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台灣地位未定論 (Chinese Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "台灣地位未定論" in Chinese language version.

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  • 吉田茂. 世界と日本. 東京: 番町書房. 1963年: p. 141. ASIN B000JAHD2Y （日语）. 台湾という地域は、サンフランシスコ平和条約において日本政府が領土権を放棄しただけで、その正式な帰属はまだ決まっていないとするのが、旧連合国一般の見解である。 

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  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin 22. Washington, D.C.: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1950: 80. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIII: 1950. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1950: pp. 607–608 （英语）. Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act......The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIV: 1951. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1951: pp. 65–66 （英语）. That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXI: 1954. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1954: p. 896 （英语）. The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these island. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXII: 1955. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1955: p. 329 （英语）. In 1945 our long-time ally, the Republic of China, was entrusted with authority over these islands. 
  • Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, New York（英语：Garden City, New York）: Doubleday（英语：Doubleday (publisher)）. March 1963: p. 461 （英语）. The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to "China," either Communist or Nationalist. 

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  • 新戰略論. 五南圖書出版股份有限公司. 2007: 508– [2014-12-21]. ISBN 978-957-11-4795-6. （原始内容存档于2015-03-21）. 
  • 台灣主權論述論文集編輯小組. 台灣主權論述論文集. 國史館. 2001 [2014-12-21]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-21）. 
  • 陳春生. 台灣主權舆兩岸關係. 翰蘆圖書出版有限公司. 2000 [2014-12-21]. ISBN 978-957-8639-55-3. （原始内容存档于2015-03-21）. 
  • Henckaerts, Jean-Marie. The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations. Kluwer Law International. 1996: 337 [2010-08-14]. ISBN 90-41-10929-3. （原始内容存档于2014-09-26）. p7. "In any case, there appears to be strong legal ground to support the view that since the entry into force of the 1952 ROC-Japan bilateral peace treaty, Taiwan has become the de jure territory of the ROC. This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by several Japanese court decisions. For instance, in the case of Japan v. Lai Chin Jung, decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 24, 1956, it was stated that ‘Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the [Peace] Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force…’”
    p8. “the principles of prescription and occupation that may justify the ROC's claim to Taiwan certainly are not applicable to the PRC because the application of these two principles to the Taiwan situation presupposes the validity of the two peace treaties by which Japan renounce its claim to Taiwan and thus makes the island terra nullius."     

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  • CIA. Probable Developments in Taiwan (PDF): pp. 1–4. 1949-03-14 [2015-03-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2015-02-15） （英语）. From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory......neither the US, or any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan......There is a strong sentiment in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by the conflicting interests of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist element. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the Nationalist administration on Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the native population to the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island's resources......The Nationalist Army, Navy and Air Force are not only inefficient, but their loyalty and will to fight are questionable. In addition, such a refugee regime would be unstable because of the hostility of the local population which, in these circumstances, would be increasingly susceptible to Communist influence. 

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  • China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei (PDF). Congressional Research Service: 9. 2014-10-10 [2017-03-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2017-04-10） （英语）. In neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of Formosa and the Pescadores] to any particular entity. 
  • Emma Chanlett-Avery; Derry Dumbaugh; William H. Cooper. Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: p. 6. 2008-12-19 [2015-03-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2014-12-28） （英语）. ......after Japan's defeat in 1945, Taiwan and the Pescadores were assigned to the Republic of China for purposes of post-war occupation. Taiwan was still under this occupation four years later, when the ROC government fled to Taiwan after the communist victory in the civil war on mainland China. 
  • Shirley A. Kan; Wayne M. Morrison. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: p. 4. 2014-12-11. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2015-06-28） （英语）. The United States has its own “one China” policy (vs. the PRC's “one China” principle) and position on Taiwan's status. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan nor Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. ...... The United States did not state a stance on the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States simply “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

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  • Y. Frank Chiang. One-China Policy and Taiwan. Fordham International Law Journal（英语：Fordham International Law Journal） (Fordham University School of Law). December 2004, 28 (1): 27, 80 [2015-02-19]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-07） （英语）. In August 1945, when U.S. General MacArthur (as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) assigned the R.O.C government to receive the surrender of the Japanese commanders in Taiwan, the R.O.C. government was still in control of a large part of China's territory. But, by 1949, that government had lost control over most of China's territory to the Chinese Communists in a civil war and taken refuge in Formosa, outside of China's territory.....It was the United States that assigned Chiang Kai-shek's R.O.C. government to occupy and administer the island of Taiwan on its behalf. So, fifty years later, the R.O.C. government still acts as an agent of the United States. The passage of time will not change, and has not changed, the legal relationship of agent and principal. 

