Fischer 1967: "He [Wilhelm] would declare war at once, if Russia mobilized. This time people would see that he was not "falling out". The Emperor's repeated protestations that in this case no one would ever again be able to reproach him with indecision were almost comic to hear" Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: "He [Wilhelm] would declare war at once, if Russia mobilized. This time people would see that he was not "falling out". The Emperor's repeated protestations that in this case no one would ever again be able to reproach him with indecision were almost comic to hear" Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: "absolute insistence on a war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were 'not yet ready' and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with Russia, possibly also France ... Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia ... In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fromkin 2004: "Information reaches me that the Austro-Hungarian government at the conclusion of the inquiry intends to make certain demands on Belgrade ... It would seem to me desirable that at the present moment, before a final decision on the matter, the Vienna Cabinet should be informed how Russia would react to the fact of Austria's presenting demands to Serbia such as would be unacceptable to the dignity of that state" David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Fromkin 2004: "We do not know the facts. The German government clearly do know. They know what the Austrian government is going to demand ... and I think we may say with some assurance that they had expressed approval of those demands and promised support should dangerous complications ensure ... the German government did not believe that there is any danger of war." David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Fischer 1967: "If the Austro-Hungarian government is not going to abdicate forever as a great power, she has no choice but to enforce acceptance by the Serbian government of her demands by strong pressure and, if necessary, by resort to military measures." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: "Since we want to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia, we must not have the world alarmed by His Majesty’s returning prematurely; on the other hand, His Majesty must be within reach, in case unpredictable developments should force us to take important decisions, such as mobilization. His Majesty might perhaps spend the last days of his cruise in the Baltic" Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fromkin 2004: "Russia is trying to drag us in. The news this morning is that Serbia had capitulated on the main points, but it is very doubtful if any reservations will be accepted by Austria, who is resolved upon a complete and final humiliation. The curious thing is that on many, if not most of the points, Austria has a good and Serbia a very bad case. But the Austrians are quite the stupidest people in Europe (as the Italians are the most perfidious), and there is a brutality about their mode of procedure, which will make most people think that is a case of a big Power wantonly bullying a little one. Anyhow, it is the most dangerous situation of the last 40 years." David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Lieven 1997: "...our rearmament programme had not been completed and it seemed doubtful whether our Army and Fleet would ever be able to compete with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary as regards modern technical efficiency ... No one in Russia desired a war. The disastrous consequences of the Russo-Japanese War had shown the grave danger which Russia would run in case of hostilities. Consequently our policy should aim at reducing the possibility of a European war, but if we remained passive we would attain our objectives ... In his view stronger language than we had used hitherto was desirable." D. C. B Lieven (1997)۔ "Russia Accepts a General War"۔ $1 میں Holger Herwig۔ The Outbreak of World War I : causes and responsibilities (6th ایڈیشن)۔ Boston: Houghton Mifflin۔ ISBN978-0-669-41692-3
Lieven 1997: "Germany looked upon our concessions as so many proofs of our weakness and far from having prevented our neighbours from using aggressive methods, we had encouraged them." D. C. B Lieven (1997)۔ "Russia Accepts a General War"۔ $1 میں Holger Herwig۔ The Outbreak of World War I : causes and responsibilities (6th ایڈیشن)۔ Boston: Houghton Mifflin۔ ISBN978-0-669-41692-3
Lieven 1997: "hesitation was no longer appropriate as far as the Imperial government was concerned. They saw no objection to a display of greater firmness in our diplomatic negotiations" D. C. B Lieven (1997)۔ "Russia Accepts a General War"۔ $1 میں Holger Herwig۔ The Outbreak of World War I : causes and responsibilities (6th ایڈیشن)۔ Boston: Houghton Mifflin۔ ISBN978-0-669-41692-3
Clark 2013: "In taking these steps, [Russian Foreign Minister] Sazonov and his colleagues escalated the crisis and greatly increased the likelihood of a general European war. For one thing, Russian pre-mobilization altered the political chemistry in Serbia, making it unthinkable that the Belgrade government, which had originally given serious consideration to accepting the ultimatum, would back down in the face of Austrian pressure. It heightened the domestic pressure on the Russian administration ... it sounded alarm bells in Austria-Hungary. Most importantly of all, these measures drastically raised the pressure on Germany, which had so far abstained from military preparations and was still counting on the localisation of the Austro-Serbian conflict." Christopher M. Clark (2013) [2012]۔ The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914۔ پینگوئن (ادارہ)۔ ISBN978-0061146657۔ LCCN2012515665
