Thomas Vermes (17. juni 2015). «Nazi-anklage mot Ukraina: Norge vil ha retten til å avklare om Azov-bataljonen i Ukraina er nazistisk». www.abcnyheter.no. «15. juni skrev ABC Nyheter at Kongressen i USA på tvers av partigrensene kuttet ut all forbindelse til den ukrainske gardens Azov-bataljon – med begrunnelse at den er nynazistisk. Hva mener så Norge, som har nært samarbeid med ukrainske myndigheter, om Azov-bataljonen og at den er integrert i det offisielle forsvaret? Tidligere har Utenriksdepartementet uttalt til ABC Nyheter at integreringen av en annen styrke som er anklaget for å være høyreekstremistisk, Høyre Sektor, kan sees som en oppfyllelse av fredsavtalen i Kiev»
Slettholm, Andreas (25. februar 2022). «Putins norske etterplaprere må gå i seg selv [kommentar]». www.aftenposten.no. Besøkt 15. mars 2022. «USA-kritiske amerikanere står tydeligvis ekstra høyt i kurs. I starten av februar kunne professor John Mearsheimer (74) fortelle at det er «USAs stadige press for å gjøre Ukraina til en del av Vesten» som har forårsaket krisen.»
Sverre Lodgaard (15. juni 2022). «Går det mot våpenhvile eller langvarig krig i Ukraina?». www.aftenposten.no. Besøkt 28. juni 2022. «Langvarig, altomfattende krig. Som reaksjon på Russlands invasjon av Ukraina har USA og Vesten gått til angrep på Russland. Den krigen er altomfattende og omfatter våpenhjelp og etterretning, økonomiske sanksjoner, boikott, fordømmelser og kanselleringer av kontakter og avtaler med Russland.»
aljazeera.com
David Child og Ramy Allahoum (21. februar 2022). «Putin orders Russian forces to Ukraine rebel regions». Al Jazeera Media Network. Besøkt 28. mars 2022. «Vladimir Putin has ordered Russian troops to “maintain peace” in two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, hours after the Russian president recognised Donetsk and Luhansk as independent entities.»
«Profile: Who are Ukraine’s far-right Azov regiment?». www.aljazeera.com (på engelsk). 1. mars 2022. Besøkt 12. mars 2022. «Russian President Vladimir Putin referenced the presence of such units within the Ukrainian military as one of the reasons for launching his so-called “special military operation … to de-militarise and de-Nazify Ukraine.»
Russia-Ukraine war: Lavrov warns of risk of nuclear conflict aljazeera.com interview med Sergey Lavrov 26.04.2022. sitat: Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has warned that the conflict in Ukraine risked escalating into a third world war and that NATO was “in essence” engaged in a proxy war with Moscow by supplying Kyiv with weapons.
Ragozin, Leonid. «Annexation of Crimea: A masterclass in political manipulation» (på engelsk). Riga: Al Jazeera. Arkivert fra originalen 28. mai 2020. Besøkt 24. januar 2022. «Putin framed the invasion and eventual annexation of Crimea as an act of salvation rather than a clear violation of international law and turned a revolution which could have marked the end of his rule into a much-needed popularity booster – the wave of chauvinism triggered by the annexation of Crimea sent Putin’s approval ratings to an unbelievable 89 percent, while sidelining the opposition and giving him another five years of relatively trouble-free time at home.»
apnews.com
Matthew, Lee; Konstantin, Manenkov (10. januar 2022). «No progress seen after Russia-US talks over Ukraine tensions». Associated Press News (på engelsk). Geneva: Associated Press. Besøkt 31. januar 2022. «The United States and Russia locked horns over Ukraine and other security issues Monday with no sign of progress from either side at highly anticipated strategic talks. Low expectations from both Washington and Moscow about the high-stakes session in Geneva appeared to have been met as senior diplomats from the two countries emerged without offering any hint of success.»
Matthew, Lee; Lorne, Cook (7. januar 2022). «US, NATO rule out halt to expansion, reject Russian demands». AP News (på engelsk). Associated Press. Arkivert fra originalen 24. januar 2022. Besøkt 24. januar 2022. «Their comments amounted to a complete dismissal of a key part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for easing tensions with Ukraine. Putin wants NATO to halt membership plans for all countries, including Ukraine. The former Soviet republic is unlikely to join the alliance in the foreseeable future, but NATO nations won’t rule it out.»
atlanticcouncil.org
Peter, Dickinson; Melinda, Haring; Danylo, Lubkivsky; Alexander, Motyl; Brian, Whitmore; Oleksiy, Gontsjarenko; Jevhen, Fedtsjenko; Brian, Bonner; Taras, Kuzio (15. juli 2021). «Putin's new Ukraine essay reveals imperial ambitions». Atlantic Council. Arkivert fra originalen 15. juli 2021. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Vladimir Putin’s inaccurate and distorted claims are neither new nor surprising. They are just the latest example of gaslighting by the Kremlin leader. This, after all, is the man who famously told US President George W. Bush that Ukraine was not a real country during a widely reported exchange at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. Putin’s claim that the “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia” is grotesquely disingenuous. For Ukraine, partnership with Russia has mainly meant subjugation by Russia.»
axios.com
U.S. warns China against a superpower proxy war in Ukraineaxios.com D. Lawler B. Allen-Ebrahimian 15.03.2022 sitat:The big picture: China is already providing its most powerful partner with tacit support, but U.S. officials are now trying to draw red lines to prevent a full-on superpower proxy war.
Paul Kirby (25. februar 2022). «Why is Russia invading Ukraine and what does Putin want?». BBC News (på engelsk). Besøkt 25. februar 2022. «Many of President Putin's arguments were false or irrational. He claimed his goal was to protect people subjected to bullying and genocide and aim for the "demilitarisation and de-Nazification" of Ukraine. There has been no genocide in Ukraine: it is a vibrant democracy, led by a president who is Jewish. "How could I be a Nazi?" said Volodymr Zelensky, who likened Russia's onslaught to Nazi Germany's invasion in World War Two. Ukraine's chief rabbi and the Auschwitz Memorial have also rejected Mr Putin's slur. (...) Russia has long resisted Ukraine's move towards the European Union and the West's defensive military alliance, Nato. Announcing Russia's invasion, he accused Nato of threatening "our historic future as a nation".»
Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine. Putin Orders 'Special Military Operation' for Ukraine www.bloomberg.com Bloomberg News datert February 24, 2022, 1:07 PM GMT+1. Sitat: I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border. (...) Any further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance’s infrastructure or the ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us. Of course, the question is not about NATO itself. It merely serves as a tool of US foreign policy. The problem is that in territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile "anti-Russia" is taking shape. Fully controlled from the outside, it is doing everything to attract NATO armed forces and obtain cutting-edge weapons.