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  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 30 June 1947 vol 439 c938 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It is the view of His Majesty's Government that formal transfer of territories formerly owned or annexed by Japan must await the eventual Peace Conference with Japan."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 14 November 1949 vol 469 c1679 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Any change in the legal status of Formosa can only be formally effected in a treaty of peace with Japan."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 26 July 1950 vol 478 c60W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "His Majesty's Government have recognised de jure the Chinese Central People's Government as the legitimate Government of China, and as such entitled to enjoy the rights of the Chinese State.
    Formosa is still de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of Formosa as such. Following on the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remaining Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pending the final determination of its status at a peace settlement......because of the provisional nature of the present administration of Formosa, it is the hope of His Majesty's Government that the disposal of Formosa will be decided, as has always been contemplated, in connection with the peace settlement, with Japan."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 20 December 1954 vol 535 c2431 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "The position with regard to Formosa is that Japan has renounced her sovereignty over it, but in our view it has not become part of China."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 01 February 1955 vol 536 c901 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It contained merely a statement of common purpose. ...... The question of future sovereignty over Formosa was left undetermined by the Japanese Peace Treaty."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 February 1955 vol 536 c159W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "......This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.
    ......In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.
    Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.
    The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 c1867 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 09 February 1955 vol 536 c216w （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "I have been unable to trace any such proclamation. Unilateral declarations could not affect the legal status of Formosa......"
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 cc1870–1 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "The document in question was the Cairo Declaration. That was couched in the form of a statement of intention, and as it was merely a statement of intention, it is merely binding in so far as it states the intent at that time, and therefore it cannot by itself transfer sovereignty......The case of Formosa is different. The sovereignty was Japanese until 1952. The Japanese Treaty came into force, and at that time Formosa was being administered by the Chinese Nationalists, to whom it was entrusted in 1945, as a military occupation......That position has been made quite clear by the statement the Prime Minister made in the House on 4th February, which has been quoted by the hon. and learned Member. Therefore I shall not repeat it. In reply—I quote the concluding passages of his statement—he said: "Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined." ......the fact is that Formosa is not under Chinese sovereignty. That does not mean that the Chinese Nationalists have no right to be there. Their presence springs from their military occupancy in which they were placed by the Allied Powers in 1945, pending future arrangements."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 19 November 1958 vol 595 c1140–1 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "......the Cairo Declaration, which was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration, was merely a statement of common purpose. Both were made at a time when there was only one entity claiming to represent China. Since then there has been a civil war in China and opinions differ as to who now represents the Government of China. The problem of Formosa has become an international one, in which a number of nations are concerned, and it cannot be solved merely by reference to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 20 December 1961 vol 651 c1519 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 23 June 1966 vol 730 c130W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Her Majesty's Government believe that the China seat in the United Nations should be occupied by representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. As for Formosa, it is our view that sovereignty over this island is undetermined."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 19 December 1966 vol 738 cc185–6W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Our position on the status of Formosa was outlined on 28th November by my noble Friend Lord Caradon in his explanation of our vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation in that organisation. A copy186W of his statement is in the Library. It remains our view that sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined."

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  • TNA: CAB 129/41/6 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）, Formosa, 03 July 1950, p. 2 （英文） "In 1943 Formosa was part of the territory of the Japanese Empire and His Majesty's Government consider that Formosa is still de jure part of that territory......On 25th October, 1945, as a result of an Order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between the Allied Powers concerned, the Japanese Forces in Formosa surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, with the consent of the Allied Powers, administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China."
  • TNA: CAB 129/73/38 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）, Formosa, 11 February 1955, p. 1–2 （英文） "In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces pursuant to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and General Order No. 1 issued by the Japanese Government at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated September 2, 1945. But this was not a cession nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupancy, responsible to the whole body of the Allies, pending a peace treaty with Japan or, if the status of Formosa was not finally settled by that treaty (which it was not), then pending an eventual settlement about Formosa—which has not yet taken place. The arrangements did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese."

