Personnel economics (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Personnel economics" in English language version.

refsWebsite

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Above text adapted from JEL Classification Codes Guide: M per JEL:M5.
JEL Classification Codes Guide: M per JEL:M5.
Above text and footnoted examples are from JEL Classification Codes Guide M5.
• Stephen A. Ross 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, 63(2), pp. 134–139.
• Eugene F. Fama, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), pp. 288–307.

pubs.aeaweb.org

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 380 [pp. 380–84]. Abstract.
• _____ and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

books.google.com

• Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), pp. 552-579.
   • James A. Mirrlees, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,"Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1) pp. 105–131.
   • Abram Bergson, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2(3), pp. 211–225. Abstract.
   • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," Human Resource Management Review, 11(4), pp. 431–452.
   • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," American Economic Review, 80(2), pp. 23-27.
   • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 99- 133.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Pietro Garibaldi, 2006. Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford. Description and preview.
• Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 31–32, 39. [pp. 7–63.
• Canice Prendergast and Robert H. Topel, 1993. "Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation," European Economic Review, vol. 37, issue 2–3, pages 355–365.

chicagobooth.edu

faculty.chicagobooth.edu

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.
• Pietro Garibaldi, 2006. Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford. Description and preview.
• Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 31–32, 39. [pp. 7–63.
• Canice Prendergast and Robert H. Topel, 1993. "Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation," European Economic Review, vol. 37, issue 2–3, pages 355–365.

chron.com

smallbusiness.chron.com

Hamel, Gregory. "The Pros & Cons of Employee Pay Being Fixed Vs. Variable & Dependent on Performance". Chron.

colorado.edu

leeds-faculty.colorado.edu

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

columbia.edu

www0.gsb.columbia.edu

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

cornell.edu

digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu

Stephen J. Deery and Roderick D. Iverson, 2005. "Labor-Management Cooperation: Antecedents and Impact on Organizational Performance," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 58(4), pp. 588–609.

dictionaryofeconomics.com

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 380 [pp. 380–84]. Abstract.
• _____ and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 381, 383. Abstract.
• _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 99–100 & 119–22 pp. 99–146.
Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 381. Abstract.
Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, p. 381 [pp. 380–84]. Abstract.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

doi.org

Grund, Christian; Bryson, Alex; Dur, Robert; Harbring, Christine; Koch, Alexander K.; Lazear, Edward P. (16 January 2017). "Personnel economics: A research field comes of age". German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung. 31 (2): 101–107. doi:10.1177/2397002216684998. ISSN 2397-0022. S2CID 115407646.
Lazear, Edward (1999). "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998". Journal of Labor Economics. 17 (2): 199–236. doi:10.1086/209918. ISSN 0734-306X. S2CID 154386072.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.
Fehr, E; Gächter, S (1990). ""Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"". The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14 (3): 159–182. doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159.
Fehr, E; Gächter, S (1990). ""Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"". The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14 (3): 159–182. doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159.
Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources". Journal of Economic Perspectives. Cambridge, MA. doi:10.3386/w13653.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review". The Academy of Management Review. 14 (1): 57–74. doi:10.2307/258191. ISSN 0363-7425. JSTOR 258191.
Miller, Gary J. (2005), "Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms", Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 349–370, doi:10.1007/0-387-25092-1_15, ISBN 1-4020-2687-0, retrieved 1 November 2020
Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources". Journal of Economic Perspectives. Cambridge, MA. doi:10.3386/w13653.
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert; Hwang, Sung-Ha (2009). "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 71 (2): 221–232. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.011. ISSN 0167-2681.
Lazear, Edward P. (1989). "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics". Journal of Political Economy. 97 (3): 561–580. doi:10.1086/261616. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 153565764.
Lazear, Edward; Shaw, Kathryn (2007). "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources". Journal of Economic Perspectives. Cambridge, MA. doi:10.3386/w13653.
Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2000). "James N. Baron/David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York et al. 1999, 602 pages, $ 71.00". Schmalenbach Business Review. 52 (4): 406–407. doi:10.1007/BF03396627. ISSN 1439-2917. S2CID 165855142.
Austin, Barbara (1994). "Competitive advantage through people unleashing the power of the work force. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994". Journal of Organizational Behavior. 15 (6): 575–576. doi:10.1002/job.4030150608. ISSN 0894-3796.
Ichniowski, Casey; Shaw, Kathryn; Prennushi, Giovanna (1997). "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity". The American Economic Review. Cambridge, MA. doi:10.3386/w5333.