Iulian, Chifu (2009). «Russia–Georgia War of August 2008: Ukrainian Approach»(PDF). The Russian Georgian War: A trilateral cognitive institutional approach of the crisis decision-making process. București: Editura Curtea Veche. s. 181. ISBN978-973-1983-19-6. Arkivert(PDF) fra originalen 30. september 2018. Besøkt 21. februar 2016. «Conceptually, Russia sees Ukraine within the sphere of own “privileged interests”; in fact, it means a modernized version of Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”, realized after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The strategic vision of the Kremlin foresees that the sovereignty of Ukraine (and other states that do not belong to Russia’s sphere of “privileged interests”) can not be significantly wider than that of the members of Warsaw Pact prior to the collapse of “the socialist camp”. Correspondingly, the political approach of Russia towards Ukraine is built.»|fornavn2= mangler |etternavn2= i Authors list (hjelp); |fornavn3= mangler |etternavn3= i Authors list (hjelp)
csis.org
Mykola, Bielieskov (21. september 2021). «The Russian and Ukrainian Spring 2021 War Scare» (på engelsk). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Arkivert fra originalen 25. november 2021. Besøkt 22. januar 2022. «Ukrainian estimates provided to the OSCE in June 2021 show that only 12,000 Russian forces were removed from the border, and the rest remain in place. As a result, the number of troops remaining is more or less the number of troops that was at the border before the exercise.»
The Russian World in Moscow’s Grand Strategy www.csis.org Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). av Igor Zevelev. August 2016. sitat:The concepts of “compatriots abroad” and the “Russian World” have evolved within two different yet overlapping discourses. Each of these concepts has its own intellectual history. However, these ideas have something in common. Basically they both reflect the tension between actual Russian Federation state borders and the mental maps of “Russianness” that exist in the minds of many Russians. (...) Of the Russian communities abroad, none faces a greater challenge than that in Ukraine. Today, Ukraine is effectively a lost cause within the context of the Russian World. For much of the Ukrainian population and for the entire political class, the idea of the Russian World has become synonymous with war.
dagbladet.no
dagbladet.no
Berg (Grafikk), NTB |, Brage Lie Jor, Kaja Storrøsten, Kjell Erik (21. februar 2022). «Anerkjenner områder som uavhengige». dagbladet.no (på norsk). Besøkt 22. februar 2022.
Jorun Gaarder, Johannes Fjeld (5. mars 2022). ««Nazi-løgnen»: - År med propaganda». dagbladet.no (på norsk). Besøkt 5. mars 2022. «Historieprofessor og Russland-ekspert ved Forsvarets høgskole Sven G. Holtsmark sier at det er to røtter til denne nazi-retorikken: - Den ene er at det en reell forekomst av ekstreme høyrekrefter i Ukraina. Det var en realitet, og det er en realitet. Blant annet har en del av disse frivillige styrkene en sterk høyreorientert ideologi, sier han, og understreker: - Den ukrainske regjeringen er ikke preget av denne ideologien. I ethvert samfunn vil det være ekstreme krefter, og ikke minst i Russland selv. Men det er ikke disse kreftene som preger dagens Ukraina. Putin forsøker å spille på det historieprofessoren omtaler som et identitetsskapende og tungt minne i den russiske befolkningen: nemlig sårene fra Den store fedrelandskrigen 1941-1945. Det er den andre roten til Putins retorikk.(...) - På 1960-tallet utviklet Sovjetunionen et narrativ om «landet som bekjempet nazistene». Moderne Russland arvet dette narrativet, med sin 9. mai-kultus (Seiersdagen - Tyskland kapitulerte 9. mai i Moskvas tidssone, red.anm.), svarer analytiker Vitalii Rybakk.»
Hagfors, Johannes Fjeld, Jesper Nordahl Finsveen, Caisa Linea (23. april 2022). «- Kunne endret spillet». dagbladet.no (på norsk). Besøkt 24. april 2022.
Diesen, Sverre (16. mars 2022). «Kronikk: Putins motiver og muligheter». www.dn.no. Besøkt 20. mars 2022. «Hva Putin vil velge og hvordan russerne kommer til å gå frem i fortsettelsen, vil avhenge av hvilket av de to grunnleggende motivene for krigen som etter hvert dominerer hos ham.»
Mikael Holter (22. august 2022). «Gassprisen til nye ekstremhøyder: – Markedet har jo egentlig sluttet å fungere». Dagens Næringsliv. Besøkt 22. august 2022. «Det betyr at europeisk gass nå handles til det som tilsvarer nesten 500 dollar per fat olje. [...] Markedet er på alle måter i en ekstrem situasjon, og den erfarne råvareanalytikeren Bjarne Schieldrop i SEB mener det ganske enkelt er farlig nær å knele helt. – Jeg vil jo si at dette markedet har jo egentlig sluttet å fungere ordentlig, sier han til DN.»
Solberg, Emilie; Feratovic, Leila (3. mars 2022). «Yara vil ikke si opp avtalene med selskaper kontrollert av russiske oligarker». www.dn.no. Besøkt 2. april 2022. «Phosagro, eiet av den russiske milliardæren og oligarken Andrej Gurjev er Yaras hovedleverandør av fosfat. Uralkali, deleiet av den russisk/belarusiske oligarken Dimitrij Mazepin, leverer produksjonskritisk kalium til den norske gjødselgiganten. Mazepin har nære bånd til Putin.»
e24.no
Eivind BøeIne BrunborgAsgeir Aga NilsenNTB (22. februar 2022). «Tyskland stanser Nord Stream 2-prosjektet». E24. Besøkt 27. mars 2022. «Tysklands forbundskansler Olaf Scholz holdt tirsdag en pressekonferanse i Berlin, der han delte nyheten om full stans av Nord Stream 2. Den omstridte rørledningen er ferdigbygget, men ikke satt i drift.»
Kozlowska, Hanna. «The Fascists are coming, the Fascists are coming!». Foreign Policy. D.C. Arkivert fra originalen 27. november 2014. Besøkt 28. februar 2022. «Experts agree that the group owes its popularity to Russian propaganda … painting [it] as a powerful neo-Nazi force determined to take over Ukraine. According to a survey by an online database of Russian media sources, Right Sector was the second-most mentioned political group in Russian mass media in 2014…»
Putin’s Thousand-Year War foreignpolicy.com (betalingsmur) av Michael Hirsh. 12.03.2022 sitat:Indeed, Putin may have been preparing for this moment longer than people realize: After the Russian leader annexed Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin’s longtime ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, wrote that it would mark "the end of Russia’s epic journey to the West, the cessation of repeated and fruitless attempts to become a part of Western civilization." Surkov predicted that Russia would exist in geopolitical solitude for at least the next hundred years.
Putin Has a Grimly Absolute Vision of the ‘Russian World’. The Ukraine war is fueled by a delusion of civilizational necessity. Foreignpolicy.com kommentar av Benjamin R. Young. sitat:Putin believes an invasion of Ukraine is a righteous cause and necessary for the dignity of the Russian civilization, which he sees as being genetically and historically superior to other Eastern European identities. The idea of protecting Russian-speakers in Eurasia has been a key part of Putin's "Russkiy Mir" worldview and 21st-century Russian identity. Under the rubric of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), Putin's government promotes the idea that Russia is not a mere nation-state but a civilization-state that has an important role to play in world history. (...) While security concerns regarding NATO expansion are certainly important to the Kremlin, the politico-cultural role that Ukraine plays in contemporary Russian ideology is of greater value to Putin's long-term vision of a rejuvenated Russian World. In February 2021, Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine as a part of Russkiy Mir..
