Gaza Strip (English Wikipedia)

Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "Gaza Strip" in English language version.

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  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
  • Shany, Yuval (19 October 2007). "FARAWAY, SO CLOSE: THE LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA AFTER ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT". Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 8: 369–383. doi:10.1017/S1389135905003697 (inactive 1 November 2024). ISSN 1574-096X. Archived from the original on 26 April 2024. Retrieved 2 July 2024.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link)

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  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However, the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border, and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will. Israel continues to control all of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry. It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
    * Scobbie, Iain (2012). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.). International Law and the Classification of Conflicts. Oxford University Press. p. 295. ISBN 978-0-19-965775-9. Even after the accession to power of Hamas, Israel's claim that it no longer occupies Gaza has not been accepted by UN bodies, most States, nor the majority of academic commentators because of its exclusive control of its border with Gaza and crossing points including the effective control it exerted over the Rafah crossing until at least May 2011, its control of Gaza's maritime zones and airspace which constitute what Aronson terms the 'security envelope' around Gaza, as well as its ability to intervene forcibly at will in Gaza.
    * Gawerc, Michelle (2012). Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships. Lexington Books. p. 44. ISBN 9780739166109. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 8 November 2016. While Israel withdrew from the immediate territory, it remained in control of all access to and from Gaza through the border crossings, as well as through the coastline and the airspace. In addition, Gaza was dependent upon Israel for water, electricity sewage communication networks and for its trade (Gisha 2007. Dowty 2008). In other words, while Israel maintained that its occupation of Gaza ended with its unilateral disengagement Palestinians – as well as many human rights organizations and international bodies – argued that Gaza was by all intents and purposes still occupied.
  • Cuyckens, Hanne (1 October 2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1. ISSN 0165-070X.
  • Cuyckens, Hanne (2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1. ISSN 0165-070X.
  • Gross, Aeyal (12 October 2024). "The Functional Approach as Lex Lata". Verfassungsblog. doi:10.59704/133f2ff82e19d7f9. Archived from the original on 1 December 2024. Retrieved 12 October 2024 – via verfassungsblog.de.
  • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a State nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border. and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will.
    Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Troops from the Israeli Defence Force regularly enter pans of the territory and/or deploy missile attacks, drones and sonic bombs into Gaza. Israel has declared a no-go buffer zone that stretches deep into Gaza: if Gazans enter this zone they are shot on sight. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry.
    It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
  • Arnon, Arie (Autumn 2007). "Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967–2007" (PDF). Middle East Journal. 61 (4): 575. doi:10.3751/61.4.11. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 June 2013.
  • Filiu, Jean-Pierre (1 November 2014). "The Twelve Wars on Gaza" (PDF). Journal of Palestine Studies. 44 (1): 52–60. doi:10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.52. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 April 2024. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  • Rynhold, Jonathan; Waxman, Dov (2008). "Ideological Change and Israel's Disengagement from Gaza". Political Science Quarterly. 123 (1): 11–37. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2008.tb00615.x. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 20202970. Archived from the original on 17 October 2023. Retrieved 21 January 2024.
  • Lustick, Ian S. (1993). Brynen, Rex; Hiltermann, Joost R.; Hudson, Michael C.; Hunter, F. Robert; Lockman, Zachary; Beinin, Joel; McDowall, David; Nassar, Jamal R.; Heacock, Roger (eds.). "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories". World Politics. 45 (4): 560–594. doi:10.2307/2950709. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2950709. S2CID 147140028.
  • Cohen, Samy (2010). "Botched Engagement in the Intifada". Israel's Asymmetric Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 73–91. doi:10.1057/9780230112971_6. ISBN 978-1-349-28896-0."The al-Aqsa Intifada ushered in an era with a new brand of violence.1 It began with a popular uprising following Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount on September 28, 2000. But unlike the first Intifada, which was basically a civil uprising against the symbols of an occupation that has lasted since June 1967, the second Intifada very quickly lapsed into an armed struggle between Palestinian activists and the Israeli armed forces. Almost from the very start, armed men took to hiding among crowds of Palestinians, using them as cover to shoot from. The IDF retaliated forcefully, each time causing several casualties."
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
    • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (1 June 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.
    • Multiple sources:
      • Sanger, Andrew (2011). "The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla". In M.N. Schmitt; Louise Arimatsu; Tim McCormack (eds.). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. Vol. 13. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 429. doi:10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_14. ISBN 978-90-6704-811-8. Israel claims it no longer occupies the Gaza Strip, maintaining that it is neither a Stale nor a territory occupied or controlled by Israel, but rather it has 'sui generis' status. Pursuant to the Disengagement Plan, Israel dismantled all military institutions and settlements in Gaza and there is no longer a permanent Israeli military or civilian presence in the territory. However, the Plan also provided that Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip as well as maintaining an Israeli military presence on the Egyptian-Gaza border. and reserving the right to reenter Gaza at will.
        Israel continues to control six of Gaza's seven land crossings, its maritime borders and airspace and the movement of goods and persons in and out of the territory. Egypt controls one of Gaza's land crossings. Troops from the Israeli Defence Force regularly enter pans of the territory and/or deploy missile attacks, drones and sonic bombs into Gaza. Israel has declared a no-go buffer zone that stretches deep into Gaza: if Gazans enter this zone they are shot on sight. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for water, electricity, telecommunications and other utilities, currency, issuing IDs, and permits to enter and leave the territory. Israel also has sole control of the Palestinian Population Registry through which the Israeli Army regulates who is classified as a Palestinian and who is a Gazan or West Banker. Since 2000 aside from a limited number of exceptions Israel has refused to add people to the Palestinian Population Registry.
        It is this direct external control over Gaza and indirect control over life within Gaza that has led the United Nations, the UN General Assembly, the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza, International human rights organisations, US Government websites, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and a significant number of legal commentators, to reject the argument that Gaza is no longer occupied.
      • Cuyckens, Hanne (2016). "Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?". Netherlands International Law Review. 63 (3): 275–295. doi:10.1007/s40802-016-0070-1.
      • Shany, Yuval (19 October 2007). "FARAWAY, SO CLOSE: THE LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA AFTER ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT". Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 8: 369–383. doi:10.1017/S1389135905003697 (inactive 1 November 2024). ISSN 1574-096X. Archived from the original on 26 April 2024. Retrieved 2 July 2024.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link)