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  • 参議院会議録情報 第013回国会 外務委員会 第40号. 昭和27年6月13日. p. 10. （日語）. "今御審議を願つております中華民国との平和条約においては、中華民国の領土はどこであるとか、中華民国の国民はどれであるとかということをきめる目的で、これは交渉がせられたのではございませんで、その領土の問題並びに領土の帰属だとか、或いは中華民国の国民ばこういうものであるというような合意は、この中には書いてございません。先ほどから申上げますように、十条の規定は、中華民国の国民はどういうものだとということを規定することが趣旨ではなく……"
  • 参議院会議録情報 第038回国会 予算委員会 第15号. 昭和36年3月15日. p. 19. （日語）. "ポツダム宣言には、カイロ宣言の条項は履行せらるべしということが書いてある。そうしてわれわれは降伏文書によって、ポツダム宣言の受諾を宣言したのであります。しかし、これは降伏文書というものは、休戦協定の性格を有するものでありまして、領土的処理を行ない得ない性質のものであるということを申し上げたのであります。"
  • 衆議院会議録情報 第038回国会 外務委員会 第2号. 昭和36年2月2日. p. 23. （日語）. "カイロ宣言によりまして、台湾及び澎湖島を中華民国に返還するということを米英華三国間できめております。そのカイロ宣言やポツダム宣言によりまして、連合国の日本に対するいわば最終的な要求事項となったカイロ宣言の条項は履行せらるべしということになっておるわけであります。それをさらに日本は降伏文書で受けまして、ここに降伏したわけであります。しかしながらこの降伏というのは、あくまでも日本が戦争行為を終止するための条件でございまして、最終的な領土の帰属その他のことは平和条約を待たなければ確定しないわけでございます。それで降伏文書で受諾しました条件は、講和条約でもしこれを提示されれば、日本はそのままこれを受諾しなければならないということになると思いますが、サンフランシスコ平和会議で日本に提示されました条約案では、澎湖島及び台湾を中華民国に帰属せしめるという規定にはなっていないのでありまして、日本はいわば一方的にこの二つの島に対する権利、権原を放棄するという案になっておるのであります。従ってサンフランシスコ条約にきめられましたところ、日本が受諾いたしましたところが、現在のような状態になっているわけでございまして、日本としては中華民国にこれを帰属せしめたという意思決定はしていないのでございます……日華条約には領土条項と称すべきものはないのでありまして、日華条約をどこに適用するかということについての了解があるのであります。従って日華条約によりまして日本が台湾及び澎湖島を中華民国に帰属せしめたという意思表示はしていないのでございます。"
  • 参議院会議録情報 第038回国会 予算委員会 第15号. 昭和36年3月15日. p. 19. （日語）.
  • 衆議院会議録情報 第046回国会 外務委員会 第1号. 昭和39年2月6日. p. 11. （日語）. "台湾の帰属の問題につきましては、御指摘のように、カイロ宣言では、中華民国に返させるというカイロ宣言の当事国の意思の表明がありました。これはポツダム宣言で確認されておりますが、最終的な領有権の問題については、日本の平和条約で、日本から放棄されるだけであって、将来の連合国間の決定にまかされておるというのが連合国の見解でございます。"
  • 衆議院会議録情報 第046回国会 予算委員会 第17号. 昭和39年2月29日. p. 24. （日語）. "はっきりしておるのであります。平和条約でわれわれは放棄したのであります。日本はこれにとやこう言う筋合いのものじゃございません。だから、平和条約の規定によりまして、その規定を守りつつ新たに日華条約を結んだわけでございます。日華条約におきましても、これを、サンフランシスコできめた、日本が放棄したということに反するようなことはできないのであります。きめる場合におきましても、中華民国が台湾に対して領土権があるという頭でわれわれが条約を結んでいないことは、条約局長からたびたび申しておるとおりで、われわれはそういう考え方でいまも日華条約を運用しておるのであります。"
  • 衆議院会議録情報 第087回国会 予算委員会 第12号. 昭和54年2月16日. p. 47. （日語）. "台湾及び澎湖島に対するわが国のあらゆる権原はサンフランシスコ平和条約によって放棄せられたわけでございます。その場合に、それがだれのために放棄せられたかということがサンフラシスコ平和条約では決め得なかった。したがって、その台湾及び澎湖島の帰属先が法律的に未定であった、サンフランシスコの平和条約では未定であったというところからその問題が発生するわけで、いわゆる台湾の地位がどうなのだという問題かその後ずっとあったわけでございます。"
  • 衆議院会議録情報 第162回国会 外務委員会 第7号. 平成17年5月13日. p. 18. （日語）. "日本はサンフランシスコ平和条約によって台湾を放棄いたしました……日華平和条約においては同放棄が承認をされた。ただ、その場合、どこの国に対して放棄したかは明記していないわけでございます。したがって、台湾がどこに帰属するかについて、これは専ら連合国が決定すべき問題であり、日本は発言する立場にない、これが日本側の一貫した法的な立場であります。"

newtaiwan.com.tw

newtalk.tw

nknu.edu.tw

ir.lib.nknu.edu.tw

npf.org.tw

nyls.edu

nytimes.com

query.nytimes.com

  • Tillman Durdin（英语：Tillman Durdin）. Formosans' Plea for Red Aid Seen需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-30 [2015-03-06]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. All foreign witnesses of the slaughters, looting and wholesale imprisonment of natives by Chinese troops and police agree that bitter hostility has been fanned among Formosans......China's possession of the island has not been formalized by international treaty. This cannot come about until the peace pact with Japan is concluded. Formosans know this and some are talking of appealing to the United Nations to put the island under an international mandate. They stress that China has no more historical claim to Formosa than the Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese, who had early trading interests there. 
  • Transcript of Second Day of MacArthur's Testimony需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1951-05-05: p. 4 [2015-01-28]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. It has not, sir. Legalistically it is still a part of defeated Japan. The disposition of the various segments of the Empire of Japan has not yet been formally determined. There were certain agreements that were entered into, as I understood it, at Yalta and other places, but legalistically Formosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan. ...... The Allies turned over what you might call the administration and the trusteeship of Formosa to China, just as Japan was turned over to us, and it is still in that status. 
  • Drew Middleton. Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date, Says Churchill需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1955-02-02 [2015-03-08]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. 
  • James Reston（英语：James Reston）. New Formosa Bid需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1955-02-06 [2015-03-12]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. ......Secretary of State Dulles prepared to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow to urge Senate ratification of the mutual assistance treaty with the Republic of China.
    The Administration clarified its position on the legal status of Formosa, and was prepared to make clear to the Senate that ratification of the treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek would not give him legal sovereignty over Formosa and Pescadores......
    ......Some prominent Democrats have suggested that the signing of a mutual defense agreement with President Chiang will change the legal status of these territories and give the Nationalists sovereignty over them.
    Mr. Dulles will reject this argument when he testifies on the treaty this week. He will assert that the Administration does not regard the sovereignty of Formosa and the Pescadores as having been settled. His view is that the treaty will not give General Chiang sovereignty over these islands.
    Ths position of the Administration is that these territories were handed over to the Allied and associated powers of World War II by Japan, which had held them since 1895, and that General Chiang was merely asked to administer them for the Allied and associated powers pending a final decision as to their ownership......     

