List of Exhibits from D. W. Kennamer's Investigation of the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935 FlickrArchived 2015-06-01 at the Wayback Machine
Administrative letters and findings from D. W. Kennamer's Investigation of the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935. FlickrArchived 2015-06-01 at the Wayback Machine
Report of Special Investigation Committee, Florida Hurricane Disaster to National Executive Committee, The American Legion, by Quimby Melton, Georgia, Chairman, November 1, 1935, p. 6. FlickrArchived 2015-05-29 at the Wayback Machine
There were no turntables on the Florida East Coast Railway below Miami. In routine operations locomotives were reversed using the "wye (rail)" junctions at Homestead, Marathon or Key West. In this case, it was decided to use the wye at Homestead and run the locomotive backward to Camp #3 on Lower Matecumbe, and then, using a siding, move it to the other end of the train facing forward for the return trip. Using the Marathon wye would have allowed running the engine forward on both legs, but would have added 45.6 miles to the route, much of which was over open water. As it happened the hurricane's eye passed directly over the Long Key crossings. Caught there the entire train would have been lost in the bay. Florida Hurricane Disaster Hearings, Statements by Loftin, p. 504, Beals, p. 509 and Branch, p. 514.[permanent dead link]
6 coaches, 2 baggage cars, and 3 box cars. The box cars were at the rear of the train; being empty and smaller than the other cars they blew off the tracks even before the storm surge arrived, stopping the train from continuing past Islamorada. A close examination of photographs of the wreck show one box car still coupled to the last baggage car. The other two broke off completely and were carried by the surge half-way across the key towards the bay. Two other boxcars were on a siding before the storm and ended up wedged against the sides of coaches 5 and 6, counting back from the locomotive. Florida Hurricane Disaster Hearings, Statements by Loftin, p. 504, Aitcheson, p. 506, and Branch, p. 515Archived 2022-12-25 at the Wayback Machine
Scott Loftin, FEC co-receiver, concluded on Sept 6, 1935, that the delays likely saved the crew and passengers; if the train had arrived an hour earlier it would have been on Lower Matecumbe or the narrow Indian Key fill when the surge struck and destroyed. "From what we now know it seems that the men could not have been extracted from the camps unless the train had left Miami about 10:00 am." Florida Hurricane Disaster Hearings, p. 504. HathiTrust Digital LibraryArchived 2022-12-25 at the Wayback Machine
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, Oct. 30, 2013 House ArchivesArchived 2015-06-09 at the Wayback Machine
Miami Daily News, February 16, 1939, p.1, Florida Awaits Train Bearing Roosevelt Here. Google News
noaa.gov
ncei.noaa.gov
Mindling, George W. (September 1935). "Georgia Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 39 (9). Atlanta, Georgia: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on February 1, 2021. Retrieved February 1, 2021 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
Merchant, G. C. (September 1935). "South Carolina Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 38 (9). Columbia, South Carolina: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 6, 2022. Retrieved July 6, 2022 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
Weeks, J. R. (September 1935). "Maryland and Delaware Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 40 (9). Baltimore, Maryland: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 6, 2022. Retrieved July 6, 2022 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
Injured Recount Camp Gale Horror, by the Associated Press, New York Times, September 5, 1935, Pg. 3Archived December 25, 2022, at the Wayback Machine: "Dr. Lassiter Alexander, medical officer at Camp No. 1, Snake Creek, who had injuries to his back, related: ... One of those killed in the collapse of the Snake Creek Hotel was Dr. E. [sic] C. Main, medical director of the camp, who lost his life before my eyes."
6 coaches, 2 baggage cars, and 3 box cars. The box cars were at the rear of the train; being empty and smaller than the other cars they blew off the tracks even before the storm surge arrived, stopping the train from continuing past Islamorada. A close examination of photographs of the wreck show one box car still coupled to the last baggage car. The other two broke off completely and were carried by the surge half-way across the key towards the bay. Two other boxcars were on a siding before the storm and ended up wedged against the sides of coaches 5 and 6, counting back from the locomotive. Florida Hurricane Disaster Hearings, Statements by Loftin, p. 504, Aitcheson, p. 506, and Branch, p. 515Archived 2022-12-25 at the Wayback Machine
Scott Loftin, FEC co-receiver, concluded on Sept 6, 1935, that the delays likely saved the crew and passengers; if the train had arrived an hour earlier it would have been on Lower Matecumbe or the narrow Indian Key fill when the surge struck and destroyed. "From what we now know it seems that the men could not have been extracted from the camps unless the train had left Miami about 10:00 am." Florida Hurricane Disaster Hearings, p. 504. HathiTrust Digital LibraryArchived 2022-12-25 at the Wayback Machine
St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 5, 1935, p. 1. "Storm Danger Fades Here, Damage Heavy". Google NewsArchived 2016-04-29 at the Wayback Machine
Mindling, George W. (September 1935). "Georgia Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 39 (9). Atlanta, Georgia: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on February 1, 2021. Retrieved February 1, 2021 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
Merchant, G. C. (September 1935). "South Carolina Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 38 (9). Columbia, South Carolina: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 6, 2022. Retrieved July 6, 2022 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
Weeks, J. R. (September 1935). "Maryland and Delaware Section"(PDF). Climatological Data. 40 (9). Baltimore, Maryland: Weather Bureau. Archived from the original(PDF) on July 6, 2022. Retrieved July 6, 2022 – via National Centers for Environmental Information.
List of Exhibits from D. W. Kennamer's Investigation of the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935 FlickrArchived 2015-06-01 at the Wayback Machine
Administrative letters and findings from D. W. Kennamer's Investigation of the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935. FlickrArchived 2015-06-01 at the Wayback Machine
Report of Special Investigation Committee, Florida Hurricane Disaster to National Executive Committee, The American Legion, by Quimby Melton, Georgia, Chairman, November 1, 1935, p. 6. FlickrArchived 2015-05-29 at the Wayback Machine
Preservationist Jerry Wilkinson visits unmarked Miami graves of soldiers killed in the 1935 Labor Day hurricane You TubeArchived 2019-11-06 at the Wayback Machine
Injured Recount Camp Gale Horror, by the Associated Press, New York Times, September 5, 1935, Pg. 3Archived December 25, 2022, at the Wayback Machine: "Dr. Lassiter Alexander, medical officer at Camp No. 1, Snake Creek, who had injuries to his back, related: ... One of those killed in the collapse of the Snake Creek Hotel was Dr. E. [sic] C. Main, medical director of the camp, who lost his life before my eyes."
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, Oct. 30, 2013 House ArchivesArchived 2015-06-09 at the Wayback Machine
Preservationist Jerry Wilkinson visits unmarked Miami graves of soldiers killed in the 1935 Labor Day hurricane You TubeArchived 2019-11-06 at the Wayback Machine