Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2009). «Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures». Journal of Political Philosophy. 2 (på engelsk). 17: 202–227. ISSN1467-9760. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00325.x. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «“THE truth is out there”: conspiracy theories are all around us. In August 2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act.” In a Scripps‐Howard Poll in 2006, some 36 percent of respondents assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.” Sixteen percent said that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that “the collapse of the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two buildings.”»
Swami, Viren; Voracek, Martin; Stieger, Stefan; Tran, Ulrich S.; Furnham, Adrian (1. desember 2014). «Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories». Cognition. 3. 133: 572–585. ISSN0010-0277. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.»
Wood, Michael J.; Douglas, Karen M.; Sutton, Robbie M. (25. januar 2012). «Dead and Alive». Social Psychological and Personality Science. 6 (på engelsk). 3: 767–773. ISSN1948-5506. doi:10.1177/1948550611434786. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.»
Oliver, J. Eric; Wood, Thomas J. (2014). «Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion». American Journal of Political Science. 4 (på engelsk). 58: 952–966. ISSN1540-5907. doi:10.1111/ajps.12084. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture. … Self‐described liberals score over one point lower, on average, on the ideological conspiracy scale than self‐described conservatives.»
Imhoff, Roland; Zimmer, Felix; Klein, Olivier; António, João H. C.; Babinska, Maria; Bangerter, Adrian; Bilewicz, Michal; Blanuša, Nebojša; Bovan, Kosta (17. januar 2022). «Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries». Nature Human Behaviour (på engelsk): 1–12. ISSN2397-3374. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7. Besøkt 30. januar 2022. «We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.»
Eberl, Jakob-Moritz; Huber, Robert A.; Greussing, Esther (31. mai 2021). «From populism to the “plandemic”: why populists believe in COVID-19 conspiracies». Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. sup1. 31: 272–284. ISSN1745-7289. doi:10.1080/17457289.2021.1924730. Besøkt 17. desember 2021. «[T]he complex nature of the COVID-19 pandemic makes it an ideal playground for populists’ opposition to scientific and political elites. […] We demonstrate a negative correlation of populist attitudes with both trust in political and scientific institutions, which, in return, negatively relate to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. This results in an overall positive relationship of populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs that is independent of political ideology.»
Dyrendal, Asbjørn; NTNU (18. mai 2006). «Kronikk: Sammensvergelser på bestselgerlistene». forskning.no (på norsk). Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Den pensjonerte journalisten Per-Aslak Ertresvåg har oppdaget amerikansk konspirasjonstenkning og svelger teoriene med søkke og snøre. Resultatet selges i tusentall, skriver religionsviteren Asbjørn Dyrendal i denne kronikken om boka "Makten bak makten".»
Ingrid Spilde: «Hvem tror på konspirasjonsteorier?»Arkivert 2014-02-20, hos Wayback Machine., forskning.no, 24. april 2012: «Mennesker som er tilhengere av én konspirasjonsteori har en større tendens til å også tro på andre teorier, selv om det ikke er noen logisk eller tematisk sammenheng mellom dem.»
Imhoff, Roland; Zimmer, Felix; Klein, Olivier; António, João H. C.; Babinska, Maria; Bangerter, Adrian; Bilewicz, Michal; Blanuša, Nebojša; Bovan, Kosta (17. januar 2022). «Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries». Nature Human Behaviour (på engelsk): 1–12. ISSN2397-3374. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7. Besøkt 30. januar 2022. «We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.»
Sandvik, Ragnhild Laukholm (10. november 2019). «Gjør podkast-suksess med konspirasjonsteorier». NRK. Besøkt 10. november 2019. «Sjøl assosierer jeg ordet med tankegodset som ble referert til i Anders Behring Breiviks manifest, Eurabia-teorien om at muslimene tar over Europa etter avtale med regjeringene. Terrorsiktede Philip Manshaus har i avhør forklart at han mener det pågår et folkemord mot den hvite rase.»
««Lå det en sammensvergelse bak valget av Gardermoen?»». www.rb.no (på norsk). 29. august 2014. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Konspirasjonsteorier kan være svært underholdende lesestoff, men påstandene om en sammensvergelse fra lyssky Gardermoen-krefter er ikke av ny dato. Dette er slett ikke den første boka i rekka om Wiborgs skjebne. I 2000 kom journalist Ebbe Ording med «Historien om Gardermoen – et nasjonalt bedrageri», og også Ording mer enn antyder at Wiborg ble tatt av dage for å hindre en storpolitisk skandale.»