Putin Has a Grimly Absolute Vision of the ‘Russian World’. The Ukraine war is fueled by a delusion of civilizational necessity. Foreignpolicy.com kommentar av Benjamin R. Young. sitat:Putin believes an invasion of Ukraine is a righteous cause and necessary for the dignity of the Russian civilization, which he sees as being genetically and historically superior to other Eastern European identities. The idea of protecting Russian-speakers in Eurasia has been a key part of Putin's "Russkiy Mir" worldview and 21st-century Russian identity. Under the rubric of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), Putin's government promotes the idea that Russia is not a mere nation-state but a civilization-state that has an important role to play in world history. (...) While security concerns regarding NATO expansion are certainly important to the Kremlin, the politico-cultural role that Ukraine plays in contemporary Russian ideology is of greater value to Putin's long-term vision of a rejuvenated Russian World. In February 2021, Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov named Ukraine as a part of Russkiy Mir..
Russernes broderkjærlighet til ukrainerne og Putins angrep på Ukraina: Hvor er sammenhengen? forskersonen.no Pål Kolstø kronikk 07. mars 2022. sitat: Ukrainskhet ble oppfattet som en krysning mellom russiskhet og polskhet, og for å forhindre at ukrainsk identitet tippet i retning av det polske, ble det bestemt at ukrainerne måtte gjennomgå massiv russifisering. Et hemmelig dekret fra Innenriksdepartementet i juli 1863 – det såkalte Valuev-sirkulæret etter innenriksminister Pyotr Valuev – erklærte at «et eget lillerussisk språk har aldri eksistert, eksisterer ikke og skal ikke eksistere. Det (lillerussiske) språk som brukes av vanlige mennesker, er kun russisk som er blitt forkvaklet gjennom polsk påvirkning».
Hvor russisk er Ukraina? forsvaretsforum.no Olivia Durand 27.02.2022 sitat:Kulturelt hegemoni i Ukraina. Fremveksten til den ukrainske nasjonalistbevegelsen i det 19. århundret ble av russiske myndigheter oppfattet som et tegn på forstyrrende innflytelse fra utlandet – kanskje til og med et resultat av et vestlig komplott. Ukrainsk identitet ble omtalt som underlegen en for det meste urban, russisk høykultur, og det ukrainske språket ble forbundet med landsbygda. (...) Da Ukraina ble uavhengig i 1991 besto én tredjedel av befolkningen av disse russofile migrantene og etterfølgerne deres, spesielt i det industrielle øst og på Krim. Inntil denne dag huser Ukraina den største russisktalende befolkningen utenfor Russland. I 1991 stemte 90 prosent av befolkningen for et uavhengig Ukraina. Nå, 30 år senere, betrakter Ukraina seg selv som en postkolonial og multinasjonal stat – hverken som «russisk» eller «liten». Samtidig fortsetter russiske politikere å gi Ukraina en russisk innramming for egen vinnings skyld, ignorer dette synet hvordan Ukraina har holdt stand i møte med tvungen assimilering, kulturell differensiering, imperialistisk krigerskhet og kolonial utnyttelse for å bli sitt eget land.
globalaffairs.ru
Ensomhet hos en halvrase (14+) globalaffairs.ru Vladislav Surkov. 04.09.2018 (via google translate) sitat:Det 14. året av vårt århundre huskes for viktige og svært viktige prestasjoner, som alle vet og alt er sagt. Men det viktigste av datidens hendelser blir først nå åpenbart for oss, og de langsomme, dype nyhetene om det når nå bare våre ører. Denne begivenheten er slutten på Russlands episke reise til Vesten, opphøret av gjentatte og fruktløse forsøk på å bli en del av den vestlige sivilisasjonen, for å gifte seg med den "gode familien" til europeiske folk. Fra det 14. året og utover strekker det seg en uendelig lang ny tid, epoken 14+, der vi vil ha hundre (to hundre? Tre hundre?) år med geopolitisk ensomhet. (orig:Одиночество полукровки (14+) (...) 14-й год нашего века памятен важными и очень важными свершениями, о которых всем известно и все сказано. Но важнейшее из тогдашних событий только теперь открывается нам, и медленная, глубинная новость о нем теперь только достигает наших ушей. Событие это – завершение эпического путешествия России на Запад, прекращение многократных и бесплодных попыток стать частью Западной цивилизации, породниться с «хорошей семьей» европейских народов. С 14-го года и далее простирается неопределенно долгое новое время, эпоха 14+, в которую нам предстоит сто ( двести? триста?) лет геополитического одиночества.
go.com
abcnews.go.com
«Path to war in Ukraine was laid in months of plans, warnings». ABC News (på engelsk). 26. februar 2022. Besøkt 27. februar 2022. «He laid down his demands on Dec. 15: a ban on NATO membership for Ukraine and other ex-Soviet nations, a halt to the deployment of NATO weapons in those countries and a rollback of NATO forces from Eastern Europe.»
Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics Dunlop, John B Demokratizatsiya 12.1 2004. web.archive.org fra archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John Dunlop Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.pdf original sitat:On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible. Dugin speculates that three extreme western regions of Ukraine--Volynia, Galicia, and Trans-Carpathia--heavily populated with Uniates and other Catholics, could be permitted to form an independent "Western Ukrainian Federation." But this area must not under any circumstances be permitted to fall under Atlanticist control (382). With the exception of these three western regions, Ukraine, like Belorussia, is seen as an integral part of Eurasia-Russia.
huffingtonpost.com
Feffer, John (14. mars 2014). «Who Are These 'People,' Anyway?». HuffPost. «At that point, his own party abandoned him and called for a vote to take place. Parliament then voted to remove Yanukovych from office by a margin of 328 to 0. There are 449 seats in the parliament, so there were some absences and abstentions, but the majority position was clear, and it included many deputies from Yanukovych's own party.»
«Rada removes Yanukovych from office, schedules new elections for May 25». Interfax-Ukraine. 24. februar 2014. «Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada has decided to remove Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office and scheduled early presidential elections for May 25, 2014. The decisions were supported by 328 MPs at a parliament meeting on Saturday.»
journalofdemocracy.org
Celeste Wallander (2021). «How the Putin Regime Really Works». Journal of Democracy (på engelsk). Besøkt 22. mars 2022. «Authoritarian regimes are typically led by a political party, the national military, or a powerful individual. In the first two types, institutions rule, as is the case in China under the Communist Party and Burma under the military. But in a personalist autocracy, such as Putin’s Russia, political power is exercised through individual relationships, and thus state institutions are feeble.»
«– USA er ikke Ukrainas venn». klassekampen.no. 2. februar 2022. Besøkt 15. mars 2022. «Vesten, og særlig USA, må ta storparten av skylda for eskaleringen og frykten for en russisk invasjon av Ukraina, sier John Mearsheimer, professor ved Universitetet i Chicago. Ukraina betaler nå prisen for USA og Natos idiotiske ekspansjonsforsøk, sier professor John Mearsheimer.»
kremlin.ru
en.kremlin.ru
Vladimir, Putin (12. juli 2021). «Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'». The Kremlin. Arkivert fra originalen 25. januar 2021. «During the recent Direct Line, when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today's situation.»
