Gaza Strip (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Gaza Strip" in English language version.

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  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However, the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border, and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will. Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry. It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
    * Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. p. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza.
    * Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. p. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human rights organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied.
  • Chami, Ralph; Espinoza, Raphael; Montiel, Peter J. (26 January 2021). Macroeconomic Policy in Fragile States. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885309-1. Archived from the original on 11 April 2023. Retrieved 4 August 2021.
  • Joshua Castellino, Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Minority Rights in the Middle East, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Oxford University Press 2013 p.150:'Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza constitute a majority (demographically) with representation by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), a self-governing body run by Fatah in the West Bank, and by Hamas in the Gaza Strip'.
  • Tristan Dunning, Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy: Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Routledge, 2016 p.212:'Since taking sole control of Gaza in June 2007, Hamas has proven itself to be a remarkably resilient and resourceful government entity. The movement has clearly entrenched itself as the hegemonic power in the coastal enclave to such an extent that the International Crisis Group contends that the power struggle in Gaza is no longer between Hamas and Fatah. Rather the main source of confrontation is between Hamas and other more hardline Islamists and salafists. . . Hamas has been far more successful in an administrative sense than the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, despite having access to only a fraction of the resources.'
  • Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza, p.45 Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine. 'Dahlan, who was supported by U.S. officials, has been a bitter enemy of Hamas since his 1996 crackdown on the movement. He consistently refused to accept the Palestinian unity government brokered by the Saudi government in the Mecca Agreement "and made his opposition intolerable to Hamas when he refused to subject the security forces under his command, armed and trained by the U.S., to the legitimate Palestinian unity government as agreed between Hamas and Fatah." Alistair Crooke, a former Middle East adviser to the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, similarly observed, "Dahlan refused to deal with (the independent interior minister appointed to the unity government), and put his troops on the streets in defiance of the interior minister. Hamas felt that they had little option but to take control of security away from forces which were in fact creating insecurity." Hence, Hamas was not attempting a coup against the government or the Fatah organization as a whole but also against Dahlan's U.S.-funded militia (and individual Fatah loyalists it blamed for the murder of Hamas members).'
  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border. and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will.
    Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Troops from the Israeli Defence Force regularly enter pans of the territory and/or deploy missile attacks, drones and sonic bombs into Gaza. Israel has declared a no-go buffer zone that stretches deep into Gaza: if Gazans enter this zone they are shot on sight. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry.
    It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.

    *Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. p. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza.
    *Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. p. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 8 November 2016. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human right organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied.
  • Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Princeton University Press, 2013 p.41:'Hamas's democratic victory, however, was short-lived . .followed as it was in June 2006 by an Israeli and US-led international political and economic boycott of the new Palestinian government. The boycott amounted to a form of collective punishment against the entire Palestinian population and, to my knowledge, was the first time in the history of the conflict that the international community imposed sanctions on the occupied rather than the occupier.'
  • Doug Suisman, Steven Simon, Glenn Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, Michael Schoenbaum (eds.) The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Rand Corporation, 2007 p.79
  • Norman G. Finkelstein (2018). Gaza. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1.
  • Sara M. Roy (2016). The Gaza Strip. Institute for Palestine Studies USA, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0-88728-321-5.
  • James Kraska, 'Rule Selection in the Case of Israel's Blockade of Gaza:Law of Naval Warfare or Law of Sea?,' in M.N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu, Tim McCormack (eds.,) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Springer Science & Business Media, 2011 pp.367–395, p.387
  • Filiu 2014, p. 71-72. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Filiu 2014, p. 76. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Filiu 2014, p. 96. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Filiu 2014, p. 97. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Filiu 2014, p. 99-100. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Filiu 2014, p. 105. Filiu, Jean-Pierre (2014). Gaza: A History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-190-20191-3. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 2 November 2020.
  • Elisha Efrat, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of Occupation and Disengagement, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Routledge, 2006 pp.74–75.
  • Tom Segev 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East, Archived 2 November 2022 at the Wayback Machine Henry Holt and Company, 2007 p.532
  • Lockman; Beinin (1989), p. 5.
  • Edward Said (1989). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation. South End Press. pp. 5–22. ISBN 978-0-89608-363-9.
  • Ruth Margolies Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas, Lexington Books, 2004 p.xi.
  • Byman 2011, p. 114. Byman, Daniel (15 June 2011). A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press. pp. 114–. ISBN 978-0-19-983045-9. Archived from the original on 18 November 2021. Retrieved 29 October 2020.
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  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.

cia.gov

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  • "CASE OF CHIRAGOV AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA". European Court of Human Rights. 16 June 2015. Retrieved 7 January 2024. Military occupation is considered to exist in a territory, or part of a territory, if the following elements can be demonstrated: the presence of foreign troops, which are in a position to exercise effective control without the consent of the sovereign. According to widespread expert opinion, physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement of occupation, that is, occupation is not conceivable without "boots on the ground", therefore forces exercising naval or air control through a naval or air blockade do not suffice.

