Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Pakistan Movement" in English language version.
The Muslim League maintained an elitist character until 1937 when its leadership began to engage in popular mobilisation. It functioned as a mass and popular party for 7-8 years after the Congress provincial ministries resigned in 1939, more so, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940.
During this growth spurt, the ML itself was transformed from an elite moribund organization into a mass-based party that gave itself a new constitution, a more radical ideology and a revamped organizational structure.
That, too, had begun life as a cosy club of upper-class Indians, seeking a limited range of extra privileges for Indian Muslims. However, under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the League grew rapidly to a membership of more than two million and its message became increasingly religious and separatist in tone.
Although it was founded in 1909 the League had only caught on among South Asian Muslims during the Second World War. The party had expanded astonishingly rapidly and was claiming over two million members by the early 1940s, an unimaginable result for what had been previously thought of as just one of the numerous pressure groups and small but insignificant parties.
The 1946 election was, in effect, a plebiscite among Muslims on Pakistan and a mighty success for the League, which won 90 per cent of the Muslim seats.
At the all-India level, the demand for Pakistan pitted the League against the Congress and the British.
His standing with the British remained high, however, for even though they no more agreed with the idea of a separate Muslim state than the Congress did, government officials appreciated the simplicity of a single negotiating voice for all of India's Muslims.
By this scheme, the British hoped they could at once preserve the united India desired by the Congress, and by themselves, and at the same time, through the groups, secure the essence of Jinnah's demand for a 'Pakistan'.
At Independence there was a Congress-led ministry in the North West Frontier...The Congress-supported government of the North West Frontier led by the secular Pashtun leaders, the Khan brothers, wanted to join India and not Pakistan. If joining India was not an option, then the secular Pashtun leaders espoused the cause of Pashtunistan: an ethnic state for Pashtuns.
In the 1940s a solid majority of the Barelvis were supporters of the Pakistan Movement and played a supporting role in its final phase (1940–7), mostly under the banner of the All-India Sunni Conference which had been founded in 1925.
For example, the Barelvi ulama supported the formation of the state of Pakistan and thought that any alliance with Hindus (such as that between the Indian National Congress and the Jamiat ulama-I-Hind [JUH]) was counterproductive.
During the 1946 election, Barelvi Ulama issued fatwas in favour of the Muslim League.
Believing that Islam was a universal religion, the Deobandi advocated a notion of a composite nationalism according to which Hindus and Muslims constituted one nation.
Madani...stressed the difference between qaum, meaning a nation, hence a territorial concept, and millat, meaning an Ummah and thus a religious concept.
Madani makes a crucial distinction between qaum and millat. According to him, qaum connotes a territorial multi-religious entity, while millat refers to the cultural, social and religious unity of Muslims exclusively.
Ironically, Islamic state politics in Pakistan was mostly in favour of Deobandi, and more recently Ahl-e Hadith/Salafi, institutions. Only a few Deobandi clerics decided to support the Pakistan Movement, but they were highly influential.
The senior alim conceded that the ML leaders still had some work to do before they could be seen as conscientious and observant Muslims,,, He instead emphasised the virtues of patient and quiet counseling...At the same time though, Thanawi dismissed criticisms of ML leaders as being non-observant Muslims as a case of the pot calling the kettle black.
Despite their different viewpoints all these theories have tended either to concentrate on the All-India struggle between the Muslim League and the Congress in the pre-partition period or to turn their interest to the Muslim cultural heartland of the UP where the League gained its earliest foothold and where the demand for Pakistan was strongest.
Huge crowds attended Muslim League meetings and flocked to glimpse Jinnah as he journeyed about India from 1937 onwards. They also joined in processions, strikes, and riots.
The stance of the central JUH was pro-Congress, and accordingly the JUS supported the Congressite Khudai Khidmatgars through to the elections of 1937. However the secular stance of Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, disparaging the role of religion in government and social leadership, was driving a wedge between the ulama of the JUS and the Khudai Khidmatgars, irrespective of the commitments of mutual support between the JUH and Congress leaderships. In trying to highlight the separateness and vulnerability of Muslims in a religiously diverse public space, the directives of the NWFP ulama began to veer away from simple religious injunctions to take on a communalist tone. The ulama highlighted 'threats' posed by Hindus to Muslims in the province. Accusations of improper behaviour and molestation of Muslim women were levelled against 'Hindu shopkeepers' in Nowshera. Sermons given by two JUS-connected maulvis in Nowshera declared the Hindus the 'enemies' of Islam and Muslims. Posters were distributed in the city warning Muslims not to buy or consume food prepared and sold by Hindus in the bazaars. In 1936, a Hindu girl was abducted by a Muslim in Bannu and then married to him. The government demanded the girl's return, But popular Muslim opinion, supported by a resolution passed by the Jamiyatul Ulama Bannu, demanded that she stay, stating that she had come of her free will, had converted to Islam, and was now lawfully married and had to remain with her husband. Government efforts to retrieve the girl led to accusations of the government being anti-Muslim and of encouraging apostasy, and so stirred up strong anti-Hindu sentiment across the majority Muslim NWFP. ... Involvement of the Deobandi ulama in public political activity and in the negotiation of a Muslim identity in the NWFP appeared in no way to rely upon a wider consensus of Indian Deobandis.
