Analysis of information sources in references of the Wikipedia article "United States involvement in regime change" in English language version.
Sihanouk's dismissal (which followed constitutional forms, rather than a blatant military coup d'état) immediately produced much speculation as to its causes. ... most others see at least some American involvement.
Prince Sihanouk has long claimed that the American CIA 'masterminded' the coup against him. ... There is in fact no evidence of CIA involvement in the 1970 events, but a good deal of evidence points to a role played by sections of the US military intelligence establishment and the Army Special Forces. ... While [Samuel R.] Thornton's allegation that 'the highest level' of the US government was party to the coup plans remains uncorroborated, it is clear that Lon Nol carried out the coup with at least a legitimate expectation of significant US support.
During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.
Predictably, this version of events has proven highly controversial ... In fact, most of the available evidence indicates that it was the Kurd himself [Za'im] who took the initiative in plotting his coup.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
For example, the author does not believe that the Husni Zaim coup of 1949 was primarily the work of the cia, despite such claims by cia operatives; he does, however, provide considerable detail on the plotting against Syria by Turkey, Iraq, and the United States in 1957.
While scholars and journalists have long suspected that the CIA was involved in the 1963 coup, as yet, there is very little archival analysis of the question. The most comprehensive study put forward thus far finds "mounting evidence of U.S. involvement" but ultimately runs up against the problem of available documentation.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
In a campaign designed to oust Maduro from power, the United States has encouraged foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations to recognize Guaidó and has imposed a series of targeted economic sanctions to weaken Maduro's regime. ... the Trump administration has consistently exempted humanitarian assistance and insisted that the sanctions 'do not target the innocent people of Venezuela. Despite this assertion, Venezuela's economic situation has worsened severely under the prolonged sanctions, and the humanitarian crisis remains devastating.
For example, the author does not believe that the Husni Zaim coup of 1949 was primarily the work of the cia, despite such claims by cia operatives; he does, however, provide considerable detail on the plotting against Syria by Turkey, Iraq, and the United States in 1957.
Despite continued speculation about the CIA's role in a 1949 coup to install a military government in Syria, the ouster of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh is the earliest coup of the Cold War that the U.S. government has acknowledged.
Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. ... we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam ...Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. ISBN 9781594200076.
By 1984, [bin Laden] was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar – the MAK – which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war. What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan's state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA's primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow's occupation [...] So bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the 'reliable' partners of the CIA in its war against Moscow.
We urge President Obama to state unequivocally, as he did in the case of (Libyan leader Moammar) Gadhafi and Egyptian president Hosni) Mubarak — that it is time for Assad to go.
According to Simpson, these previously unseen cables, telegrams, letters, and reports "contain damning details that the U.S. was willfully and gleefully pushing for the mass murder of innocent people."
And some of the same warriors who fought the Soviets with the C.I.A.'s help are now fighting under Mr. bin Laden's banner.
My view is we don't want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power," said President George H. W. Bush
The Iraqi government at the time claimed that the bombs, including one it said exploded in a movie theater, resulted in many civilian casualties ... One former Central Intelligence Agency officer who was based in the region, Robert Baer, recalled that a bombing during that period 'blew up a school bus; school children were killed.' Mr. Baer ... said he did not recall which resistance group might have set off that bomb. Other former intelligence officials said Dr. Allawi's organization was the only resistance group involved in bombings and sabotage at that time. But one former senior intelligence official recalled that 'bombs were going off to no great effect.' 'I don't recall very much killing of anyone,' the official said.
What unites these seemingly disparate threads is a contradiction at the core of Trump administration's Venezuela policy: the imposition of crippling economic sanctions aimed at the implosion of the Nicolás Maduro regime, while doing far too little to assist the region in absorbing the millions of refugees resulting from the country's economic collapse. The Trump administration's hostility to immigration and to foreign aid spending overall clashes openly with the effort to procure regime change via the economic strangulation of the Maduro government.