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  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However, the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border, and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will. Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry. It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
    * Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. p. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza.
    * Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. p. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human rights organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied.
  • Cuyckens, Hanne (1 October 2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1 – via Springer Link.
  • Cuyckens, Hanne (2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1. ISSN 0165-070X.
  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border. and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will.
    Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Troops from the Israeli Defence Force regularly enter pans of the territory and/or deploy missile attacks, drones and sonic bombs into Gaza. Israel has declared a no-go buffer zone that stretches deep into Gaza: if Gazans enter this zone they are shot on sight. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry.
    It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.

    *Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. p. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza.
    *Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. p. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 8 November 2016. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human right organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied.
  • Arnon, Arie (Autumn 2007). "Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967–2007" (PDF). Middle East Journal. 61 (4): 575. doi:10.3751/61.4.11. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 June 2013.
  • Filiu, Jean-Pierre (1 November 2014). "The Twelve Wars on Gaza" (PDF). Journal of Palestine Studies. 44 (1): 52–60. doi:10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.52.
  • Rynhold, Jonathan; Waxman, Dov (2008). "Ideological Change and Israel's Disengagement from Gaza". Political Science Quarterly. 123 (1): 11–37. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2008.tb00615.x. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 20202970.
  • Lustick, Ian S. (1993). Brynen, Rex; Hiltermann, Joost R.; Hudson, Michael C.; Hunter, F. Robert; Lockman, Zachary; Beinin, Joel; McDowall, David; Nassar, Jamal R.; Heacock, Roger (eds.). "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories". World Politics. 45 (4): 560–594. doi:10.2307/2950709. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2950709. S2CID 147140028.
  • Cohen, Samy (2010). "Botched Engagement in the Intifada". Israel's Asymmetric Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 73–91. doi:10.1057/9780230112971_6. ISBN 978-1-349-28896-0."The al-Aqsa Intifada ushered in an era with a new brand of violence.1 It began with a popular uprising following Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount on September 28, 2000. But unlike the first Intifada, which was basically a civil uprising against the symbols of an occupation that has lasted since June 1967, the second Intifada very quickly lapsed into an armed struggle between Palestinian activists and the Israeli armed forces. Almost from the very start, armed men took to hiding among crowds of Palestinians, using them as cover to shoot from. The IDF retaliated forcefully, each time causing several casualties."
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
  • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (1 June 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.
  • Multiple sources:
    • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a Stale nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However, the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border. and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will.
      Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Troops from the Israeli Defence Force regularly enter pans of the territory and/or deploy missile attacks, drones and sonic bombs into Gaza. Israel has declared a no-go buffer zone that stretches deep into Gaza: if Gazans enter this zone they are shot on sight. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry.
      It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
    • Burton, Guy (2012). "Hamas and its Vision of Development". Third World Quarterly. 33 (3): 525–540. doi:10.1080/01436597.2012.657491. ISSN 0143-6597. JSTOR 41507185. S2CID 144037453. The joint Hamas-Fatah government did not last long. Within months the two sides were fighting again, eventually leading to a political split of the occupied territory, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas establishing a virtual one-party state in Gaza
    • Cuyckens, Hanne (2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1.
    • Shany, Yuval (December 2005). "Faraway, so close: the legal status of Gaza after Israel's disengagement". Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 8: 369–383. doi:10.1017/S1389135905003697. ProQuest 196888152.

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  • "How powerful is Hamas?". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 17 October 2023. In 2006, a year after Israel withdrew from Gaza, Hamas won a majority of seats in a Palestinian election and later formed a new unity government with Fatah, its nationalist rival. In June 2007, after a brief civil war, it assumed sole control of Gaza, leaving Fatah to run the Palestinian Authority (pa) in the West Bank. In response Israel and Egypt imposed a suffocating blockade on the coastal strip in 2007, strangling its economy and in effect confining its people in an open-air prison. There have been no elections since. Hamas has run Gaza as an oppressive one-party state, leaving some Palestinians there disenchanted with its leadership. Nevertheless, Palestinians widely consider it more competent than the ailing, corrupt pa.

erudit.org

  • Kober, Avi (2007). "Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada:: The Quest for Effectiveness". Journal of Conflict Studies. 27 (1): 94–114. ISSN 1198-8614. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government.

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  • Beaule, Victoria; Ferris, Layla (5 January 2024). "Visual analysis shows 60% of Gaza now under evacuation orders". ABC News. Archived from the original on 2 April 2024. Retrieved 8 April 2024.
  • Hutchinson, Bill (22 November 2023). "Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments". ABC News. Retrieved 30 November 2023.
  • "'Hell on earth': Israel unrest spotlights dire conditions in Gaza". abcnews. 9 October 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2023.