nytimes.com

select.nytimes.com

  • Tillman Durdin（英语：Tillman Durdin）. Formosa Killings Are Put at 10,000需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-29 [2015-01-25]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. Formosans are reported to be seeking United Nations' action on their case. Some have approached foreign consuls to ask that Formosa be put under the jurisdiction of Allied Supreme Command or be made an American protectorate. Formosan hostility to the mainland Chinese has deepened.
    Two women who described events at Pingtung said that when Formosans assembled to take over the administration of the town they sang "The Star Spangled Banner."     

openjurist.org

  • New Jersey v. New York, 523 US 767 (1998). US Supreme Court. 1998-05-26 [2010-01-29]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-07）. Even as to terra nullius, like a volcanic island or territory abandoned by its former sovereign, a claimant by right as against all others has more to do than planting a flag or rearing a monument. Since the 19th century the most generous settled view has been that discovery accompanied by symbolic acts give no more than "an inchoate title, an option, as against other states, to consolidate the first steps by proceeding to effective occupation within a reasonable time.8 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 146 (4th ed.1990); see also 1 C. Hyde, International Law 329 (rev.2d ed.1945); 1 L. Oppenheim International Law §§222-223, pp. 439-441 (H. Lauterpacht 5th ed.1937); Hall A Treatise on International Law, at 102-103; 1 J. Moore, International Law 258 (1906); R. Phillimore, International Law 273 (2d ed. 1871); E. Vattel, Law of Nations, §208, p. 99 (J. Chitty 6th Am. ed. 1844). 

openlibrary.org

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sangiin.go.jp

sinica.edu.tw

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newsletter.sinica.edu.tw

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state.gov

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state.gov

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twtimes.com.tw

un.org

  • Letter Dated 50/08/25 from the Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General Concerning Formosa (PDF). United Nations: p. 4. 1950-08-25 [2015-02-18]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-09） （英语）. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the Island. The actual status of the Island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now. 
  • United Nations General Assembly Sixteenth Session Official Records (PDF). United Nations: p. 1070. 1961-12-15 [2015-03-20]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-08） （英语）. I wish, however, to make it clear that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined. It therefore follows in its view that the question as to who should represent Formosa in the United Nations is also undetermined. The vote which I cast in favour of the draft resolution and of the amendment does not prejudice the position of Her Majesty's Government on this point. 
  • 潘基文对中国台湾省地震表示关切. 联合国新闻. [2017-10-27]. （原始内容存档于2016-02-20）. 

voacantonese.com

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webcitation.org

  • CIA. Probable Developments in Taiwan (PDF): pp. 1–4. 1949-03-14 [2015-03-08]. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2015-02-15） （英语）. From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory......neither the US, or any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan......There is a strong sentiment in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by the conflicting interests of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist element. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the Nationalist administration on Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the native population to the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island's resources......The Nationalist Army, Navy and Air Force are not only inefficient, but their loyalty and will to fight are questionable. In addition, such a refugee regime would be unstable because of the hostility of the local population which, in these circumstances, would be increasingly susceptible to Communist influence. 
  • Harry S. Truman. Letter to Ambassador Warren Austin Restating the U.S. Position on Formosa. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. 1950-08-27 [2015-03-08]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. 