By 1947 the majority of NWFP ulama supported the Muslim League idea of Pakistan. Because of the now long-standing relations between JUS ulama and the Muslim League, and the strong communalist tone in the NWFP, the move away from the pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan party line of the central JUH to interest and participation in the creation of Pakistan by the NWFP Deobandis was not a dramatic one.
Despite their different viewpoints all these theories have tended either to concentrate on the All-India struggle between the Muslim League and the Congress in the pre-partition period or to turn their interest to the Muslim cultural heartland of the UP where the League gained its earliest foothold and where the demand for Pakistan was strongest.
The stance of the central JUH was pro-Congress, and accordingly the JUS supported the Congressite Khudai Khidmatgars through to the elections of 1937. However the secular stance of Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, disparaging the role of religion in government and social leadership, was driving a wedge between the ulama of the JUS and the Khudai Khidmatgars, irrespective of the commitments of mutual support between the JUH and Congress leaderships. In trying to highlight the separateness and vulnerability of Muslims in a religiously diverse public space, the directives of the NWFP ulama began to veer away from simple religious injunctions to take on a communalist tone. The ulama highlighted 'threats' posed by Hindus to Muslims in the province. Accusations of improper behaviour and molestation of Muslim women were levelled against 'Hindu shopkeepers' in Nowshera. Sermons given by two JUS-connected maulvis in Nowshera declared the Hindus the 'enemies' of Islam and Muslims. Posters were distributed in the city warning Muslims not to buy or consume food prepared and sold by Hindus in the bazaars. In 1936, a Hindu girl was abducted by a Muslim in Bannu and then married to him. The government demanded the girl's return, But popular Muslim opinion, supported by a resolution passed by the Jamiyatul Ulama Bannu, demanded that she stay, stating that she had come of her free will, had converted to Islam, and was now lawfully married and had to remain with her husband. Government efforts to retrieve the girl led to accusations of the government being anti-Muslim and of encouraging apostasy, and so stirred up strong anti-Hindu sentiment across the majority Muslim NWFP. ... Involvement of the Deobandi ulama in public political activity and in the negotiation of a Muslim identity in the NWFP appeared in no way to rely upon a wider consensus of Indian Deobandis.
By 1947 the majority of NWFP ulama supported the Muslim League idea of Pakistan. Because of the now long-standing relations between JUS ulama and the Muslim League, and the strong communalist tone in the NWFP, the move away from the pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan party line of the central JUH to interest and participation in the creation of Pakistan by the NWFP Deobandis was not a dramatic one.
The stance of the central JUH was pro-Congress, and accordingly the JUS supported the Congressite Khudai Khidmatgars through to the elections of 1937. However the secular stance of Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, disparaging the role of religion in government and social leadership, was driving a wedge between the ulama of the JUS and the Khudai Khidmatgars, irrespective of the commitments of mutual support between the JUH and Congress leaderships. In trying to highlight the separateness and vulnerability of Muslims in a religiously diverse public space, the directives of the NWFP ulama began to veer away from simple religious injunctions to take on a communalist tone. The ulama highlighted 'threats' posed by Hindus to Muslims in the province. Accusations of improper behaviour and molestation of Muslim women were levelled against 'Hindu shopkeepers' in Nowshera. Sermons given by two JUS-connected maulvis in Nowshera declared the Hindus the 'enemies' of Islam and Muslims. Posters were distributed in the city warning Muslims not to buy or consume food prepared and sold by Hindus in the bazaars. In 1936, a Hindu girl was abducted by a Muslim in Bannu and then married to him. The government demanded the girl's return, But popular Muslim opinion, supported by a resolution passed by the Jamiyatul Ulama Bannu, demanded that she stay, stating that she had come of her free will, had converted to Islam, and was now lawfully married and had to remain with her husband. Government efforts to retrieve the girl led to accusations of the government being anti-Muslim and of encouraging apostasy, and so stirred up strong anti-Hindu sentiment across the majority Muslim NWFP. ... Involvement of the Deobandi ulama in public political activity and in the negotiation of a Muslim identity in the NWFP appeared in no way to rely upon a wider consensus of Indian Deobandis.
By 1947 the majority of NWFP ulama supported the Muslim League idea of Pakistan. Because of the now long-standing relations between JUS ulama and the Muslim League, and the strong communalist tone in the NWFP, the move away from the pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan party line of the central JUH to interest and participation in the creation of Pakistan by the NWFP Deobandis was not a dramatic one.
