In "Knowledge and Experience – An Examination of the Four Reflective 'Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy", Kant-Studien 78:2 (1987), pp.170-200, Stephen Palmquist shows how Kant's own discussion of the role of hypotheses (and the "as if" approach) in philosophy can be understood only as an example of analytic aposteriority. See also the revised version of this article, reprinted as Chapter IV of Stephen Palmquist, Kant's System of Perspectives （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）: An architectonic interpretation of the Critical philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). In "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp.255-282, Palmquist argues that Saul Kripke uses Kant's terms incorrectly when he analyzes naming as contingent a priori; when Kripke's use of the key terms is translated to make it consistent with Kant's usage, Kripke's position can be understood as defending the analytic a posteriority of naming.
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Rey, Georges. The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition). [February 12, 2012]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-30）.
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Rey, Georges. The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition). [February 12, 2012]. （原始内容存档于2020-11-30）.
In "Knowledge and Experience – An Examination of the Four Reflective 'Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy", Kant-Studien 78:2 (1987), pp.170-200, Stephen Palmquist shows how Kant's own discussion of the role of hypotheses (and the "as if" approach) in philosophy can be understood only as an example of analytic aposteriority. See also the revised version of this article, reprinted as Chapter IV of Stephen Palmquist, Kant's System of Perspectives （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）: An architectonic interpretation of the Critical philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). In "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp.255-282, Palmquist argues that Saul Kripke uses Kant's terms incorrectly when he analyzes naming as contingent a priori; when Kripke's use of the key terms is translated to make it consistent with Kant's usage, Kripke's position can be understood as defending the analytic a posteriority of naming.
