Pak, Hŭi-gwŏn. (2000). The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: a Challenge for Cooperation,, p. 108, at Google Books; excerpt, "Under the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the Military Demarcation Line was drawn across the Korean peninsula. Since no maritime demarcation line was specified in the Armistice Agreement, however, the United Nations Command drew the NLL...."
Ryoo, Moo Bong. (2009). "The Korean Armistice and the Islands,"Archived 2013-02-21 at the Wayback Machine p. 5. Strategy research project at the U.S. Army War College; excerpt, "Strategic Consequences of the Agreement. The agreement to retain the five islands under UNC control has shaped many aspects of the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. The most obvious and prominent consequence is the establishment of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The NLL has served as a practical maritime borderline and an effective means to separate the forces and thus prevent military clashes between the two Koreas"; compare Kim, Kwang-Tae. "After Exchange of Fire, N. Korea Threatens More Strikes on South,"Archived 2010-11-26 at the Wayback MachineTime (US). November 23, 2010.
Van Dyke, Jon et al. "The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea," Marine Policy 27 (2003), 143–58; note that "Inter-Korean MDL" is cited because it comes from an academic sourceArchived 2012-03-09 at the Wayback Machine and the writers were particular enough to include in quotes as we present it. The broader point is that the maritime demarcation line here is NOT a formal extension of the Military Demarcation Line; compare "NLL—Controversial Sea Border Between S.Korea, DPRK, "People's Daily (PRC), November 21, 2002; retrieved 22 Dec 2010
The MDL was defined and established in the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA), Article I, paragraphs 1–11. The KAA includes provisions regarding the MDL and DMZ; but those provisions do not extend into the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan. The subsequently devised Northern Boundary Line or NLLArchived 2012-03-11 at the Wayback Machine was neither initially conceived as part of the MDL, nor have the DPRK and UNC agreed to any subsequent extension of the MDL beyond the agreed upon limits of 1953/7/27.
Ryoo, p. 11; excerpt, "The NLL has served as an effective means of preventing military tension between North and South Korean military forces for 46 years. It serves as a practical demarcation line, which has contributed to the separation of forces." 1999 United Nations Command (Korea); Aigner, Erin and Haeoun Park. "Military Strike in the Waters Between North and South Korea,"New York Times. November 23, 2010; Williams, David and Peter Simpson. retrieved 22 Dec 2010.
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Van Dyke, Jon et al. "The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea," Marine Policy 27 (2003), 143–58; note that "Inter-Korean MDL" is cited because it comes from an academic sourceArchived 2012-03-09 at the Wayback Machine and the writers were particular enough to include in quotes as we present it. The broader point is that the maritime demarcation line here is NOT a formal extension of the Military Demarcation Line; compare "NLL—Controversial Sea Border Between S.Korea, DPRK, "People's Daily (PRC), November 21, 2002; retrieved 22 Dec 2010
Ryoo, Moo Bong. (2009). "The Korean Armistice and the Islands,"Archived 2013-02-21 at the Wayback Machine p. 5. Strategy research project at the U.S. Army War College; excerpt, "Strategic Consequences of the Agreement. The agreement to retain the five islands under UNC control has shaped many aspects of the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. The most obvious and prominent consequence is the establishment of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The NLL has served as a practical maritime borderline and an effective means to separate the forces and thus prevent military clashes between the two Koreas"; compare Kim, Kwang-Tae. "After Exchange of Fire, N. Korea Threatens More Strikes on South,"Archived 2010-11-26 at the Wayback MachineTime (US). November 23, 2010.
The MDL was defined and established in the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA), Article I, paragraphs 1–11. The KAA includes provisions regarding the MDL and DMZ; but those provisions do not extend into the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan. The subsequently devised Northern Boundary Line or NLLArchived 2012-03-11 at the Wayback Machine was neither initially conceived as part of the MDL, nor have the DPRK and UNC agreed to any subsequent extension of the MDL beyond the agreed upon limits of 1953/7/27.
Ryoo, Moo Bong. (2009). "The Korean Armistice and the Islands,"Archived 2013-02-21 at the Wayback Machine p. 5. Strategy research project at the U.S. Army War College; excerpt, "Strategic Consequences of the Agreement. The agreement to retain the five islands under UNC control has shaped many aspects of the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. The most obvious and prominent consequence is the establishment of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The NLL has served as a practical maritime borderline and an effective means to separate the forces and thus prevent military clashes between the two Koreas"; compare Kim, Kwang-Tae. "After Exchange of Fire, N. Korea Threatens More Strikes on South,"Archived 2010-11-26 at the Wayback MachineTime (US). November 23, 2010.
Van Dyke, Jon et al. "The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea," Marine Policy 27 (2003), 143–58; note that "Inter-Korean MDL" is cited because it comes from an academic sourceArchived 2012-03-09 at the Wayback Machine and the writers were particular enough to include in quotes as we present it. The broader point is that the maritime demarcation line here is NOT a formal extension of the Military Demarcation Line; compare "NLL—Controversial Sea Border Between S.Korea, DPRK, "People's Daily (PRC), November 21, 2002; retrieved 22 Dec 2010