However, the book is a tribute to the role of one Muslim leader who steadfastly opposed the Partition of India: the Sindhi leader Allah Bakhsh Soomro. Allah Bakhsh belonged to a landed family. He founded the Sindh People's Party in 1934, which later came to be known as 'Ittehad' or 'Unity Party'. ... Allah Bakhsh was totally opposed to the Muslim League's demand for the creation of Pakistan through a division of India on a religious basis. Consequently, he established the Azad Muslim Conference. In its Delhi session held during April 27–30, 1940 some 1400 delegates took part. They belonged mainly to the lower castes and working class. The famous scholar of Indian Islam, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, feels that the delegates represented a 'majority of India's Muslims'. Among those who attended the conference were representatives of many Islamic theologians and women who also took part in the deliberations ... Shamsul Islam argues that the All-India Muslim League at times used intimidation and coercion to silence any opposition among Muslims to its demand for Partition. He calls such tactics of the Muslim League a 'Reign of Terror'. He gives examples from all over India including the NWFP where the Khudai Khidmatgars remain opposed to the Partition of India.
The Muslim League maintained an elitist character until 1937 when its leadership began to engage in popular mobilisation. It functioned as a mass and popular party for 7-8 years after the Congress provincial ministries resigned in 1939, more so, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940.
During this growth spurt, the ML itself was transformed from an elite moribund organization into a mass-based party that gave itself a new constitution, a more radical ideology and a revamped organizational structure.
That, too, had begun life as a cosy club of upper-class Indians, seeking a limited range of extra privileges for Indian Muslims. However, under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the League grew rapidly to a membership of more than two million and its message became increasingly religious and separatist in tone.
Although it was founded in 1909 the League had only caught on among South Asian Muslims during the Second World War. The party had expanded astonishingly rapidly and was claiming over two million members by the early 1940s, an unimaginable result for what had been previously thought of as just one of the numerous pressure groups and small but insignificant parties.
However, the book is a tribute to the role of one Muslim leader who steadfastly opposed the Partition of India: the Sindhi leader Allah Bakhsh Soomro. Allah Bakhsh belonged to a landed family. He founded the Sindh People's Party in 1934, which later came to be known as 'Ittehad' or 'Unity Party'. ... Allah Bakhsh was totally opposed to the Muslim League's demand for the creation of Pakistan through a division of India on a religious basis. Consequently, he established the Azad Muslim Conference. In its Delhi session held during April 27–30, 1940 some 1400 delegates took part. They belonged mainly to the lower castes and working class. The famous scholar of Indian Islam, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, feels that the delegates represented a 'majority of India's Muslims'. Among those who attended the conference were representatives of many Islamic theologians and women who also took part in the deliberations ... Shamsul Islam argues that the All-India Muslim League at times used intimidation and coercion to silence any opposition among Muslims to its demand for Partition. He calls such tactics of the Muslim League a 'Reign of Terror'. He gives examples from all over India including the NWFP where the Khudai Khidmatgars remain opposed to the Partition of India.
The 1946 election was, in effect, a plebiscite among Muslims on Pakistan and a mighty success for the League, which won 90 per cent of the Muslim seats.
At the all-India level, the demand for Pakistan pitted the League against the Congress and the British.
His standing with the British remained high, however, for even though they no more agreed with the idea of a separate Muslim state than the Congress did, government officials appreciated the simplicity of a single negotiating voice for all of India's Muslims.
By this scheme, the British hoped they could at once preserve the united India desired by the Congress, and by themselves, and at the same time, through the groups, secure the essence of Jinnah's demand for a 'Pakistan'.
At Independence there was a Congress-led ministry in the North West Frontier...The Congress-supported government of the North West Frontier led by the secular Pashtun leaders, the Khan brothers, wanted to join India and not Pakistan. If joining India was not an option, then the secular Pashtun leaders espoused the cause of Pashtunistan: an ethnic state for Pashtuns.
In the 1940s a solid majority of the Barelvis were supporters of the Pakistan Movement and played a supporting role in its final phase (1940–7), mostly under the banner of the All-India Sunni Conference which had been founded in 1925.
For example, the Barelvi ulama supported the formation of the state of Pakistan and thought that any alliance with Hindus (such as that between the Indian National Congress and the Jamiat ulama-I-Hind [JUH]) was counterproductive.
During the 1946 election, Barelvi Ulama issued fatwas in favour of the Muslim League.
Believing that Islam was a universal religion, the Deobandi advocated a notion of a composite nationalism according to which Hindus and Muslims constituted one nation.
Madani...stressed the difference between qaum, meaning a nation, hence a territorial concept, and millat, meaning an Ummah and thus a religious concept.
Madani makes a crucial distinction between qaum and millat. According to him, qaum connotes a territorial multi-religious entity, while millat refers to the cultural, social and religious unity of Muslims exclusively.
Ironically, Islamic state politics in Pakistan was mostly in favour of Deobandi, and more recently Ahl-e Hadith/Salafi, institutions. Only a few Deobandi clerics decided to support the Pakistan Movement, but they were highly influential.
The senior alim conceded that the ML leaders still had some work to do before they could be seen as conscientious and observant Muslims,,, He instead emphasised the virtues of patient and quiet counseling...At the same time though, Thanawi dismissed criticisms of ML leaders as being non-observant Muslims as a case of the pot calling the kettle black.
This was also reflected in one of the resolutions of the Azad Muslim Conference, an organization which attempted to be representative of all the various nationalist Muslim parties and groups in India.