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  • Israel ended its occupation of the Gaza Strip when it withdrew from Gaza in 2005, so why does Hamas continue to fire rockets into Israel? Archived 14 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. FAQ on the official Hamas website. Accessed November 2015. "This is one of the myths perpetuated by Israel's propaganda ... Israel re-deployed its military occupation forces and evacuated its illegal settlers outside the population centers in Gaza. BUT Israel effectively controls the sea, land and air spaces and border crossings that link the Gaza Strip to the outside world. According to the UN and human rights organizations, Israel still maintains its occupation of the Gaza Strip and subjects the 1.8 million Palestinians in this tiny strip to a horrendous siege and blockade that constitute a war crime under international law." Here, Hamas cites the view of the international community.

heinonline.org

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  • Philip Slater, ‘A Message to Israel: Time to Stop Playing the Victim Role Archived 24 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine,’ Huffington Post, 25 May 2011:'Calling Hamas the 'aggressor' is undignified. The Gaza strip is little more than a large Israeli concentration camp, in which Palestinians are attacked at will, starved of food, fuel, energy—even deprived of hospital supplies. They cannot come and go freely, and have to build tunnels to smuggle in the necessities of life.'

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  • Schachter, J. (2010). The End of the Second Intifada? Archived 30 September 2021 at the Wayback Machine. Strategic Assessment, 13(3), 63–70. "This article attempts to identify the end of the second intifada by focusing on the incidence of suicide bombings, arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence."

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  • The Hamas Enterprise and the Talibanization of Gaza, Khaled Al-Hroub, Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), 11 October 2010. Translation Archived 24 October 2010 at the Wayback Machine by the Middle East Research Institute, 22 October 2010.

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  • Samira Shackle (14 October 2013). "Israel tightens its blockade of Gaza for 'security reasons'". Middle East Monitor. Archived from the original on 14 October 2013.:'Yet critics point out that it is not just military supplies that cannot enter Gaza, but basic construction materials, medical supplies, and food stuffs. The issue came to international attention in 2010, when a flotilla of activists attempted to break the blockade and carry humanitarian aid into Gaza. Nine were killed when the Israeli navy entered the flotilla. The incident shone a spotlight onto the blockade of Gaza. At one stage, prohibited materials included coriander, ginger, nutmeg and newspapers. A relaxation of the rules in June 2009 meant that processed hummus was allowed in, but not hummus with extras such as pine nuts or mushrooms. One of the biggest issues has been building materials. The strict restrictions on goods going into Gaza meant that it was impossible to start reconstruction work; it was therefore impossible to repair shattered windows to keep out the winter rain.'
  • Israeli military admits destroying Gaza crops on border Archived 5 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine. MEMO, 31 December 2015

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  • Lustick, Ian S. (1993). Brynen, Rex; Hiltermann, Joost R.; Hudson, Michael C.; Hunter, F. Robert; Lockman, Zachary; Beinin, Joel; McDowall, David; Nassar, Jamal R.; Heacock, Roger (eds.). "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories". World Politics. 45 (4): 560–594. doi:10.2307/2950709. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2950709. S2CID 147140028.
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
  • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (1 June 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.
  • Burton, Guy (2012). "Hamas and its Vision of Development". Third World Quarterly. 33 (3): 525–540. doi:10.1080/01436597.2012.657491. ISSN 0143-6597. JSTOR 41507185. S2CID 144037453. The joint Hamas-Fatah government did not last long. Within months the two sides were fighting again, eventually leading to a political split of the occupied territory, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas establishing a virtual one-party state in Gaza

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  • 'Israel Has Been Bitten by a Bat,' Archived 3 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine Truthdig 18 July 2014. Lawrence Weschler:'I'm tired, for example, of hearing about how vital and cosmopolitan and democratic are the streets and cafes and nightclubs of Tel Aviv. For the fact is that one simply can't sustain such cosmopolitan vitality 40 miles from a prison camp containing close to two million people: It's a contradiction in terms.'

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  • United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Geneva: UNCTAD, September 2015), p. 8, online at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdb62d3_en.pdf .

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  • David Rose, 'The Gaza Bombshell,' Archived 28 April 2018 at the Wayback Machine Vanity Fair April, 2008. 'The plan was for forces led by Dahlan, and armed with new weapons supplied at America's behest, to give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power. . But the secret plan backfired, resulting in a further setback for American foreign policy under Bush. Instead of driving its enemies out of power, the U.S.-backed Fatah fighters inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza.'

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  • "Opinion and Judgment of Military Tribunal V". Worldcourts. 19 February 1948. Retrieved 7 January 2024. The term invasion implies a military operation while an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the exclusion of the established government. This presupposes the destruction of organized resistance and the establishment of an administration to preserve law and order. To the extent that the occupant's control is maintained and that of the civil government eliminated, the area will be said to be occupied.

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  • "Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV)". Avalon Project. 18 October 1907. Retrieved 7 January 2024. Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

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