लंडस्ट्रॉम, पर्ल हार्बर टू मिडवे, पृ. 197–198 (says 1,500 یارڈ (1,372 میٹر) for the cruisers with शोहो); हॉइट, पृ. 54–55; क्रेसमन, पृ. 96–97; मिलॉट, पृ. 69; डल, पृ. 132; लंडस्ट्रॉम (2006), पृ. 168–169; हेन्री, पृ. 54–56. शोहो was preparing a strike of five torpedo planes आणि three Zeros belowdecks when the American attack occurred. Three Zeros were aloft at the beginning of the attack आणि three more were launched as the attack commenced. Senshi Sōshō, Japan's War Ministry's official history, apparently specifies that Gotō's cruisers were 3,000 یارڈ (2,743 میٹر) to 5,000 یارڈ (4,572 میٹر) away in order to warn the carrier of incoming aircraft, not to provide anti-aircraft support (लंडस्ट्रॉम 2006, पृ. 169 आणि a privately made sketch from the Senshi Sōshoآرکائیو شدہ(Date missing) بذریعہ dreadnoughtproject.org (Error: unknown archive URL)). Japanese carrier defense doctrine at that time relied on maneuvering आणि fighter defenses to avoid air attack instead of concentrated anti-aircraft fire from escorting warships (लंडस्ट्रॉम).
लंडस्ट्रॉम, पर्ल हार्बर टू मिडवे, पृ. 181–182; हॉइट, पृ. 37; क्रेसमन, पृ. 94–95; मिलॉट, p 56. नियोशो was supposed to shuttle between two prearranged rendezvous points, "Rye" (16°S158°E / 16°S 158°E / -16; 158) आणि "Corn" (15°S160°E / 15°S 160°E / -15; 160) to be available to provide additional fuel to TF17 as needed (क्रेसमन, पृ. 94 आणि मॉरिसन, पृ. 33).