On the historical unity of russians and ukrainians Vladimir Putin. 2021. en.wikisource.org attribute www.kremlin.ru. etter original en.kremlin.ru sitat:Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory - from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov - were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and - after the baptism of Rus - the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.
kyivpost.com
Grytsenko, Oksana (12. april 2014). «Armed pro-Russian insurgents in Luhansk say they are ready for police raid». Kyiv Post. Lugansk. «The insurgents demand the authorities to stop an anti-terrorist operation against them and other separatists of Ukraine' southeast. They also want the Russian language to have official status as well a law allowing local referendums and legalization of their army. But their top aim is federalization of the country through all-Ukrainian referendum, one step from secession from the nation. “It should be a federation in the borders of Ukraine, but with the right to separate if people demand this,” Kariakin said, confident that 85 percent of people in Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine's seventh most populous with 2.2 million people, support him. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, in neighboring Donetsk on April 11, that local referendums are possible, but only to decide local issues. He also assured the residents of the mostly Russian-speaking southeast that the government would not revoke the current law on regional languages that, in fact, gives Russian official status in these regions.»
Is Europe Prepared for a Proxy War With Russia? www.lawfareblog.com Michel Wyss mars 2022.sitat:Proxies like the Ukrainian forces often enjoy an influx of resources that can significantly boost their combat effectiveness. In some instances, external support may even translate into increased political legitimacy. For the sponsors, meanwhile, proxy warfare provides several advantages. For starters, it is a cheaper alternative to conventional military intervention. It can also, in some instances, mitigate the risk of escalation through plausible deniability or by signaling to an adversary a desire to keep a conflict contained. And proxy interventions can decrease the political costs of involvement in a conflict, both at home by circumventing parliamentary approval and avoiding the public’s aversion to casualties, and abroad by limiting exposure to sanctions or legal prosecution. NATO, in essence, could fight to the last Ukrainian.
Paust, Thomas (23. februar 2022). «- Hvis Ukraina gjør dette, er på en måte Putin sjakk matt». Nettavisen (på norsk). Besøkt 23. februar 2022. «- Det er en stor forskjell på situasjonen nå og situasjonen for to dager siden. Frem til nå har Putin kunnet tenke gjennom og planlegge på forhånd med nokså stor sikkerhet for hvordan Vesten vil reagere på russernes handlemåte. Han har stilt krav overfor Vesten og Nato som han visste ville bli avvist, sier [tidligere forsvarssjef Sverre] Diesen til Nettavisen.»
«Joe Biden marshals U.S. allies as Europe faces darkest hour since WW2». Newsweek (på engelsk). 24. februar 2022. Besøkt 24. februar 2022. «The U.S. and its allies have also warned that such an invasion would be a major conflict as around 150,000 to 190,000 Russian troops are amassed along Ukraine's borders. A military offensive of that size hasn't taken place in Europe since World War II.»
Chotiner, Isaac (1. mars 2022). «Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine». The New Yorker (på engelsk). Besøkt 15. mars 2022. «For years, the political scientist has claimed that Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine is caused by Western intervention. Have recent events changed his mind?»
Putins lange tilstand. Om hva som skjer her ng.ru Vladislav Surkov 02.11.2019 (via google translate)sitat: Det er nødvendig å forstå, forstå og beskrive Putins maktsystem og generelt hele komplekset av ideer og dimensjoner ved Putinismen som fremtidens ideologi. Det er fremtiden, siden den virkelige Putin neppe er en Putinist, akkurat som for eksempel Marx ikke er en marxist og det er ikke et faktum at han ville gått med på å være det hvis han visste hva det var. Men dette må gjøres for alle som ikke er Putin, men som gjerne vil være som ham. For å kunne kringkaste hans metoder og tilnærminger i tiden som kommer. ...Beskrivelsen skal ikke utføres i stil med to propagandaer, vår og ikke vår, men på et språk som både russisk embetsverk og anti-russisk embetsverk vil oppfatte som moderat kjettersk. Et slikt språk kan bli akseptabelt for et ganske bredt publikum, noe som kreves, siden det politiske systemet laget i Russland er egnet ikke bare for en innenlandsk fremtid, det har tydeligvis et betydelig eksportpotensial, etterspørselen etter det eller for dets individuelle komponenter allerede eksisterer, blir dens erfaring studert og delvis adoptert, imitert av både regjerende og opposisjonelle grupper i mange land. (Original:Владислав Сурков: Долгое государство Путина. О том, что здесь вообще происходит Необходимо осознание, осмысление и описание путинской системы властвования и вообще всего комплекса идей и измерений путинизма как идеологии будущего. Именно будущего, поскольку настоящий Путин едва ли является путинистом, так же, как, например, Маркс не марксист и не факт, что согласился бы им быть, если бы узнал, что это такое. Но это нужно сделать для всех, кто не Путин, а хотел бы быть, как он. Для возможности трансляции его методов и подходов в предстоящие времена. Описание должно быть исполнено не в стиле двух пропаганд, нашей и не нашей, а на языке, который и российский официоз, и антироссийский официоз воспринимали бы как умеренно еретический. Такой язык может стать приемлемым для достаточно широкой аудитории, что и требуется, поскольку сделанная в России политическая система пригодна не только для домашнего будущего, она явно имеет значительный экспортный потенциал, спрос на нее или на отдельные ее компоненты уже существует, ее опыт изучают и частично перенимают, ей подражают как правящие, так и оппозиционные группы во многих странах.)
noek.info
Ukraine: Metropolit Onufrij wirft Putin Brudermord vor, Kirchenoberhäupter loben Verteidigungswillen noek.info Der Nachrichtendienst Östliche Kirchen 27.02.2022 sitat:Metropolit Onufrij (Berezovskij) hat die ukrainische Bevölkerung und alle Gläubigen der Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche aufgerufen, nicht in Panik zu verfallen, mutig zu sein und Liebe für das Heimatland zu zeigen. Das Oberhaupt der zum Moskauer Patriarchat gehörenden Kirche appellierte am 27. Februar an die Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer, die Gebete für die Ukraine, „für unsere Armee und unser Volk“ zu intensivieren. „In dieser tragischen Zeit bringen wir unseren Soldaten besondere Liebe und Unterstützung dar, die Wache stehen und unser Land und unser Volk beschützen und verteidigen“, so Metropolit Onufrij. Er forderte den russischen Präsidenten auf, den Bruderkrieg sofort zu beenden. „Das ukrainische und das russische Volk entstammen dem Taubecken des Dnipro, ein Krieg zwischen diesen Völkern ist eine Wiederholung der Sünde Kains, der seinen eigenen Bruder aus Neid tötete. Für einen solchen Krieg gibt es keine Entschuldigung, weder von Gott noch von den Menschen.“ Bereits am 25. Februar hatte Metropolit Onufrij angeordnet, die Keller aller Gotteshäuser der UOK in Kiew für Schutz suchende Bürger zu öffnen, um Sicherheit vor Granaten und Bomben zu bieten.
Rønning, Mats (12. mars 2022). «Listhaug ut mot «USA-hat» – refser norsk oberstløytnant». NRK. Besøkt 12. mars 2022. «– Det er nokså uvanlig å bruke etterretningstjenester i informasjonskrigen. Normalt har disse vært brukt som grunnlag for myndighetene. Det vi så denne gangen var noe helt nytt, sier han [oberstløytnant Tormod Heier] til NRK.»