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  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin 22. Washington, D.C.: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1950: 80. 
  • George H. Kerr. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin（英语：Houghton Mifflin）. 1965. OCLC 242620. OL 5948105M （英语）. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VIII, The Far East. Washington: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1971: 358–359 （英语）. In particular, it is considered that exemption from Japanese jurisdiction was not intended to be accorded the estimated 20,000 persons in Japan claiming to be Taiwanese; these persons throughout the war were enemy nationals and according to Japanese law still retain Japanese nationality, excepting only those who have individually divested themselves thereof in accordance with established procedure......It should, however, be pointed out that from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan's Sovereignty remains to be formalized; assumably a treaty of cession will in due course be negotiated which will effect such transfer and which may contain provisions in regard to appropriate change in the national status of Taiwan's residents. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Vol. VII, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1972: p. 433 （英语）. Formosans stress American responsibility through Cairo decision and have published intent to appeal for American help in seeking UN intervention pending final transfer sovereignty to China. Responsible island-wide group preparing formal petition and has so advised Consulate. One such petition received addressed to General Marshall. Possibilities of interim administration under SCAP openly discussed. ...... American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans who believe representations at Nanking and direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese de jure sovereignty status. 
  • Tillman Durdin（英语：Tillman Durdin）. Formosa Killings Are Put at 10,000需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-29 [2015-01-25]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. Formosans are reported to be seeking United Nations' action on their case. Some have approached foreign consuls to ask that Formosa be put under the jurisdiction of Allied Supreme Command or be made an American protectorate. Formosan hostility to the mainland Chinese has deepened.
    Two women who described events at Pingtung said that when Formosans assembled to take over the administration of the town they sang "The Star Spangled Banner."     
  • Tillman Durdin（英语：Tillman Durdin）. Formosans' Plea for Red Aid Seen需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1947-03-30 [2015-03-06]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. All foreign witnesses of the slaughters, looting and wholesale imprisonment of natives by Chinese troops and police agree that bitter hostility has been fanned among Formosans......China's possession of the island has not been formalized by international treaty. This cannot come about until the peace pact with Japan is concluded. Formosans know this and some are talking of appealing to the United Nations to put the island under an international mandate. They stress that China has no more historical claim to Formosa than the Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese, who had early trading interests there. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 30 June 1947 vol 439 c938 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It is the view of His Majesty's Government that formal transfer of territories formerly owned or annexed by Japan must await the eventual Peace Conference with Japan."
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: 332–333 （英语）. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: p. 336 （英语）. Dept's position re status Taiwan made clear in statement by Dept spokesman that final determination must await conclusion peace settlement for Japan. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: 342 （英语）. ......should a refugee Chinese government or a Chinese government in exile be set up in Taiwan, which is not yet legally Chinese territory, it is probable that the British Government would simply appoint a British Consulate in Tamsui as an office of the British Embassy in China. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 14 November 1949 vol 469 c1679 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Any change in the legal status of Formosa can only be formally effected in a treaty of peace with Japan."
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VII, Korea. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 383 （英语）. Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 26 July 1950 vol 478 c60W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "His Majesty's Government have recognised de jure the Chinese Central People's Government as the legitimate Government of China, and as such entitled to enjoy the rights of the Chinese State.
    Formosa is still de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of Formosa as such. Following on the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remaining Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pending the final determination of its status at a peace settlement......because of the provisional nature of the present administration of Formosa, it is the hope of His Majesty's Government that the disposal of Formosa will be decided, as has always been contemplated, in connection with the peace settlement, with Japan."
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 398 （英语）. There come to mind number of factors, generally unenvisaged at time Cairo Declaration, which lead us not to accept that Declaration as necessarily last word on subj Formosa.
    (a) Commitments by USSR in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of Natl Govt of Chi) have been grossly flouted;
    (b) Record of Chi Natl Govt in Formosa, which assumed responsibility fol VJ-Day, has not been satis;
    (c) It appears to us to be one thing to turn Formosa over to Rep of Chi as constituted at time Cairo Declaration; quite another to turn it over to Peiping regime which is acting in support of Moscow conspiracy against free nations;
    (d) In view drastic change in situation in Chi and hostile totalitarian regime now established Peiping, are democratic countries not entitled to question the turning of Formosa over to such regime without consulting Formosans or applying principles of UN Charter applicable to dependent peoples?......     