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  • Kober, Avi (2007). "Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada:: The Quest for Effectiveness". Journal of Conflict Studies. 27 (1): 94–114. ISSN 1198-8614. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government.

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  • Beaule, Victoria; Ferris, Layla (5 January 2024). "Visual analysis shows 60% of Gaza now under evacuation orders". ABC News. Archived from the original on 2 April 2024. Retrieved 8 April 2024.
  • Hutchinson, Bill (22 November 2023). "Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments". ABC News. Archived from the original on 16 October 2023. Retrieved 30 November 2023.

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  • Philip Slater, ‘A Message to Israel: Time to Stop Playing the Victim Role Archived 24 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine,’ Huffington Post, 25 May 2011:'Calling Hamas the 'aggressor' is undignified. The Gaza strip is little more than a large Israeli concentration camp, in which Palestinians are attacked at will, starved of food, fuel, energy—even deprived of hospital supplies. They cannot come and go freely, and have to build tunnels to smuggle in the necessities of life.'

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  • The Hamas Enterprise and the Talibanization of Gaza, Khaled Al-Hroub, Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), 11 October 2010. Translation Archived 24 October 2010 at the Wayback Machine by the Middle East Research Institute, 22 October 2010.

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  • Samira Shackle (14 October 2013). "Israel tightens its blockade of Gaza for 'security reasons'". Middle East Monitor. Archived from the original on 14 October 2013.:'Yet critics point out that it is not just military supplies that cannot enter Gaza, but basic construction materials, medical supplies, and food stuffs. The issue came to international attention in 2010, when a flotilla of activists attempted to break the blockade and carry humanitarian aid into Gaza. Nine were killed when the Israeli navy entered the flotilla. The incident shone a spotlight onto the blockade of Gaza. At one stage, prohibited materials included coriander, ginger, nutmeg and newspapers. A relaxation of the rules in June 2009 meant that processed hummus was allowed in, but not hummus with extras such as pine nuts or mushrooms. One of the biggest issues has been building materials. The strict restrictions on goods going into Gaza meant that it was impossible to start reconstruction work; it was therefore impossible to repair shattered windows to keep out the winter rain.'
  • Israeli military admits destroying Gaza crops on border Archived 5 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine. MEMO, 31 December 2015

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  • Lustick, Ian S. (1993). Brynen, Rex; Hiltermann, Joost R.; Hudson, Michael C.; Hunter, F. Robert; Lockman, Zachary; Beinin, Joel; McDowall, David; Nassar, Jamal R.; Heacock, Roger (eds.). "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories". World Politics. 45 (4): 560–594. doi:10.2307/2950709. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2950709. S2CID 147140028.
  • Matta, Nada; Rojas, René (2016). "The Second Intifada: A Dual Strategy Arena". European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 57 (1): 66. doi:10.1017/S0003975616000035. ISSN 0003-9756. S2CID 146939293. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 5 April 2022. Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
    • Brym, R. J.; Araj, B. (1 June 2006). "Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada". Social Forces. 84 (4): 1969. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0081. ISSN 0037-7732. S2CID 146180585. In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.

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