Tonje Grimstad; Anne Skifjeld; Andreas Krantz; Marit Kolberg; Jan Espen Kruse; Gro Holm; Eirin Tjoflot; Julia Kirsebom Thommessen; Signe Karin Hotvedt; Ismail Burak Akkan (24. februar 2022). «Russland angriper Ukraina». NRK. Besøkt 24. februar 2022. «Det er ikke klart ut fra Putins tale om det russiske angrepet skal begrenses til Øst-Ukraina, eller om det skal omfatte større deler av landet, eller hele Ukraina. Men presidenten påpekte at Russland ikke ønsker å okkupere nabolandet. (...) Talsmann Igor Konasjenkov for det russiske forsvarsdepartementet fastholder at angrepene bare er rettet mot militære mål og at ukrainske byer ikke vil bli angrepet verken med fly, raketter eller artilleri.»
Bjørgaas, Tove (27. april 2022). «– Putin må tape for at krigen skal ta slutt». NRK. Besøkt 28. april 2022. «I boka «Veien til Ufrihet» kom han i 2018 med dystre spådommer om hva planene til Putins autoritære regime kunne være. Mange av dem har slått til.»
Zondag, Martin H. W. (21. februar 2022). «Putin har beordret soldater inn i Ukraina». NRK. Besøkt 22. februar 2022. «Han påpeker samtidig at Russland siden 2014 har hatt en sterk uoffisiell militær tilstedeværelse i deler av Donetsk og Luhansk. Det betyr at det er noe usikkert hvor store praktiske konsekvenser den siste utviklingen har.»
Mjaaland, Ola (22. februar 2022). «Forsker: Russland har fått det som de vil». NRK. Besøkt 22. februar 2022. «– Ukraina opplever at dette har blitt fremstilt som en borgerkrig i Ukraina, noe de mener det ikke er. De mener det er Russland som har kontrollert disse væpnede gruppene siden 2014, sier Flikke.»
Putins kirke? Når kirken støtter en undertrykkende stat, har den et forklaringsproblem. nrk.no Kronikk Richard Bærug 23.03.2022 sitat:(...)den nye kirken. Den lå under Konstantinopel-patriarkatet, slik tradisjonen hadde vært fram til den russiske anneksjonen i 1686. Den nye ukrainske kirken utløste et ramaskrik i Moskva. Både Putin og den russisk-ortodokse patriarken ble rasende. Lederen av den nye kirken, metropolitt Epifanij forklarer meg hvorfor: «Dette betød spikeren i kista for ønskene deres om å gjenopprette Det russiske imperiet og den russiske patriarkens ønske om å få den ledende rollen innenfor den ortodokse kirken.» Dagens krig i Ukraina kan ses på som et siste, fortvilet forsøk på å trekke ut igjen denne spikeren. Et forsøk der Putin og Kirill står samlet. Både presidenten og patriarken har bakgrunn fra KGB.
Den ortodokse kirken i Ukraina kutter russiske bånd nrk.no (NTB) 27.05.2022 sitat: 27. mai 2022 kl. 21:40 Den ortodokse kirken i Ukraina kutter russiske bånd Den Moskva-støttede ortodokse kirken i Ukraina opplyser fredag at den kutter alle bånd til Russland. Kirken erklærer full uavhengighet. Russlands patriark Kirill regnes som en nær alliert av president Vladimir Putin. Patriarken har gitt uttrykk for klar støtte til krigen, som i Russland omtales som en «spesialoperasjon». Etter Russlands invasjon av landet har imidlertid situasjonen blitt svært vanskelig for patriarkens kirke i Ukraina. – Vi er uenig med patriark Kirill i Moskva om krigen, heter det i en uttalelse fra kirken etter rådsmøtet der den russiske aggresjonen og spørsmålet om uavhengighet var temaet.
«International New York Times and Chatham House to Host Debate in London - Russia, Ukraine and The West: Is Confrontation Inevitable?». The New York Times Company (på engelsk). 11. juni 2014. Besøkt 15. mars 2022. «The event will be chaired by New York Times columnist, Roger Cohen, and broadcast live on the web. The speakers, who hold very different views on whether compromise can be achieved or indeed whether it is desirable, include Chrystia Freedland, Member of the Canadian Parliament; Michael McFaul, US Ambassador to Russia (2012-14); John Mearsheimer, American professor of political science, University of Chicago and Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.»
Paul, Taylor (23. november 2021). «Ukraine: NATO's original sin». Politico. «This Bucharest summit decision perhaps marked the culmination of the “unipolar moment,” when the U.S. believed it could reshape the world along Western lines, ignoring warnings by leaders like former French President Jacques Chirac, that “Russia should not be humiliated,” and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that Moscow’s “legitimate security interests” should be taken into account. The result heightened Kremlin’s fears of encirclement and of losing the strategic depth that enabled Russia to prevail over Western invaders twice in two centuries — Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler from 1941 to 1945. It also failed to enhance the security of Georgia or Ukraine — no amount of assurances that NATO is not a threat to Russia, that its purpose is purely defensive or that none of its weapons would ever be used except in response to an attack could assuage Moscow.»
providencemag.com
The West Overestimates Aleksandr Dugin’s Influence in Russia providencemag.com George Barros 2019 sitat:Correlation should never be conflated with causation. Many casual Russia observers and armchair Kremlinologists ascribe grand power to the controversial philosopher using speculative evidence based in hearsay. While Dugin does enjoy some publicity in Russia, his personal eccentrics and appearance of influence, coupled with Putin’s aggressive foreign policy, facilitated the plausible narrative in a Western media echo chamber that Dugin is Putin’s strategist. This myth has grown grossly out of proportion. As a result, Dugin is granted far more credibility than deserved. Proponents of the "Dugin the mastermind" argument need to substantiate their claims with evidence and ask themselves how effective, if at all, is Dugin at influencing Kremlin elites and Russian foreign policy.
rand.org
Dobbins, James; Cohen, Raphael S.; Chandler, Nathan; Frederick, Bryan; Geist, Edward; DeLuca, Paul; Morgan, Forrest E.; Shatz, Howard J.; Williams, Brent (24. april 2019). «Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground» (på engelsk). RAND Corporation. Besøkt 2. april 2022.
Steve, Holland; Andrea, Shalal; Jonathan, Landay; Will, Dunham (8. april 2021). Franklin, red. «Russian force on Ukraine border larger than any time since 2014, U.S. says» (på engelsk). Washington D.C.Reuters. «Russia has more troops on Ukraine’s eastern border than at any time since 2014, when it annexed Crimea and backed separatist territory seizures, and the United States is concerned by growing “Russian aggressions,” the White House said on Thursday.»