While scholars and journalists have long suspected that the CIA was involved in the 1963 coup, as yet, there is very little archival analysis of the question. The most comprehensive study put forward thus far finds "mounting evidence of U.S. involvement" but ultimately runs up against the problem of available documentation.
a US Embassy official in Jakarta, Robert Martens, had supplied the Indonesian Army with lists containing the names of thousands of PKI officials in the months after the alleged coup attempt. According to the journalist Kathy Kadane, "As many as 5,000 names were furnished over a period of months to the Army there, and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had been killed or captured." Despite Martens later denials of any such intent, these actions almost certainly aided in the death or detention of many innocent people. They also sent a powerful message that the US government agreed with and supported the army's campaign against the PKI, even as that campaign took its terrible toll in human lives.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
One study from 1961 or 1962 included a section on "the capability of the U.S. Government to provide support to friendly groups, not in power, who are seeking the violent overthrow of a communist dominated and supported government." The study went on to discuss providing "covert assistance" to such groups and advised that, "Pinpointing of enemy concentrations and hideouts can permit effective use of 'Hunter‐Killer' teams." Given the Embassy's concern with the immediate suppression of Baghdad's sarifa population, it seems likely that American intelligence services would be interested in providing support to the Ba'thist "'Hunter‐Killer' teams."
Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia. This was efficacious terror, an essential building block of the neoliberal policies that the West would attempt to impose on Indonesia after Sukarno's ouster.
one fighter crouched in the dirt behind the frightened captive and sodomised him with a bayonet
The new telegrams confirm the US actively encouraged and facilitated genocide in Indonesia to pursue its own political interests in the region, while propagating an explanation of the killings it knew to be untrue.
But the secret plan backfired, resulting in a further setback for American foreign policy under Bush. Instead of driving its enemies out of power, the U.S.-backed Fatah fighters inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza.
During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.
By 1984, [bin Laden] was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar – the MAK – which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war. What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan's state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA's primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow's occupation [...] So bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the 'reliable' partners of the CIA in its war against Moscow.
And some of the same warriors who fought the Soviets with the C.I.A.'s help are now fighting under Mr. bin Laden's banner.
My view is we don't want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power," said President George H. W. Bush
What unites these seemingly disparate threads is a contradiction at the core of Trump administration's Venezuela policy: the imposition of crippling economic sanctions aimed at the implosion of the Nicolás Maduro regime, while doing far too little to assist the region in absorbing the millions of refugees resulting from the country's economic collapse. The Trump administration's hostility to immigration and to foreign aid spending overall clashes openly with the effort to procure regime change via the economic strangulation of the Maduro government.
While scholars and journalists have long suspected that the CIA was involved in the 1963 coup, as yet, there is very little archival analysis of the question. The most comprehensive study put forward thus far finds "mounting evidence of U.S. involvement" but ultimately runs up against the problem of available documentation.
Archival sources on the U.S. relationship with this regime are highly restricted. Many records of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations and the Department of Defense from this period remain classified, and some declassified records have not been transferred to the National Archives or cataloged.
[Kennedy] Administration officials viewed the Iraqi Ba'th Party in 1963 as an agent of counterinsurgency directed against Iraqi communists, and they cultivated supportive relationships with Ba'thist officials, police commanders, and members of the Ba'th Party militia. The American relationship with militia members and senior police commanders had begun even before the February coup, and Ba'thist police commanders involved in the coup had been trained in the United States.
What unites these seemingly disparate threads is a contradiction at the core of Trump administration's Venezuela policy: the imposition of crippling economic sanctions aimed at the implosion of the Nicolás Maduro regime, while doing far too little to assist the region in absorbing the millions of refugees resulting from the country's economic collapse. The Trump administration's hostility to immigration and to foreign aid spending overall clashes openly with the effort to procure regime change via the economic strangulation of the Maduro government.
George H. W. Bush: Everybody felt that Saddam Hussein could not stay in office—certainly not stay in office as long as he's stayed in office. I miscalculated—I thought he'd be gone. But I wasn't alone! People in the Arab world felt, with unanimity, that he would be out of there. I think all observers felt that (event occurs at 45:14).
