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Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002). "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems". Journal of Economic Theory. 103 (2): 444–460. CiteSeerX10.1.1.584.1856. doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2790.
Aghion, Philippe; Fudenberg, Drew; Holden, Richard; Kunimoto, Takashi; Tercieux, Olivier (2012). "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 127 (4): 1843. CiteSeerX10.1.1.224.2883. doi:10.1093/qje/qjs026. ISSN0033-5533.
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011). "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence". Games and Economic Behavior. 73 (1): 186–199. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.002. S2CID7430522.
Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. (2002). "The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)". Econometrica. 70 (1): 1–45. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00268. ISSN1468-0262.
Aghion, Philippe; Fudenberg, Drew; Holden, Richard; Kunimoto, Takashi; Tercieux, Olivier (2012). "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 127 (4): 1843. CiteSeerX10.1.1.224.2883. doi:10.1093/qje/qjs026. ISSN0033-5533.
Maskin, Eric; Tirole, Jean (1999). "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies. 66 (1): 83–114. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00079. ISSN0034-6527.