Polityuk, Pavel; Robinson, Matt (22. februar 2014). Roche, red. «Ukraine parliament removes Yanukovich, who flees Kiev in "coup"». Reuters. Gabriela Baczynska, Marcin Goettig, Peter Graff, Giles Elgood. Kyiv. Arkivert fra originalen 9. juni 2016. Besøkt 12. februar 2022. «Underscoring Ukraine’s regional divisions, leaders of Russian-speaking eastern provinces loyal to Yanukovich voted to challenge anti-Yanukovich steps by the central parliament.»
rferl.org
In First Interview Since Departure, Russia's Former 'Gray Cardinal' Questions Existence Of Ukraine rferl.org interview gjort av Mike Eckel. 26.02.2020 sitat:And he suggested that Ukrainians historically were upstarts who needed to be restrained by force. "Relations with Ukraine were never simple, even when Ukraine was part of Russia. Ukraine has always been troublesome for the imperial and Soviet bureaucracy," he was quoted as saying. "Forceful coercion for brotherly relations, this is the only method that has historically proven effective when it comes to Ukraine. I do not think that any other will be invented."
Sindelar, Daisy (23. februar 2014). «Was Yanukovych's Ouster Constitutional?». Radio Free Europe. Arkivert fra originalen 29. juli 2020. Besøkt 25. februar 2014. «A majority of 328 lawmakers of the 450-seat parliament voted on February 22 to remove Yanukovych from power, citing as grounds his abandoning office and the deaths of more than 80 protesters and police in the past chaotic week of violence.»
rusi.org
Andrew, Wilson (23. desember 2021). «Russia and Ukraine: 'One People' as Putin Claims?». Royal United Services Institute. Arkivert fra originalen 24. januar 2022. Besøkt 25. januar 2022. «Putin’s key trope is that Ukrainians and Russians are ‘one people’, and he calls them both ‘Russian’. He starts with a myth of common origin: ‘Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus', which was the largest state in Europe’ from the 9th–13th centuries AD. Here, Putin uses the right word – Rus’ – not the modern word for ‘Russia’, which is Rossiya, a Hellenism only introduced in the 17th century.»
Fredrik Fosaas, Jacob Aasland Ravndal og Kurt Dørum. «Antifascisme». Store norske leksikon. «Siden antifascismen eksisterte i kraft av å være en motreaksjon, svant den hen etter de alliertes seier over nazismen og fascismen etter andre verdenskrigs avslutning i 1945. Sovjetunionen benyttet seg imidlertid av antifascismen som et virkemiddel for å skape et kollektivt minne av seieren over nazismen, og fremmet det som en sentral del av den sovjetiske identiteten.»
Cooper, Camilla Guldahl (14. oktober 2021). «Budapest-memorandumet». Store norske leksikon. Besøkt 12. februar 2022.
Jarslett, Yngve (14. november 2019). «Ukrainas forsvar». Store norske leksikon. Besøkt 24. februar 2022.
Fischer, Sebastian; Stark, Holger (2. juli 2015). «Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski on Russia and Ukraine - DER SPIEGEL». Der Spiegel (på engelsk). ISSN2195-1349. Besøkt 12. mars 2022. «We should make it more costly for the Russians to use force. I think it makes sense to give defensive weapons to the Ukrainians, like mortars and anti-tank rockets, for the defense of major cities. If you want to take over a large country, you have to take the big cities. And taking big cities is extremely expensive if people are willing to defend it. (...) Ukraine should be free to choose its political identity, its political philosophy, and institutionalize it by closer links with Europe. But at the same time, Russia should be assured credibly that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. I still think this is the formula for a solution.»
Timothy D., Snyder (18. januar 2022). «How to think about war in Ukraine». Thinking about... (newsletter). Arkivert fra originalen 19. januar 2022. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Nationality is about the way that people in the present think about the what is to come. If Ukrainians regard themselves as a national community with a future together in a state, then the issue is settled. Historically speaking, the idea that a dictator in another country decides who is a nation and who is not is known as imperialism.»
Goldberg, Jeffrey (10. mars 2016). «The Obama Doctrine». The Atlantic (på engelsk). Besøkt 14. juni 2022. «Obama’s theory here is simple: Ukraine is a core Russian interest but not an American one, so Russia will always be able to maintain escalatory dominance there. “The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-nato country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do,” he said.»
«Is Russia invading Ukraine and what will happen next?». the Guardian (på engelsk). 22. februar 2022. Besøkt 22. februar 2022. «Putin has also sent his military on a “peacekeeping mission” to Ukraine, meaning that Russia will formally occupy sovereign Ukrainian territory for a second time following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. But in this case, Russia has not annexed the territories. A document signed by Putin on Monday also allows him to establish military bases or place missiles in the territories.»
«US and UK intelligence warnings vindicated by Russian invasion». the Guardian (på engelsk). 24. februar 2022. Besøkt 26. februar 2022. «in early December, the Washington Post reported that US intelligence had found that the Kremlin was “planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops”, from the north, east and south.»
«Ukraine fighting to stop ‘a new iron curtain’ after Russian invasion». the Guardian (på engelsk). 24. februar 2022. Besøkt 18. mars 2022. «In a bid to justify the attack, Putin claimed in his TV address: "A hostile anti-Russia is being created on our historic lands." "We have taken the decision to conduct a special military operation," he said, in what amounted to a declaration of war. He claimed it was for the "demilitarisation and denazification" of Ukraine, echoing a theme of Kremlin propaganda, the false claim that the Kyiv government is controlled by the far right.»
Andrew, Roth (7. desember 2021). «Putin's Ukraine rhetoric driven by distorted view of neighbour». The Guardian. Moskva. Arkivert fra originalen 7. desember 2021. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Putin has threatened a broader war in Ukraine over Nato enlargement, demanding “legal guarantees” to ensure Ukraine does not join the military alliance or become a kind of “unofficial” member hosting troops or defence infrastructure. But that fear has gone hand-in-hand with chauvinistic bluster that indicates Moscow has a distorted view of modern Ukraine and the goals it wants to achieve there.»
«Boycott of Russian gas and oil ‘could cause mass poverty in Germany’». the Guardian (på engelsk). 14. mars 2022. Besøkt 18. april 2022. «Depending on the predictions of various thinktanks and economic institutes, an immediate stop in Russian gas deliveries could shrink Germany’s GDP by as little as 0.1 or as much as 5.2 percentage points.»
"Russkiy Mir" as the Kremlin’s Quasi-ideology uacrisis.org sitat:The Kremlin defines anyone who, according to Vladimir Putin, "speaks and thinks in Russian", as a part of "Russkiy Mir". On such grounds Dmitriy Peskov, the spokesperson of the Russian President, has named Ukraine as a part of "Russkiy Mir" in February 2021. It yet again underlines the expansionist nature of the concept and refusal to agree with the national self-determination of other states.
«CIA Director Makes Rare Trip to Moscow for Talks on Russia-US Ties». VOA (på engelsk). 2. november 2021. Besøkt 26. februar 2022. «CIA Director William Burns is making a rare visit to Moscow to discuss U.S.-Russia relations, the latest in a series of high-level contacts that show both sides want to keep talking despite mutual distrust and a long list of disputes.»
vox.com
Zack Beauchamp (24. februar 2022). «Putin’s “Nazi” rhetoric reveals his terrifying war aims in Ukraine». Vox.com. Besøkt 28. mars 2022. «Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his version of an answer in his televised speech Wednesday night, announcing a “special military operation” whose “goal is to protect people who have been abused by the genocide of the Kyiv regime for eight years.” Ultimately: “We will strive for the demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine, as well as bringing to justice those who committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians.”»