dx.doi.org

Lazear, Edward (1999). "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998". Journal of Labor Economics. 17 (2): 199–236. doi:10.1086/209918. ISSN 0734-306X. S2CID 154386072.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review". The Academy of Management Review. 14 (1): 57–74. doi:10.2307/258191. ISSN 0363-7425. JSTOR 258191.
Miller, Gary J. (2005), "Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms", Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 349–370, doi:10.1007/0-387-25092-1_15, ISBN 1-4020-2687-0, retrieved 1 November 2020
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert; Hwang, Sung-Ha (2009). "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 71 (2): 221–232. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.011. ISSN 0167-2681.
Austin, Barbara (1994). "Competitive advantage through people unleashing the power of the work force. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994". Journal of Organizational Behavior. 15 (6): 575–576. doi:10.1002/job.4030150608. ISSN 0894-3796.

duke.edu

faculty.fuqua.duke.edu

• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–91.
   • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324–340.
   • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), pp. 23-54.
   • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182.
   • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 972–991.
   • _____ and Paul Milgrom, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), 24–52 Archived 25 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine.

hha.dk

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

illinois.edu

business.illinois.edu

• Stephen A. Ross 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, 63(2), pp. 134–139.
• Eugene F. Fama, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), pp. 288–307.

jstor.org

• Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), pp. 552-579.
   • James A. Mirrlees, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,"Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1) pp. 105–131.
   • Abram Bergson, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2(3), pp. 211–225. Abstract.
   • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," Human Resource Management Review, 11(4), pp. 431–452.
   • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," American Economic Review, 80(2), pp. 23-27.
   • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 99- 133.
• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–91.
   • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324–340.
   • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), pp. 23-54.
   • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182.
   • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 972–991.
   • _____ and Paul Milgrom, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), 24–52 Archived 25 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Sherwin Rosen 1978. "Substitution and Division of Labour," Economica, 45(179), pp. 235–250.
   • _____, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), pp. 311-323.
   • _____, 1986a. "The Theory of Equalizing Differences," ch. 12, O. C. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, ed. Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 1 , Elsevier, pp. 641-692.
   • _____, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, 76(4), pp. 701-715.
Edward Lazear, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
• Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 841–864.
• Sherwin Rosen, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, 76(4), pp. 701-715.
• Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), pp. "Tournaments-and-Piece-Rates-An-Experimental-Study".pdf 1–33.
   • Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), pp. 627–668.
   • Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 850–873.
   • Bruce Sheare, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies,71(2), pp. 513–534.
   • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp. 729–773.
Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, 12(2), pp. 155-179.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review". The Academy of Management Review. 14 (1): 57–74. doi:10.2307/258191. ISSN 0363-7425. JSTOR 258191.

lakeheadu.ca

flash.lakeheadu.ca

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 381, 383. Abstract.
• _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 99–100 & 119–22 pp. 99–146.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

managementhelp.org

McNamara, MBA, PHD, Carter (18 January 2022). "What is Peer Learning?".{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

mit.edu

web.mit.edu

Robert Gibbons, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4, Part 1), pp. 413–429.

montclair.edu

msuweb.montclair.edu

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263–292.

nyu.edu

cess.nyu.edu

• Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), pp. "Tournaments-and-Piece-Rates-An-Experimental-Study".pdf 1–33.
   • Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), pp. 627–668.
   • Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 850–873.
   • Bruce Sheare, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies,71(2), pp. 513–534.
   • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp. 729–773.

queensu.ca

qed.econ.queensu.ca

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.
• Pietro Garibaldi, 2006. Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford. Description and preview.
• Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 31–32, 39. [pp. 7–63.
• Canice Prendergast and Robert H. Topel, 1993. "Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation," European Economic Review, vol. 37, issue 2–3, pages 355–365.

sciencedirect.com

Harald Dale-Olsen, 2006. "Wages, Fringe Benefits and Worker Turnover," Labour Economics, 13(1), pp. 87–105. Abstract.
Axel Engellandt and Regina T. Riphahn, 2005. "Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort," Labour Economics, 12(3), pp. 281–99. Abstract.
• Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), pp. 552-579.
   • James A. Mirrlees, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,"Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1) pp. 105–131.
   • Abram Bergson, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2(3), pp. 211–225. Abstract.
   • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," Human Resource Management Review, 11(4), pp. 431–452.
   • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," American Economic Review, 80(2), pp. 23-27.
   • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 99- 133.
• Sherwin Rosen 1978. "Substitution and Division of Labour," Economica, 45(179), pp. 235–250.
   • _____, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), pp. 311-323.
   • _____, 1986a. "The Theory of Equalizing Differences," ch. 12, O. C. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, ed. Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 1 , Elsevier, pp. 641-692.
   • _____, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, 76(4), pp. 701-715.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

scribd.com

• Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?" Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1307–1324.
• Sue Fernie and David Metcalf, 1999. "It's Not What You Pay It's the Way that You Pay it and That's What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance," LABOUR, 13(2), pp. 385–411.