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIII: 1950. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1950: pp. 607–608 （英语）. Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act......The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 588 （英语）. On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIV: 1951. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1951: pp. 65–66 （英语）. That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 880, 885, 895 （英语）. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 883 （英语）. The conversation then turned to territorial and security problems and President Quirino emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa and expressed disagreement with what he understood would be the United States' position that the future of Formosa should be determined in the first instance by only Big Four. President Quirino intended that the Philippiones should be a party to any determinination of the future of Formosa and that in his opinion some form of United Nations trusteeship might be the most satisfactory solution. Mr. Dulles stated that the original position of the United States had been tentative only; that the United States would certainly wish to consider carefully the views of the Philippine Government on this matter and that he too had long been of the personal opinion that a United Nations trusteeship might be the best solution. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government was completely opposed to any such solution and it would therefore be useful to seek some other formula and in this regard the suggestions of the Philippine Government would be most welcome 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 886–887 （英语）. Mr. Spender's second point was with regard to Formosa. He said that if the intention was to confirm the National Government's title to the island Australia would have serious reservations. The Australian Government has no desire to recognize the Chinese Communist regime but is very unhappy over continued recognition of the National Government, and would be reluctant to strengthen that Government by giving it Formosa. Ambassador Dulles said that Formosa presented a difficult problem. It was not our intention to confirm the National Government's title to Formosa. Mr. Spender suggested that the best solution might be to require Japan to renounce title without indicating to whom title had been transferred. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 953, 954 （英语）. It is the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Central People's Government of China should be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan......With respect to the second point, that is the renunciation by Japan of claims to Formosa in favor of China without specifying what China. Sir Oliver said that he thought our language, which provided for the renunciation of Formosa by Japan, but without specifying who should have it was a little bit vague......Ambassador Dulles said that this, too, presented us with many problems but that we would consider the British views carefully. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 977, 978 （英语）. As the Government of the United States does not recognize the Central People's Government of China it would not find it possible to invite that regime to participate in negotiations with it for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan......With respect to Formosa, Mr. Dulles emphasized the view of the United States that a Treaty with Japan should do nothing which would of itself and suddenly eliminate all international concern over the disposition of Formosa; nor did it appear wise to the United States Government that Japan by a Treaty should be compelled to take action which might in fact result in Japan itself becoming embroiled in a controversy or being given an opportunity to claim that the “China” to which Formosa had been turned over was not the “China” to which the Japanese had intended, by the Treaty, Formosa should be turned over. Mr. Dulles then reviewed at some length the United States general position with regard to Formosa and the undesirability of turning over to a Communist regime the island and people of Formosa without some attempt being made to determine the desires of the people of that island...... 
  • Department of State. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1951: p. 93. The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands. The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 1349 （英语）. FYI word “terrs” shld not be employed in way to imply Formosa is for purposes of Treaty already legal Dept China. Such action wld make difficult any possible future UN action; also it is not believed to be matter to be determined only by bilat Sino-Jap arrangement. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 770 （英语）. ......Formosa and the Pescadores had a distinctive juridical status under the Japanese Peace Treaty. They were not technically under Chinese sovereignty since Japan had made no cession in favor of China......once we mad a security treaty with Nationalist China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be necessary for them to refrain from offensive operations from their “privileged sanctuary”. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 811 （英语）. ......Japan never ceded sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores to China. Japan renounced its own sovereignty but left the future title undefined. Thus the United States as principal victor of Japan has an unsatisfied interest in these former Japanese islands. 
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXI: 1954. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1954: p. 896 （英语）. The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these island. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 20 December 1954 vol 535 c2431 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "The position with regard to Formosa is that Japan has renounced her sovereignty over it, but in our view it has not become part of China."
  • Department of External Affairs（英语：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 26. Canberra: Department of External Affairs（英语：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. 1955: p. 57 （英语）. In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and Pescadores, and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not...... Negotiations for a cease fire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 01 February 1955 vol 536 c901 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It contained merely a statement of common purpose. ...... The question of future sovereignty over Formosa was left undetermined by the Japanese Peace Treaty."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 February 1955 vol 536 c159W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "......This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.
    ......In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.
    Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.
    The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."
  • James Reston（英语：James Reston）. New Formosa Bid需要付费订阅. New York Times (New York). 1955-02-06 [2015-03-12]. （原始内容存档于2015-03-08） （英语）. ......Secretary of State Dulles prepared to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow to urge Senate ratification of the mutual assistance treaty with the Republic of China.
    The Administration clarified its position on the legal status of Formosa, and was prepared to make clear to the Senate that ratification of the treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek would not give him legal sovereignty over Formosa and Pescadores......
    ......Some prominent Democrats have suggested that the signing of a mutual defense agreement with President Chiang will change the legal status of these territories and give the Nationalists sovereignty over them.
    Mr. Dulles will reject this argument when he testifies on the treaty this week. He will assert that the Administration does not regard the sovereignty of Formosa and the Pescadores as having been settled. His view is that the treaty will not give General Chiang sovereignty over these islands.
    Ths position of the Administration is that these territories were handed over to the Allied and associated powers of World War II by Japan, which had held them since 1895, and that General Chiang was merely asked to administer them for the Allied and associated powers pending a final decision as to their ownership......     
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 c1867 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