Fromkin 2004: Berchtold: "We should like to deliver the declaration of war on Serbia as soon as possible so as to put an end to diverse influences. When do you want the declaration of war?" Conrad: "Only when we have progressed far enough for operations to begin immediately—on approximately August 12th." Berchtold: "The diplomatic situation will not hold as long as that." David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Fischer 1967: "You must most carefully avoid giving any impression that we want to hold Austria back. We are concerned only to find a modus to enable the realisation of Austria-Hungary’s aim without at the same time unleashing a world war, and should this after all prove unavoidable, to improve as far as possible the conditions under which it is to be waged." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: "As we have already rejected one British proposal for a conference, it is not possible for us to refuse this suggestion also a limine. If we rejected every attempt at mediation, the whole world would hold us responsible for the conflagration and represent us as the real war-mongers. That would also make our position impossible here in Germany, where we have got to appear as though the war had been forced on us. Our position is the more difficult because Serbia seems to have given way very extensively. We cannot therefore reject the role of mediator; we have to pass on the British proposal to Vienna for consideration, especially since London and Paris are continuously using their influence on St. Petersburg." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: If therefore, Austria should reject all mediation, we are faced with a conflagration in which Britain would be against us, Italy and Romania in all probability not with us. We should be two Powers against Four. With Britain an enemy, the weight of the operations would fall on Germany ... Under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically suggest to the Vienna Cabinet acceptance of mediation under the present honourable conditions. The responsibility falling on us and Austria for the consequences which would ensure in case of refusal would be uncommonly heavy." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fischer 1967: "If Vienna ... refuses ... to give way at all, it will hardly be possible to place the blame on Russia for the outbreak of the European conflagration. H. M. has, on the request of the Tsar, undertaken to intervene in Vienna because he could not refuse without awakening an irrefutable suspicion that we wanted war ... If these efforts of Britain's meet with success, while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only urgently recommend Vienna to accept Grey's proposal, which safeguards its position in every way." Fritz Fischer (1967)۔ Germany's Aims in the First World War۔ New York: W.W. Norton۔ ISBN978-0-393-09798-6
Fromkin 2004: "The European situation is at least one degree worse than it was yesterday, and has not been improved by a rather shameless attempt on the part of Germany to buy our neutrality during the war by promises that she will not annex French territory (except colonies) or Holland or Belgium. There is something very crude & childlike about German diplomacy. Meanwhile the French are beginning to press in the opposite sense, as the Russians have been doing for some time. The City, wh. is in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, is the time being all against English intervention." David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Fromkin 2004: "I thank you heartily for your mediation which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. It is technically impossible to our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia's account are taking place my troops shall not make any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this." David Fromkin (2004)۔ Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914۔ Heinemann۔ ISBN978-0-434-00858-2
Balfour 1964: "For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary—to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us." Michael Balfour (1964)۔ The Kaiser and His Times۔ Boston: Houghton Mifflin۔ OCLC1035915119
Clark 2013: "In taking these steps, [Russian Foreign Minister] Sazonov and his colleagues escalated the crisis and greatly increased the likelihood of a general European war. For one thing, Russian pre-mobilization altered the political chemistry in Serbia, making it unthinkable that the Belgrade government, which had originally given serious consideration to accepting the ultimatum, would back down in the face of Austrian pressure. It heightened the domestic pressure on the Russian administration ... it sounded alarm bells in Austria-Hungary. Most importantly of all, these measures drastically raised the pressure on Germany, which had so far abstained from military preparations and was still counting on the localisation of the Austro-Serbian conflict." Christopher M. Clark (2013) [2012]۔ The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914۔ پینگوئن (ادارہ)۔ ISBN978-0061146657۔ LCCN2012515665
Kautsky 1924: "If Austria really wants to clear up her relationship with Serbia once and for all, which Tisza himself in his recent speech called ‘indispensable’, then it would pass comprehension why such demands were not being made as would make the breach unavoidable. If the action simply peters out, once again, and ends with a so-called diplomatic success, the belief which is already widely held there that the Monarchy is no longer capable of vigorous action will be dangerously strengthened. The consequences, internal and external, which would result from this, inside Austria and abroad, are obvious." Karl Kautsky، مدیر (1924)۔ Outbreak of the World War: German Documents۔ Oxford University Press۔ OCLC1181368
Kautsky 1924: "The administration will, immediately upon the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action with the Powers, in the interest of the localization of the war. It will claim that that Austrian action has been just as much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact that the Emperor is on his northern journey, and that the Prussian Minister of War, as well as the Chief of the Grand General Staff are away on leave of absence." Karl Kautsky، مدیر (1924)۔ Outbreak of the World War: German Documents۔ Oxford University Press۔ OCLC1181368
Balfour 1964: "For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary—to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us." Michael Balfour (1964)۔ The Kaiser and His Times۔ Boston: Houghton Mifflin۔ OCLC1035915119
