN 9780495095064.

cogprints.org

  • Dennett, Daniel C. (July 1988). Review of Psychosemantics by Jerry Fodor. The Journal of Philosophy. 85 (7): 384–389 (389). doi:10.2307/2026956. JSTOR 2026956. Fodor is too wise to think his series of arguments can flat disprove the claims of the opposition, so time and again he resorts to claims about shifting the burden of proof, begging the question, outsmarting by embracing the conclusions of reductios, and other exploitations of the rules of the game. The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher's pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now? Fodor mostly plays solitaire burden-tennis, against an imaginary opponent often personified as Granny or Aunty, which permits him to express the opposition view in terms that suit his rebuttal, without having to address the issue of whether this is a sympathetic rendering of any real opponent's claims.

doi.org

  • Cargile, James (January 1997). On the burden of proof. Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 72 (279): 59—83. doi:10.1017/s0031819100056655. JSTOR 3751305.
  • Leite, Adam (2005). A localist solution to the regress of justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 83 (3): 395–421 [p. 418]. doi:10.1080/00048400500191974. [t]he point of articulating reasons in defense of one's belief is to establish that one is justified in believing as one does.
  • Leite, Adam (2005). A localist solution to the regress of justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 83 (3): 395–421 [p. 403]. doi:10.1080/00048400500191974. justificatory conversation...[is]...characterized by a person's sincere attempt to vindicate his or her entitlement to a belief by providing adequate reasons in its defense and responding to objections.
  • Dennett, Daniel C. (July 1988). Review of Psychosemantics by Jerry Fodor. The Journal of Philosophy. 85 (7): 384–389 (389). doi:10.2307/2026956. JSTOR 2026956. Fodor is too wise to think his series of arguments can flat disprove the claims of the opposition, so time and again he resorts to claims about shifting the burden of proof, begging the question, outsmarting by embracing the conclusions of reductios, and other exploitations of the rules of the game. The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher's pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now? Fodor mostly plays solitaire burden-tennis, against an imaginary opponent often personified as Granny or Aunty, which permits him to express the opposition view in terms that suit his rebuttal, without having to address the issue of whether this is a sympathetic rendering of any real opponent's claims.
  • Hales, Steven D. (Summer 2005). Thinking tools: You can prove a negative (PDF). Think. Cambridge University Press. 4 (10): 109—112. doi:10.1017/S1477175600001287.
  • Goldman, Alvin (1994). Argumentation and social epistemology. The Journal of Philosophy. 91 (1): 27—49. doi:10.2307/2940949. JSTOR 2940949.

jstor.org

  • Cargile, James (January 1997). On the burden of proof. Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 72 (279): 59—83. doi:10.1017/s0031819100056655. JSTOR 3751305.
  • Dennett, Daniel C. (July 1988). Review of Psychosemantics by Jerry Fodor. The Journal of Philosophy. 85 (7): 384–389 (389). doi:10.2307/2026956. JSTOR 2026956. Fodor is too wise to think his series of arguments can flat disprove the claims of the opposition, so time and again he resorts to claims about shifting the burden of proof, begging the question, outsmarting by embracing the conclusions of reductios, and other exploitations of the rules of the game. The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher's pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now? Fodor mostly plays solitaire burden-tennis, against an imaginary opponent often personified as Granny or Aunty, which permits him to express the opposition view in terms that suit his rebuttal, without having to address the issue of whether this is a sympathetic rendering of any real opponent's claims.
  • Goldman, Alvin (1994). Argumentation and social epistemology. The Journal of Philosophy. 91 (1): 27—49. doi:10.2307/2940949. JSTOR 2940949.

lander.edu

philosophy.lander.edu

stanford.edu

law.stanford.edu

trans-lex.org

utm.edu

iep.utm.edu

web.archive.org

worldcat.org

search.worldcat.org

  • Rodych, Victor (1996). Wittgenstein's inversion of Gödel's theorem. У Shanker, Stuart; Kilfoyle, David (ред.). Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments. Т. 2. The later Wittgenstein: from Philosophical investigations to On certainty. London; New York: Routledge. с. 232–265 (261). ISBN 0415149150. OCLC 47938413. Thus, in 1991 Wang seems to understand why Wittgenstein rejects GIT, but, apparently favouring the "onus game" (or "burden tennis"), he unfortunately concludes (pp. 257–58) that "the burden of proof falls ... squarely on Wittgenstein's side" because of Wang's own 'principle of presumed innocence'.
  • Abelson, Robert P. (1995). Credibility of argument. Statistics as principled argument. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. с. 170. ISBN 0805805273. OCLC 31011850. When research presentations advance claims that many or most readers deem incredible, these claims are vulnerable to severe challenge. In response, there will typically be a rebuttal by the investigator, and then a fresh round of criticism. The burden of proof shifts back and forth between the investigator and the critic in what might be called the game of 'burden tennis'.