  • Department of External Affairs（英语：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 26. Canberra: Department of External Affairs（英语：Department of External Affairs (1921–70)）. 1955: p. 176 （英语）. As to the juridical status of Formosa, this was something yet to be determined, and would no doubt some day be determined by the United Nations or under United Nations machinery. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 09 February 1955 vol 536 c216w （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "I have been unable to trace any such proclamation. Unilateral declarations could not affect the legal status of Formosa......"
  • Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXII: 1955. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1955: p. 329 （英语）. In 1945 our long-time ally, the Republic of China, was entrusted with authority over these islands. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 04 May 1955 vol 540 cc1870–1 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "The document in question was the Cairo Declaration. That was couched in the form of a statement of intention, and as it was merely a statement of intention, it is merely binding in so far as it states the intent at that time, and therefore it cannot by itself transfer sovereignty......The case of Formosa is different. The sovereignty was Japanese until 1952. The Japanese Treaty came into force, and at that time Formosa was being administered by the Chinese Nationalists, to whom it was entrusted in 1945, as a military occupation......That position has been made quite clear by the statement the Prime Minister made in the House on 4th February, which has been quoted by the hon. and learned Member. Therefore I shall not repeat it. In reply—I quote the concluding passages of his statement—he said: "Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined." ......the fact is that Formosa is not under Chinese sovereignty. That does not mean that the Chinese Nationalists have no right to be there. Their presence springs from their military occupancy in which they were placed by the Allied Powers in 1945, pending future arrangements."
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Vol. II, China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1986: p. 619 （英语）. ......Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 19 November 1958 vol 595 c1140–1 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "......the Cairo Declaration, which was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration, was merely a statement of common purpose. Both were made at a time when there was only one entity claiming to represent China. Since then there has been a civil war in China and opinions differ as to who now represents the Government of China. The problem of Formosa has become an international one, in which a number of nations are concerned, and it cannot be solved merely by reference to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations."
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Vol. XXII, Northeast Asia. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1996: p. 698. ISBN 0160452066 （英语）. He recalled that the legal status of the island of Formosa was not determined at the San Francisco Peace Conference, at which Japan merely renounced her sovereignty. He repeated a suggestion he had made to Ambassador Stevenson, that a conference of those nations which attended the San Francisco Conference be called to determine the legal status of Formosa. 
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 20 December 1961 vol 651 c1519 （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 23 June 1966 vol 730 c130W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Her Majesty's Government believe that the China seat in the United Nations should be occupied by representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. As for Formosa, it is our view that sovereignty over this island is undetermined."
  • HC Deb（英语：Hansard） 19 December 1966 vol 738 cc185–6W （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） （英文）. "Our position on the status of Formosa was outlined on 28th November by my noble Friend Lord Caradon in his explanation of our vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation in that organisation. A copy186W of his statement is in the Library. It remains our view that sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined."
  • Office of the Legal Adviser（英语：Office of the Legal Adviser）. Treaties in Force (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Government Publishing Office. 2013-01-01: p. 324 [2015-02-17]. ISBN 9780160922930. （原始内容存档 (PDF)于2018-06-12） （英语）. The United States does not recognize the "Republic of China" as a state or government. 
  • House of Commons. Foreign Affairs - Tenth Report - Taiwan. London: Foreign Affairs Select Committee（英语：Foreign Affairs Select Committee）. 2000-11-22 [2015-11-10]. The official British position was set out in a 1972 agreement with China, under which the United Kingdom “acknowledged the position of the government of the PRC that Taiwan was a province of the PRC and recognised the PRC Government as the sole legal Government of China.” 
  • Chen Lung-chu, W. M. Reisman. Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title. Yale Law Journal（英语：Yale Law Journal） (The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.). March 1972, 81 (4): 611–612 [2015-02-15]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-07） （英语）. At the conclusion of World War II, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Command in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, authorized the Nationalist Chinese authorities to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to undertake temporarily military occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers. 
  • Jonathan I Charney, J. R. V. Prescott. Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan. 美國國際法雜誌（英语：American Journal of International Law） (American Society of International Law（英语：American Society of International Law）). July 2000, 94 (3): 458. JSTOR 2555319. doi:10.2307/2555319 （英语）. After occupying Taiwan in 1945 as a result of Japan's surrender, the Nationalists were defeated on the mainland in 1949, abandoning it to retreat to Taiwan. 
  • Y. Frank Chiang. One-China Policy and Taiwan. Fordham International Law Journal（英语：Fordham International Law Journal） (Fordham University School of Law). December 2004, 28 (1): 27, 80 [2015-02-19]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-07） （英语）. In August 1945, when U.S. General MacArthur (as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) assigned the R.O.C government to receive the surrender of the Japanese commanders in Taiwan, the R.O.C. government was still in control of a large part of China's territory. But, by 1949, that government had lost control over most of China's territory to the Chinese Communists in a civil war and taken refuge in Formosa, outside of China's territory.....It was the United States that assigned Chiang Kai-shek's R.O.C. government to occupy and administer the island of Taiwan on its behalf. So, fifty years later, the R.O.C. government still acts as an agent of the United States. The passage of time will not change, and has not changed, the legal relationship of agent and principal. 
  • Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, New York（英语：Garden City, New York）: Doubleday（英语：Doubleday (publisher)）. March 1963: p. 461 （英语）. The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to "China," either Communist or Nationalist. 