Swami, Viren; Voracek, Martin; Stieger, Stefan; Tran, Ulrich S.; Furnham, Adrian (1. desember 2014). «Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories». Cognition. 3. 133: 572–585. ISSN0010-0277. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.»
Ingrid Spilde: «Hvem tror på konspirasjonsteorier?»Arkivert 2014-02-20, hos Wayback Machine., forskning.no, 24. april 2012: «Mennesker som er tilhengere av én konspirasjonsteori har en større tendens til å også tro på andre teorier, selv om det ikke er noen logisk eller tematisk sammenheng mellom dem.»
Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2009). «Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures». Journal of Political Philosophy. 2 (på engelsk). 17: 202–227. ISSN1467-9760. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00325.x. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «“THE truth is out there”: conspiracy theories are all around us. In August 2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act.” In a Scripps‐Howard Poll in 2006, some 36 percent of respondents assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.” Sixteen percent said that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that “the collapse of the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two buildings.”»
Oliver, J. Eric; Wood, Thomas J. (2014). «Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion». American Journal of Political Science. 4 (på engelsk). 58: 952–966. ISSN1540-5907. doi:10.1111/ajps.12084. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture. … Self‐described liberals score over one point lower, on average, on the ideological conspiracy scale than self‐described conservatives.»
Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2009). «Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures». Journal of Political Philosophy. 2 (på engelsk). 17: 202–227. ISSN1467-9760. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00325.x. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «“THE truth is out there”: conspiracy theories are all around us. In August 2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act.” In a Scripps‐Howard Poll in 2006, some 36 percent of respondents assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.” Sixteen percent said that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that “the collapse of the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two buildings.”»
Swami, Viren; Voracek, Martin; Stieger, Stefan; Tran, Ulrich S.; Furnham, Adrian (1. desember 2014). «Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories». Cognition. 3. 133: 572–585. ISSN0010-0277. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.»
Wood, Michael J.; Douglas, Karen M.; Sutton, Robbie M. (25. januar 2012). «Dead and Alive». Social Psychological and Personality Science. 6 (på engelsk). 3: 767–773. ISSN1948-5506. doi:10.1177/1948550611434786. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Conspiracy theories can form a monological belief system: A self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually supportive beliefs. The present research shows that even mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated in endorsement. In Study 1 (n = 137), the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered. In Study 2 (n = 102), the more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S. special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive. Hierarchical regression models showed that mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are positively associated because both are associated with the view that the authorities are engaged in a cover-up (Study 2). The monological nature of conspiracy belief appears to be driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by broader beliefs supporting conspiracy theories in general.»
Oliver, J. Eric; Wood, Thomas J. (2014). «Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion». American Journal of Political Science. 4 (på engelsk). 58: 952–966. ISSN1540-5907. doi:10.1111/ajps.12084. Besøkt 5. november 2019. «Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture. … Self‐described liberals score over one point lower, on average, on the ideological conspiracy scale than self‐described conservatives.»
Imhoff, Roland; Zimmer, Felix; Klein, Olivier; António, João H. C.; Babinska, Maria; Bangerter, Adrian; Bilewicz, Michal; Blanuša, Nebojša; Bovan, Kosta (17. januar 2022). «Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries». Nature Human Behaviour (på engelsk): 1–12. ISSN2397-3374. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7. Besøkt 30. januar 2022. «We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.»
Eberl, Jakob-Moritz; Huber, Robert A.; Greussing, Esther (31. mai 2021). «From populism to the “plandemic”: why populists believe in COVID-19 conspiracies». Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. sup1. 31: 272–284. ISSN1745-7289. doi:10.1080/17457289.2021.1924730. Besøkt 17. desember 2021. «[T]he complex nature of the COVID-19 pandemic makes it an ideal playground for populists’ opposition to scientific and political elites. […] We demonstrate a negative correlation of populist attitudes with both trust in political and scientific institutions, which, in return, negatively relate to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. This results in an overall positive relationship of populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs that is independent of political ideology.»