Zack Beauchamp (24. februar 2022). «Putin’s “Nazi” rhetoric reveals his terrifying war aims in Ukraine». Vox.com. «“Ukraine might have remained a sovereign state so long as it had a pro-Putin government,” says Seva Gunitsky, a political scientist at the University of Toronto who studies Russia. “Reuniting the lands formally would probably not have been at the forefront of the agenda if Putin felt he had enough political support from the Ukrainian regime.” [...] How Putin’s worldview helps us understand Russia’s true war aims With this history in mind, it’s possible to make sense of Putin’s seemingly unhinged ranting about genocide and the de-Nazification of Ukraine. For starters, the idea of Ukraine as a Nazi state is deeply rooted in the Russian nationalist narrative. “It goes back to World War II, [when some] Ukrainian partisans took the Nazi side against the Soviets,” Gunitsky explains. “The [new official] narrative in Russia [today] is that these are all neo-Nazis running the show.” Putin is wrapping this history into his basic idea that Ukraine is not and cannot be a legitimate sovereign state. Ukraine, in this view, is not merely a historically Russian territory wrongly severed; it is the inheritor of a neo-Nazi tradition that contributed to untold Russian deaths during World War II. Similarly, Putin’s claims of “genocide” in Ukraine reflect Russian nationalism. Ukraine has a large ethnic Russian population, especially in its East, and many Ukrainians of all ethnicities speak Russian. In Putin’s paranoid telling, these people are not merely rightful Russian citizens wrongfully separated from the motherland; they are potential victims of an ethnic cleansing campaign by the neo-Nazi Ukrainian government. “The formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us,” as he put it in his 2021 essay. “As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even millions.” There is a small amount of truth in this hyperbole. The Azov Battalion, a neo-Nazi militia, played an important role in fighting Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014; since then, it has been integrated into the Ukrainian national guard. Ukraine’s government has pushed to make Ukrainian the country’s dominant language. Many ethnic Russians — though by no means all — would rather live under Moscow than Kyiv. But there is an ocean of difference between these real concerns and hyperbolic claims that Ukraine is a neo-Nazi state committing genocide against ethnic Russians. In Ukraine’s 2019 national election, a far-right political alliance including Azov’s political arm only received 2 percent of the vote. There is no evidence that Zelensky’s government is engaging in large-scale extermination of Russians; no international human rights group nor credible expert has made such a claim.»
Jonathan, Guyer (27. januar 2022). «How America's NATO expansion obsession plays into the Ukraine crisis». Vox. «Ukraine is a former Soviet republic. It isn’t joining NATO anytime soon, and President Joe Biden has said as much. Still, NATO’s open-door policy — the alliance’s foundational principle that any qualified European country could join — cuts both ways. To the West, it’s a statement of autonomy; to Russia, it’s a threat. The core of the NATO treaty is Article 5, a commitment that an attack on any country is treated as an attack on the entire alliance — meaning any Russian military engagement with a hypothetical NATO-member Ukraine would theoretically bring Moscow into conflict with the US, the UK, France, and the 27 other NATO members.»
washingtonpost.com
Miriam Berger (24. februar 2022). «Putin says he will ‘denazify’ Ukraine. Here’s the history behind that claim.». Washington Post (på engelsk). ISSN0190-8286. Besøkt 5. mars 2022. «The rhetoric around fighting fascism resonates deeply in Russia, which made tremendous sacrifices battling Nazi Germany in World War II. Critics say that Putin is exploiting the trauma of the war and twisting history for his own interests.»
Putin has been redefining ‘sovereignty’ in dangerous ways washingtonpost.com The Washington Post. av Roland Paris. 3. Mars 2022. Sitat:There is more at stake in Russia’s invasion than the survival of Ukraine as an independent, democratic state. This is also a war over the definition of sovereignty itself.
Russia planning potential sabotage operations in Ukraine, U.S. washingtonpost.com P. Sonne, M. Ryan, J. Hudson 14.01.2022 sitat:“The operatives are trained in urban warfare and in using explosives to carry out acts of sabotage against Russia’s own proxy-forces,” the U.S. official said, referring to Russian-backed separatists who have been waging a war against Ukrainian forces in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Mykola, Bielieskov (21. september 2021). «The Russian and Ukrainian Spring 2021 War Scare» (på engelsk). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Arkivert fra originalen 25. november 2021. Besøkt 22. januar 2022. «Ukrainian estimates provided to the OSCE in June 2021 show that only 12,000 Russian forces were removed from the border, and the rest remain in place. As a result, the number of troops remaining is more or less the number of troops that was at the border before the exercise.»
Address by the President of the Russian Federation en.kremlin.ru arkivert av web.archive.org. Tale av presidenten i den Russiske Føderasjon Vladimir Putin, 21 Februar 2022. sitat:It should be noted that Ukraine actually never had stable traditions of real statehood. And, therefore, in 1991 it opted for mindlessly emulating foreign models, which have no relation to history or Ukrainian realities. Political government institutions were readjusted many times to the rapidly growing clans and their self-serving interests, which had nothing to do with the interests of the Ukrainian people. (...) In this regard, I consider it necessary to take a long overdue decision and to immediately recognise the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic. I would like to ask the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to support this decision and then ratify the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with both republics. These two documents will be prepared and signed shortly.
Kozlowska, Hanna. «The Fascists are coming, the Fascists are coming!». Foreign Policy. D.C. Arkivert fra originalen 27. november 2014. Besøkt 28. februar 2022. «Experts agree that the group owes its popularity to Russian propaganda … painting [it] as a powerful neo-Nazi force determined to take over Ukraine. According to a survey by an online database of Russian media sources, Right Sector was the second-most mentioned political group in Russian mass media in 2014…»
Iulian, Chifu (2009). «Russia–Georgia War of August 2008: Ukrainian Approach»(PDF). The Russian Georgian War: A trilateral cognitive institutional approach of the crisis decision-making process. București: Editura Curtea Veche. s. 181. ISBN978-973-1983-19-6. Arkivert(PDF) fra originalen 30. september 2018. Besøkt 21. februar 2016. «Conceptually, Russia sees Ukraine within the sphere of own “privileged interests”; in fact, it means a modernized version of Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”, realized after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The strategic vision of the Kremlin foresees that the sovereignty of Ukraine (and other states that do not belong to Russia’s sphere of “privileged interests”) can not be significantly wider than that of the members of Warsaw Pact prior to the collapse of “the socialist camp”. Correspondingly, the political approach of Russia towards Ukraine is built.»|fornavn2= mangler |etternavn2= i Authors list (hjelp); |fornavn3= mangler |etternavn3= i Authors list (hjelp)
Sindelar, Daisy (23. februar 2014). «Was Yanukovych's Ouster Constitutional?». Radio Free Europe. Arkivert fra originalen 29. juli 2020. Besøkt 25. februar 2014. «A majority of 328 lawmakers of the 450-seat parliament voted on February 22 to remove Yanukovych from power, citing as grounds his abandoning office and the deaths of more than 80 protesters and police in the past chaotic week of violence.»
