自由意志主义 (形而上学) (Chinese Wikipedia)
Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "自由意志主义 (形而上学)" in Chinese language version.
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archive.org
archive.org
- Lewis, C.S. Miracles. HarperCollins. 1947: 24. ISBN 0-688-17369-1.
- William L. Rowe. Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality
. Cornell University Press. 1991 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-8014-2557-8. - John Thorp. Free will: a defence against neurophysiological determinism. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1980 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0710005656.
- Thomas Reid; Dugald Stewart. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind: An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; and An Essay on Quantity. T. Tegg. 1843: 102.
- Mark Balaguer. Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View. Philosophical Studies. 1999, 93 (2): 189–211. S2CID 169483672. doi:10.1023/a:1004218827363.
- Robert Nozick. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press. 1981 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-674-66479-1.
www23.us.archive.org
- Niels Bohr. Light and Life. Nature. April 1, 1933, 131 (3309): 457–459 [July 8, 2017]. Bibcode:1933Natur.131..457B. ISBN 9780444899729. doi:10.1038/131457a0
. （原始内容存档于February 8, 2024）. For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Full text on line at us.archive.org.
books.google.com
- William Belsham, "Essays", printed for C. Dilly, 1789; original from the University of Michigan, digitized May 21, 2007, p. 11.
- Niels Bohr. Light and Life. Nature. April 1, 1933, 131 (3309): 457–459 [July 8, 2017]. Bibcode:1933Natur.131..457B. ISBN 9780444899729. doi:10.1038/131457a0 . （原始内容存档于February 8, 2024）.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Full text on line at us.archive.org. - Roderick M. Chisholm. Person And Object: A Metaphysical Study. Psychology Press. 2004 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-415-29593-2.
- Alan Donagan. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1987 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-7102-1168-2.
- Timothy O'Connor. Robert Kane , 编. Oxford Hb Of Free Will:Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. Oxford Handbooks Online. 2005: 337–355 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-517854-8.
- Richard Taylor. Action and purpose. Prentice-Hall. 1966 [27 December 2012].
- Michael J. Zimmerman. An essay on human action. P. Lang. 1984 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-8204-0122-5.
- George Berkeley; Jonathan Dancy. A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. Oxford University Press. 1998 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-875160-1.
- Thomas Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind; An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; And an Essay on Quantity. HardPress. 2012 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-1-4077-2950-3.
- Chisholm, Roderick. Human Freedom and the Self. John Wiley & Sons. 1964 [8 July 2017]. ISBN 978-1118604519. （原始内容存档于8 February 2024）.
- Laura Waddell Ekstrom. Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview Press. 2000 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-8133-9093-2.
- Alfred R. Mele. Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press. 2006 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-530504-3.
- Daniel Clement Dennett. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. MIT Press. 1981 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-262-54037-7.
- Robert Kane. Free Will. Oxford University Press. 2005 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-514970-8.
- Richard Sorabji. Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. Duckworth. 1980 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-7156-1549-2.
- Peter Van Inwagen. An Essay on Free Will. Clarendon Press. 1983 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-824924-5.
- Ted Honderich. Essays on Freedom of Action:Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1973: 33–61 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-7100-7392-1.
- John R. Searle. Rationality in Action. MIT Press. 2001 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-262-69282-3.
- Robert Kane. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 1996 [27 December 2012]. ISBN 978-0-19-510550-6.
doi.org
- Niels Bohr. Light and Life. Nature. April 1, 1933, 131 (3309): 457–459 [July 8, 2017]. Bibcode:1933Natur.131..457B. ISBN 9780444899729. doi:10.1038/131457a0 . （原始内容存档于February 8, 2024）.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Full text on line at us.archive.org. - Randolph Clarke. Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics. 1996, 24 (2): 19–48. doi:10.5840/philtopics19962427.
- L. Peterson, Michael; Fischer, John Martin. Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker. Faith and Philosophy. 1995, 12: 119–125. ISSN 0739-7046. doi:10.5840/faithphil199512123 .
- Mark Balaguer. Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View. Philosophical Studies. 1999, 93 (2): 189–211. S2CID 169483672. doi:10.1023/a:1004218827363.
gutenberg.org
- Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2020-10-16. (1907), Hackett Publishing, 1981; Dover, 1995: ISBN 0-915145-05-7、0-486-28270-8
harvard.edu
ui.adsabs.harvard.edu
- Niels Bohr. Light and Life. Nature. April 1, 1933, 131 (3309): 457–459 [July 8, 2017]. Bibcode:1933Natur.131..457B. ISBN 9780444899729. doi:10.1038/131457a0 . （原始内容存档于February 8, 2024）.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Full text on line at us.archive.org.
informationphilosopher.com
- Niels Bohr. The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.. The Information Philosopher, dedicated to the new information philosophy. Robert O. Doyle, publisher. [2012-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2021-04-17）.
... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
oed.com
- Oxford English Dictionary definition of libertarianism 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2008-01-11..
routledge.com
rep.routledge.com
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2007-08-25.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will (section 2) 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-09-23.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009. "These anti-compatibilists or incompatibilists divide into two groups: the libertarians and the no-freedom theorists or pessimists about free will and moral responsibility."
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will (section 2) 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-09-23.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009. "[Libertarians] hold (1) that we do have free will, (2) that free will is incompatible with determinism, and (3) that determinism is therefore false."
semanticscholar.org
api.semanticscholar.org
- Mark Balaguer. Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View. Philosophical Studies. 1999, 93 (2): 189–211. S2CID 169483672. doi:10.1023/a:1004218827363.
stanford.edu
plato.stanford.edu
- Randolph, Clarke. Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. Edward N. Zalta (编). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2008. 2008 [2017-07-08]. （原始内容存档于2024-02-08）.
typepad.com
experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com
- Shaun Nichols. The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy (PDF): 8–9. [9 July 2017]. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于9 June 2010）.
utm.edu
iep.utm.edu
- Timpe, Kevin (2006) Free Will 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-05-08. in Feiser, J and Dowden, B (Eds.) 'Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'. Retrieved on July 31, 2009 "Other incompatibilists think that the actual world is not deterministic and that at least some of the agents in the actual world have free will. These incompatibilists are referred to as "libertarians" [see Kane (2005), particularly chapters 3 and 4]."
web.archive.org
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2007-08-25.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will (section 2) 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-09-23.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009. "These anti-compatibilists or incompatibilists divide into two groups: the libertarians and the no-freedom theorists or pessimists about free will and moral responsibility."
- Timpe, Kevin (2006) Free Will 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-05-08. in Feiser, J and Dowden, B (Eds.) 'Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'. Retrieved on July 31, 2009 "Other incompatibilists think that the actual world is not deterministic and that at least some of the agents in the actual world have free will. These incompatibilists are referred to as "libertarians" [see Kane (2005), particularly chapters 3 and 4]."
- Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will (section 2) 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2009-09-23.. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 31, 2009. "[Libertarians] hold (1) that we do have free will, (2) that free will is incompatible with determinism, and (3) that determinism is therefore false."
- Shaun Nichols. The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy (PDF): 8–9. [9 July 2017]. （原始内容 (PDF)存档于9 June 2010）.
- Oxford English Dictionary definition of libertarianism 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2008-01-11..
- Niels Bohr. The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles underlying the Description of Nature; Based on a lecture to the Scandinavian Meeting of Natural Scientists and published in Danish in Fysisk Tidsskrift in 1929. First published in English in 1934 by Cambridge University Press.. The Information Philosopher, dedicated to the new information philosophy. Robert O. Doyle, publisher. [2012-09-14]. （原始内容存档于2021-04-17）.
... any observation necessitates an interference with the course of the phenomena, which is of such a nature that it deprives us of the foundation underlying the causal mode of description.
- Niels Bohr. Light and Life. Nature. April 1, 1933, 131 (3309): 457–459 [July 8, 2017]. Bibcode:1933Natur.131..457B. ISBN 9780444899729. doi:10.1038/131457a0 . （原始内容存档于February 8, 2024）.
For instance, it is impossible, from our standpoint, to attach an unambiguous meaning to the view sometimes expressed that the probability of the occurrence of certain atomic processes in the body might be under the direct influence of the will. In fact, according to the generalized interpretation of the psycho-physical parallelism, the freedom of the will must be considered a feature of conscious life that corresponds to functions of the organism that not only evade a causal mechanical description, but resist even a physical analysis carried to the extent required for an unambiguous application of the statistical laws of atomic mechanics. Without entering into metaphysical speculations, I may perhaps add that an analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
Full text on line at us.archive.org. - Chisholm, Roderick. Human Freedom and the Self. John Wiley & Sons. 1964 [8 July 2017]. ISBN 978-1118604519. （原始内容存档于8 February 2024）.
- Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 互联网档案馆的存檔，存档日期2020-10-16. (1907), Hackett Publishing, 1981; Dover, 1995: ISBN 0-915145-05-7、0-486-28270-8
- Randolph, Clarke. Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. Edward N. Zalta (编). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2008. 2008 [2017-07-08]. （原始内容存档于2024-02-08）.
worldcat.org
- L. Peterson, Michael; Fischer, John Martin. Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker. Faith and Philosophy. 1995, 12: 119–125. ISSN 0739-7046. doi:10.5840/faithphil199512123 .