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  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VIII, The Far East. Washington: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1971: 358–359 （英语）. In particular, it is considered that exemption from Japanese jurisdiction was not intended to be accorded the estimated 20,000 persons in Japan claiming to be Taiwanese; these persons throughout the war were enemy nationals and according to Japanese law still retain Japanese nationality, excepting only those who have individually divested themselves thereof in accordance with established procedure......It should, however, be pointed out that from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan's Sovereignty remains to be formalized; assumably a treaty of cession will in due course be negotiated which will effect such transfer and which may contain provisions in regard to appropriate change in the national status of Taiwan's residents. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Vol. VII, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1972: p. 433 （英语）. Formosans stress American responsibility through Cairo decision and have published intent to appeal for American help in seeking UN intervention pending final transfer sovereignty to China. Responsible island-wide group preparing formal petition and has so advised Consulate. One such petition received addressed to General Marshall. Possibilities of interim administration under SCAP openly discussed. ...... American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans who believe representations at Nanking and direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese de jure sovereignty status. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: 美國政府印務局（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: 332–333 （英语）. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: p. 336 （英语）. Dept's position re status Taiwan made clear in statement by Dept spokesman that final determination must await conclusion peace settlement for Japan. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1974: 342 （英语）. ......should a refugee Chinese government or a Chinese government in exile be set up in Taiwan, which is not yet legally Chinese territory, it is probable that the British Government would simply appoint a British Consulate in Tamsui as an office of the British Embassy in China. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VII, Korea. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 383 （英语）. Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 398 （英语）. There come to mind number of factors, generally unenvisaged at time Cairo Declaration, which lead us not to accept that Declaration as necessarily last word on subj Formosa.
    (a) Commitments by USSR in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of Natl Govt of Chi) have been grossly flouted;
    (b) Record of Chi Natl Govt in Formosa, which assumed responsibility fol VJ-Day, has not been satis;
    (c) It appears to us to be one thing to turn Formosa over to Rep of Chi as constituted at time Cairo Declaration; quite another to turn it over to Peiping regime which is acting in support of Moscow conspiracy against free nations;
    (d) In view drastic change in situation in Chi and hostile totalitarian regime now established Peiping, are democratic countries not entitled to question the turning of Formosa over to such regime without consulting Formosans or applying principles of UN Charter applicable to dependent peoples?......     
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1976: p. 588 （英语）. On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 880, 885, 895 （英语）. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 883 （英语）. The conversation then turned to territorial and security problems and President Quirino emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa and expressed disagreement with what he understood would be the United States' position that the future of Formosa should be determined in the first instance by only Big Four. President Quirino intended that the Philippiones should be a party to any determinination of the future of Formosa and that in his opinion some form of United Nations trusteeship might be the most satisfactory solution. Mr. Dulles stated that the original position of the United States had been tentative only; that the United States would certainly wish to consider carefully the views of the Philippine Government on this matter and that he too had long been of the personal opinion that a United Nations trusteeship might be the best solution. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government was completely opposed to any such solution and it would therefore be useful to seek some other formula and in this regard the suggestions of the Philippine Government would be most welcome 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 886–887 （英语）. Mr. Spender's second point was with regard to Formosa. He said that if the intention was to confirm the National Government's title to the island Australia would have serious reservations. The Australian Government has no desire to recognize the Chinese Communist regime but is very unhappy over continued recognition of the National Government, and would be reluctant to strengthen that Government by giving it Formosa. Ambassador Dulles said that Formosa presented a difficult problem. It was not our intention to confirm the National Government's title to Formosa. Mr. Spender suggested that the best solution might be to require Japan to renounce title without indicating to whom title had been transferred. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 953, 954 （英语）. It is the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Central People's Government of China should be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan......With respect to the second point, that is the renunciation by Japan of claims to Formosa in favor of China without specifying what China. Sir Oliver said that he thought our language, which provided for the renunciation of Formosa by Japan, but without specifying who should have it was a little bit vague......Ambassador Dulles said that this, too, presented us with many problems but that we would consider the British views carefully. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: pp. 977, 978 （英语）. As the Government of the United States does not recognize the Central People's Government of China it would not find it possible to invite that regime to participate in negotiations with it for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan......With respect to Formosa, Mr. Dulles emphasized the view of the United States that a Treaty with Japan should do nothing which would of itself and suddenly eliminate all international concern over the disposition of Formosa; nor did it appear wise to the United States Government that Japan by a Treaty should be compelled to take action which might in fact result in Japan itself becoming embroiled in a controversy or being given an opportunity to claim that the “China” to which Formosa had been turned over was not the “China” to which the Japanese had intended, by the Treaty, Formosa should be turned over. Mr. Dulles then reviewed at some length the United States general position with regard to Formosa and the undesirability of turning over to a Communist regime the island and people of Formosa without some attempt being made to determine the desires of the people of that island...... 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1977: p. 1349 （英语）. FYI word “terrs” shld not be employed in way to imply Formosa is for purposes of Treaty already legal Dept China. Such action wld make difficult any possible future UN action; also it is not believed to be matter to be determined only by bilat Sino-Jap arrangement. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 770 （英语）. ......Formosa and the Pescadores had a distinctive juridical status under the Japanese Peace Treaty. They were not technically under Chinese sovereignty since Japan had made no cession in favor of China......once we mad a security treaty with Nationalist China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be necessary for them to refrain from offensive operations from their “privileged sanctuary”. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1985: p. 811 （英语）. ......Japan never ceded sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores to China. Japan renounced its own sovereignty but left the future title undefined. Thus the United States as principal victor of Japan has an unsatisfied interest in these former Japanese islands. 
  • Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Vol. II, China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office（英语：United States Government Printing Office）. 1986: p. 619 （英语）. ......Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem. 

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  • Chen Lung-chu, W. M. Reisman. Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title. Yale Law Journal（英语：Yale Law Journal） (The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.). March 1972, 81 (4): 611–612 [2015-02-15]. （原始内容存档于2021-01-07） （英语）. At the conclusion of World War II, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Command in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, authorized the Nationalist Chinese authorities to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to undertake temporarily military occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers. 

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