Polityuk, Pavel; Robinson, Matt (22. februar 2014). Roche, red. «Ukraine parliament removes Yanukovich, who flees Kiev in "coup"». Reuters. Gabriela Baczynska, Marcin Goettig, Peter Graff, Giles Elgood. Kyiv. Arkivert fra originalen 9. juni 2016. Besøkt 12. februar 2022. «Underscoring Ukraine’s regional divisions, leaders of Russian-speaking eastern provinces loyal to Yanukovich voted to challenge anti-Yanukovich steps by the central parliament.»
Ragozin, Leonid. «Annexation of Crimea: A masterclass in political manipulation» (på engelsk). Riga: Al Jazeera. Arkivert fra originalen 28. mai 2020. Besøkt 24. januar 2022. «Putin framed the invasion and eventual annexation of Crimea as an act of salvation rather than a clear violation of international law and turned a revolution which could have marked the end of his rule into a much-needed popularity booster – the wave of chauvinism triggered by the annexation of Crimea sent Putin’s approval ratings to an unbelievable 89 percent, while sidelining the opposition and giving him another five years of relatively trouble-free time at home.»
Vladimir, Putin (12. juli 2021). «Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'». The Kremlin. Arkivert fra originalen 25. januar 2021. «During the recent Direct Line, when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today's situation.»
Timothy D., Snyder (18. januar 2022). «How to think about war in Ukraine». Thinking about... (newsletter). Arkivert fra originalen 19. januar 2022. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Nationality is about the way that people in the present think about the what is to come. If Ukrainians regard themselves as a national community with a future together in a state, then the issue is settled. Historically speaking, the idea that a dictator in another country decides who is a nation and who is not is known as imperialism.»
Andrew, Roth (7. desember 2021). «Putin's Ukraine rhetoric driven by distorted view of neighbour». The Guardian. Moskva. Arkivert fra originalen 7. desember 2021. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Putin has threatened a broader war in Ukraine over Nato enlargement, demanding “legal guarantees” to ensure Ukraine does not join the military alliance or become a kind of “unofficial” member hosting troops or defence infrastructure. But that fear has gone hand-in-hand with chauvinistic bluster that indicates Moscow has a distorted view of modern Ukraine and the goals it wants to achieve there.»
Peter, Dickinson; Melinda, Haring; Danylo, Lubkivsky; Alexander, Motyl; Brian, Whitmore; Oleksiy, Gontsjarenko; Jevhen, Fedtsjenko; Brian, Bonner; Taras, Kuzio (15. juli 2021). «Putin's new Ukraine essay reveals imperial ambitions». Atlantic Council. Arkivert fra originalen 15. juli 2021. Besøkt 25. januar 2021. «Vladimir Putin’s inaccurate and distorted claims are neither new nor surprising. They are just the latest example of gaslighting by the Kremlin leader. This, after all, is the man who famously told US President George W. Bush that Ukraine was not a real country during a widely reported exchange at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. Putin’s claim that the “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia” is grotesquely disingenuous. For Ukraine, partnership with Russia has mainly meant subjugation by Russia.»
Andrew, Wilson (23. desember 2021). «Russia and Ukraine: 'One People' as Putin Claims?». Royal United Services Institute. Arkivert fra originalen 24. januar 2022. Besøkt 25. januar 2022. «Putin’s key trope is that Ukrainians and Russians are ‘one people’, and he calls them both ‘Russian’. He starts with a myth of common origin: ‘Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus', which was the largest state in Europe’ from the 9th–13th centuries AD. Here, Putin uses the right word – Rus’ – not the modern word for ‘Russia’, which is Rossiya, a Hellenism only introduced in the 17th century.»
Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics Dunlop, John B Demokratizatsiya 12.1 2004. web.archive.org fra archive/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1/John Dunlop Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.pdf original sitat:On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions," he warns, "represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics" (348). And he adds that, "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'" (379). However, as we have seen, for Dugin all such "sanitary cordons" are inadmissible. Dugin speculates that three extreme western regions of Ukraine--Volynia, Galicia, and Trans-Carpathia--heavily populated with Uniates and other Catholics, could be permitted to form an independent "Western Ukrainian Federation." But this area must not under any circumstances be permitted to fall under Atlanticist control (382). With the exception of these three western regions, Ukraine, like Belorussia, is seen as an integral part of Eurasia-Russia.
Matthew, Lee; Lorne, Cook (7. januar 2022). «US, NATO rule out halt to expansion, reject Russian demands». AP News (på engelsk). Associated Press. Arkivert fra originalen 24. januar 2022. Besøkt 24. januar 2022. «Their comments amounted to a complete dismissal of a key part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands for easing tensions with Ukraine. Putin wants NATO to halt membership plans for all countries, including Ukraine. The former Soviet republic is unlikely to join the alliance in the foreseeable future, but NATO nations won’t rule it out.»
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On the historical unity of russians and ukrainians Vladimir Putin. 2021. en.wikisource.org attribute www.kremlin.ru. etter original en.kremlin.ru sitat:Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory - from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov - were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and - after the baptism of Rus - the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.
Strobel, Warren P. (7. desember 2021). «CIA Chief Says Intelligence Agencies Haven’t Concluded Russia Will Invade Ukraine». Wall Street Journal (på engelsk). ISSN0099-9660. Besøkt 26. februar 2022. «U. S. intelligence agencies haven’t concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin will invade Ukraine, but he has assembled military forces that “could act in a very sweeping way” and may see an opportunity to move this winter,»
Miriam Berger (24. februar 2022). «Putin says he will ‘denazify’ Ukraine. Here’s the history behind that claim.». Washington Post (på engelsk). ISSN0190-8286. Besøkt 5. mars 2022. «The rhetoric around fighting fascism resonates deeply in Russia, which made tremendous sacrifices battling Nazi Germany in World War II. Critics say that Putin is exploiting the trauma of the war and twisting history for his own interests.»
Fischer, Sebastian; Stark, Holger (2. juli 2015). «Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski on Russia and Ukraine - DER SPIEGEL». Der Spiegel (på engelsk). ISSN2195-1349. Besøkt 12. mars 2022. «We should make it more costly for the Russians to use force. I think it makes sense to give defensive weapons to the Ukrainians, like mortars and anti-tank rockets, for the defense of major cities. If you want to take over a large country, you have to take the big cities. And taking big cities is extremely expensive if people are willing to defend it. (...) Ukraine should be free to choose its political identity, its political philosophy, and institutionalize it by closer links with Europe. But at the same time, Russia should be assured credibly that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. I still think this is the formula for a solution.»
Strobel, Warren P. (7. desember 2021). «CIA Chief Says Intelligence Agencies Haven’t Concluded Russia Will Invade Ukraine». Wall Street Journal (på engelsk). ISSN0099-9660. Besøkt 26. februar 2022. «U. S. intelligence agencies haven’t concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin will invade Ukraine, but he has assembled military forces that “could act in a very sweeping way” and may see an opportunity to move this winter,»
Michael R. Gordon, Bojan Pancevski, Noemie Bisserbe og Marcus Walker (1. april 2022). «Vladimir Putin’s 20-Year March to War in Ukraine—and How the West Mishandled It». The Wall Street Journal. Besøkt 21. juli 2022. «“He then became a fervent nationalist,” said Mr. Heusgen. “His great anxiety was that Ukraine could become economically and politically successful and that the Russians would eventually ask themselves ‘Why are our brothers doing so well, while our situation remains dire?’ ”»