semanticscholar.org

api.semanticscholar.org

Grund, Christian; Bryson, Alex; Dur, Robert; Harbring, Christine; Koch, Alexander K.; Lazear, Edward P. (16 January 2017). "Personnel economics: A research field comes of age". German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung. 31 (2): 101–107. doi:10.1177/2397002216684998. ISSN 2397-0022. S2CID 115407646.
Lazear, Edward (1999). "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998". Journal of Labor Economics. 17 (2): 199–236. doi:10.1086/209918. ISSN 0734-306X. S2CID 154386072.
Lazear, Edward P. (1989). "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics". Journal of Political Economy. 97 (3): 561–580. doi:10.1086/261616. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 153565764.
Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2000). "James N. Baron/David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York et al. 1999, 602 pages, $ 71.00". Schmalenbach Business Review. 52 (4): 406–407. doi:10.1007/BF03396627. ISSN 1439-2917. S2CID 165855142.

smu.edu

faculty.smu.edu

• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 841–864.
• Sherwin Rosen, 1986b. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, 76(4), pp. 701-715.

springer.com

link.springer.com

Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2000). "James N. Baron/David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York et al. 1999, 602 pages, $ 71.00". Schmalenbach Business Review. 52 (4): 406–407. doi:10.1007/BF03396627. ISSN 1439-2917. S2CID 165855142.

stanford.edu

faculty-gsb.stanford.edu

Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2004. "Internal and External Labor Markets: A Personnel Economics Approach," Labour Economics, 11(5), pp. 527–554 Archived 1 February 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

ubalt.edu

home.ubalt.edu

• Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), pp. "Tournaments-and-Piece-Rates-An-Experimental-Study".pdf 1–33.
   • Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), pp. 627–668.
   • Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 850–873.
   • Bruce Sheare, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies,71(2), pp. 513–534.
   • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp. 729–773.

uchicago.edu

journals.uchicago.edu

Lazear, Edward P. (1989). "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics". Journal of Political Economy. 97 (3): 561–580. doi:10.1086/261616. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 153565764.

ufrgs.br

ppge.ufrgs.br

• Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), pp. 552-579.
   • James A. Mirrlees, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,"Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1) pp. 105–131.
   • Abram Bergson, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2(3), pp. 211–225. Abstract.
   • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," Human Resource Management Review, 11(4), pp. 431–452.
   • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," American Economic Review, 80(2), pp. 23-27.
   • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 99- 133.

umd.edu

faculty.arec.umd.edu

• Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Michael L. Bognanno, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?" Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1307–1324.
• Sue Fernie and David Metcalf, 1999. "It's Not What You Pay It's the Way that You Pay it and That's What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance," LABOUR, 13(2), pp. 385–411.
• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

uni-bonn.de

wiwi.uni-bonn.de

• Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), pp. 552-579.
   • James A. Mirrlees, 1976.The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,"Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1) pp. 105–131.
   • Abram Bergson, 1978. "Managerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2(3), pp. 211–225. Abstract.
   • Morley Gunderson, 2001. "Economics of Personnel and Human Resource Management," Human Resource Management Review, 11(4), pp. 431–452.
   • Debra J. Aron, 1990. "Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management," American Economic Review, 80(2), pp. 23-27.
   • Michael Gibbs and Alec Levenson, 2002. "The Economic Approach to Personnel Research," ch. 6, in S. Grossbard-Shechtman and C. K. Clague, ed., The Expansion of Economics: Toward a more Inclusive Social Science, M.E. Sharpe. pp. 99- 133.

upenn.edu

management.wharton.upenn.edu

• Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt, 1987. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), pp. "Tournaments-and-Piece-Rates-An-Experimental-Study".pdf 1–33.
   • Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan, 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), pp. 627–668.
   • Daniel S. Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 850–873.
   • Bruce Sheare, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies,71(2), pp. 513–534.
   • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp. 729–773.

utah-wbec.org

• Edward Lazear, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, v. 6, pp. 380–84. Abstract.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," ch. 20, Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 4B, pp. 1769–1823. Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), pp. 7–63.
   • _____, 2008. "contracting in firms," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Abstract and pre-pub PDF.
   • Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp. 225–264.
   • George Baker, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1994a. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 881-919.
   • _____, 1994b. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp. 921-955.
   • Andrew D. Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), pp. 213-227.
   • Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp. 1–25.
   • Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn L. Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, 87(3), pp. 291–313.
   • Brent Boning, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, 25(4), pp. 613–650. doi:10.1086/519539.
   • Ann Bartel, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), pp. 1721–1758.
   • Tor Eriksson and Mette Lauste, 2000. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 16(3), pp. 269–286.
   • Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?" Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1619–1650.
   • Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, 2005. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 99–133.

utoronto.ca

homes.chass.utoronto.ca

• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

washington.edu

faculty.washington.edu

• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–91.
   • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324–340.
   • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), pp. 23-54.
   • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182.
   • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 972–991.
   • _____ and Paul Milgrom, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), 24–52 Archived 25 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine.

web.archive.org

Edward P. Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2004. "Internal and External Labor Markets: A Personnel Economics Approach," Labour Economics, 11(5), pp. 527–554 Archived 1 February 2014 at the Wayback Machine.
• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–91.
   • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324–340.
   • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), pp. 23-54.
   • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182.
   • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 972–991.
   • _____ and Paul Milgrom, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), 24–52 Archived 25 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine.

wiley.com

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

Jed DeVaro, 2005. "Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires," Economic Inquiry, 43(2), pp. 263–82. Abstract.

worldcat.org

search.worldcat.org

Grund, Christian; Bryson, Alex; Dur, Robert; Harbring, Christine; Koch, Alexander K.; Lazear, Edward P. (16 January 2017). "Personnel economics: A research field comes of age". German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung. 31 (2): 101–107. doi:10.1177/2397002216684998. ISSN 2397-0022. S2CID 115407646.
Lazear, Edward (1999). "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions Presidential Address to the Society of Labor Economists, San Francisco, May 1, 1998". Journal of Labor Economics. 17 (2): 199–236. doi:10.1086/209918. ISSN 0734-306X. S2CID 154386072.
The handbook of organizational economics. Gibbons, Robert, 1958-, Roberts, John, 1945 February 11-. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2013. pp. 263–312. ISBN 978-1-4008-4535-4. OCLC 892969634.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review". The Academy of Management Review. 14 (1): 57–74. doi:10.2307/258191. ISSN 0363-7425. JSTOR 258191.
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert; Hwang, Sung-Ha (2009). "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 71 (2): 221–232. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.011. ISSN 0167-2681.
Lazear, Edward P. (1989). "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics". Journal of Political Economy. 97 (3): 561–580. doi:10.1086/261616. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 153565764.
Schmidt, Reinhard H. (2000). "James N. Baron/David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York et al. 1999, 602 pages, $ 71.00". Schmalenbach Business Review. 52 (4): 406–407. doi:10.1007/BF03396627. ISSN 1439-2917. S2CID 165855142.
Austin, Barbara (1994). "Competitive advantage through people unleashing the power of the work force. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994". Journal of Organizational Behavior. 15 (6): 575–576. doi:10.1002/job.4030150608. ISSN 0894-3796.

worldcat.org

The handbook of organizational economics. Gibbons, Robert, 1958-, Roberts, John, 1945 February 11-. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2013. pp. 263–312. ISBN 978-1-4008-4535-4. OCLC 892969634.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)

yale.edu

aida.econ.yale.edu

• Bengt Holmström , 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–91.
   • _____, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324–340.
   • _____, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), pp. 23-54.
   • _____, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169–182.
   • _____, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 972–991.
   • _____ and Paul Milgrom, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), 24–52 Archived 25 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine.

econ.yale.edu

• Edward Lazear, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), pp. 1261-1284.
   • _____, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
   • _____, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, 59(3), pp. 405-431.
   • _____, 1987. "incentive contracts," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 744–48. Table of Contents link.
   • _____ 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT. Arrow-page searchable contents.
   • _____, 1999. "Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions," Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), pp. 199–236. (Presidential address to the Society of Labor Economists.)
   • _____, 2000a. "Economic Imperialism," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), pp. 119–22 [pp. 99–146.
   • _____, 2000b. "The Future of Personnel Economics," Economic Journal, 110(467), pp. F611-F639.
   • _____, 2000c. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1346–1361.
   • _____, 2008. "personnel economics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Abstract.
   • _____ and Michael Gibbs, 2009. 2nd ed. Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley. Description and preview.
   • Edward Lazear and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), pp. 91–114.
   • Edward Lazear and Paul Oyer, 2009. "Personnel Economics," draft of chapter to appear in R. Gibbons and D. J. Roberts, ed., 2013,Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.

york.ac.uk

www-users.york.ac.uk

Filipe Almeida-Santos and Karen Mumford, 2005. "Employee Training and Wage Compression in Britain," Manchester School, 3(3), pp. 321-42.

york.ac.uk

University of York. "Staff Development".